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Keynote Address at the Annual Nova Law Review Banquet,
March 20, 1999: Civility and Professionalism in
Legal Advocacy
Honorable Gary M. Farmer
I am greatly honored to have been asked to be the speaker at your Law
Review banquet. Nova Law School is a great asset to our community. Its
graduates-especially its law review graduates--can justly take their place
with any in the country. Many of the judges of my court have found their
law clerks from the ranks of Nova Law Review graduates, myself included.
My first two clerks were from this law school and I rank them among the
best I have had. And so, I congratulate all of you for your achievement.
You are indeed a credit to your school.
I must say, your invitation brought to mind a similar occasion now more
than a quarter of a century ago. I was privileged to be the managing editor of
the University of Toledo Law Review. And, like you, we threw an annual
banquet to celebrate the rites of spring and imminent graduation. The
banquet was obviously held in Toledo rather than the more hospitable
environs of Fort Lauderdale in the spring. Still, after three intense years of
study and labor, it was a moment to reflect on what we had done and, more
importantly to all of us, where we were going. As it happens our featured
speaker that night was also a judge on the state intermediate court of appeal,
the Sixth District of Ohio. After the ritual opening remarks and obligatory
joke, he turned to a subject that later fell from favor for a long time in the
legal profession but which has since been resurrected today and has become,
as one of my colleagues calls it, "the new religion." The subject was of
course "Civility and Professionalism" and I should like to take it up briefly
tonight, for it made a lasting impression on me.
It is fitting that I raise this subject with you even though you have yet to
sit for the Bar exam, much less take the oath of a lawyer. You have not yet
been ensnared by the seductions of legal practice. Each of you is, in a
professional ethical sense, a tabula rasa. Each of you is free from any
compromises with the lawyers oath. What I hope to do now is plant little
seeds in you of a determined civility before you have responded to the
temptation to become like some media lawyers - to begin your careers with
a mindset to do something about the low esteem into which our profession
has slipped.
* District Judge, State of Florida Court of Appeal Fourth District, 1991 to present;
B.A., Florida Atlantic University, 1970; J.D., University of Toledo, 1973.
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I recently had occasion to participate in a seminar on civility and
professionalism among lawyers sponsored by the St. Thomas More Society.
For those who do not know the organization, it is a group of Catholic
lawyers who are interested in perpetuating the principled ethics of the
Chancellor of England under Henry VIII. As a child of the Catholic church,
educated by the wonderful Ursuline nuns in Toledo, where I grew up in the
parish of Rosary Cathedral, I identified with the group and its ideals and
thought it altogether fitting that the Society should sponsor a seminar on the
subject.
Roughly at the same time, I had a similar experience with another
group, called the Inns of Court. If you haven't heard about the Inns, I urge
you to look into it. Like the St. Thomas More Society, it is dedicated to
advancing professionalism and ethics among lawyers. I participated in a
pupilage group of the Inn of Court in Fort Lauderdale. In our presentation
last November, we took scenes from Robert Bolt's magnificent play about
More, "A Man For All Seasons," and contrasted them with skits representing
events taken from the recent impeachment crisis. And so it can be said that
when I accepted your kind invitation to speak tonight, civility and
professionalism and Thomas More had all come together as one in my mind.
Today our profession is under attack everywhere. We are almost
universally portrayed in the media as obnoxious and unprincipled. We are
seen to plead our causes with vulgar hyperbole, to continuously orate at the
top of our voice, and usually with abrasive personal attacks. We are shown
to do anything to get clients and win cases. We are routinely portrayed as
lying to courts, clients, and other lawyers, as having little interest in justice
or the needs of society as a whole. We are shown as immersed in the
attitude that our only goal, our only concern, is money.
One group of judges has written thus on the current incivility among
lawyers:
Today our talk is coarse and rude, our entertainment is vulgar and
violent, our music is hard and loud, our institutions are weakened,
our values are superficial, egoism has replaced altruism and
cynicism pervades. Amid these surroundings none should be
surprised that the courtroom is less tranquil. Cardozo reminds us
that 'judges are never free from the feelings of the times.'
The print and electronic media weekly carry pieces on the decline of
lawyers, and the low esteem in which they are held by the public as
compared to other professions. There is a perception that the public thrills at
stories in which a lawyer is ridiculed, defeated or disgraced. In fact, is it just
me, or do many of you have the impression from the media that legal
advocacy is synonymous with incivility?
[Vol. 23:809
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Television today is filled with lawyers as talking heads. If they aren't
talking about the President and the impeachment or civil cases, they are
debating whatever current trial is the obsession of the media. It seems that
every subject inevitably comes down to its legal ramifications. Even some
sports pages now have a section devoted only to "jurisprudence," as one
daily calls it.
A large number of these lawyers in the media argue their position with
striking incivility. They interrupt their opposing member; they shout over
contrary views; they use personal attacks on those with whom they disagree;
they treat every misstatement as intentional lying, as purposeful fraud; and
they use incessant overstatement and hyperbole to characterize their own
positions. Is it any wonder that many nonlawyers have come to believe that
legal advocacy is what they see constantly on television.
Sadly, much of this abusive advocacy is repeated in our courtrooms by
lawyers who seem to draw an inference of permissibility from media
pervasiveness. Much of the legal argument I see and read in appellate cases
is filled with the counterparts of all of these media sins. Many lawyers
habitually interrupt their opposition; they characterize the slightest
misstatement as a lie; they fill their argument with all manner of personal
attacks on their opposing lawyers and parties; and they seem unable to say
much without overstatement. Yet none of this is necessary to be an effective
advocate, and it is usually counterproductive in our court.
Yet some in the bar denigrate these attacks on lawyers. Many lawyers
and bar leaders dismiss them as the censure of the angry and uninformed. I
recently read a piece by the head of a local bar association ridiculing the
frequent use of the well-known quote from Shakespeare, "The first thing we
do, let's kill all the lawyers" as an attack on the legal profession. The point
was made, and rightly so, that in context the passage is in praise of lawyers
as fundamental protectors of the rights of people. Indeed we are. But it is
not enough to indicate the infelicity of that particular quote as a basis to
mount an attack on lawyers. We must instead ask ourselves what lawyers
and the organized bar should do about the problem of our image.
An essential basis for my message today is that these attacks have a
foundation in truth and that we should strive to eliminate that basis by
reforming our own conduct. To my mind, a good place to begin is the
elimination of the notion-which we see early in the law schools today and
fostered by the media itself-that the only purpose of lawyering is winning:
prevailing in litigation, prevailing in legal advocacy, prevailing in debate on
subjects in which law is an element, prevailing in statements of opinion
about current events, dominating any discussion or any proceeding in any
forum-just, simply winning.
I think we should condemn the win-at-all-cost mentality in our
profession. While our code of professional conduct demands that we
1999]
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represent our clients zealously, the duty of zeal is not a blanket excuse from
the many restraints on our conduct. No one would seriously contend for
example, that the duty of zeal allows a lawyer to injure his adversary to
render him unable to come to the courtroom. It is appropriate therefore to
begin by asking ourselves just what the duty to represent a client zealously
means.
Does it mean that our duty lies only in victory, solely in the ultimate
vindication of the client's position? Is the role of the lawyer to ensure that
every client becomes the prevailing party? Or is our duty as advocates less
connected with the result and more with the process? I submit it is the
latter. The representation of clients, in my opinion, is focused on the process
itself rather than the outcome.
In our adversarial system of justice, there cannot possibly be two
winners in every case. The system is designed, I submit, to concentrate on
the forum and the procedural and the law to be applied there. It is thought in
the best interests of society that disputes are better resolved in this neutral
forum with established rules that allow each side to be fairly heard. The role
of the lawyer is to use every legal device under our ethical restraints to
present the client's side of the dispute as fully as the circumstances require.
This institutional design is based on the assumption that if each party is
heard within the framework of prior rules of conduct and procedure before
neutral decision-makers, it is more likely that the ultimate outcome will be
just. The design is therefore not tied to the outcome but instead to the
process. If it is fair, if all sides present their case zealously but as restrained
by the rules, the probability is that the result will be fair.
I recognize that this process often presents considerable limitations or
constraints in a given case. The law may be well and truly settled, the facts
all but indisputable. An unambiguous statute may block the result your
client seeks. But-I submit-that circumstance is inevitable in a democratic
society governed by a rule of law. Indeed to be a lawyer means precisely
that one is governed by, and submits to, established rules of conduct, even
when the rules go against one's goals. To be a lawyer is to submit to
restraints on one's liberty to act in the belief that if all are similarly
restrained each has the best chance of using one's talents within that
framework of rules to achieve success. That is the great paradox, I suggest,
in a system of the democratic rule of law: each one of us is actually liberated
by these common restraints.
I am reminded of a wonderful observation by Professor Freund of
Harvard Law School that encapsulates the attitude that I have in mind. He
once addressed the complex and insoluble problems facing law and medicine
regarding the use of experimental drugs or medical procedures on consenting
patients. Near the end of his piece he addressed the essential dilemma
facing both doctors and the law in recognizing that there were no easy
[Vol. 23:809
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answers, that under the law doctors could not necessarily administer any
procedure or substance to a patient, that ethical restraints sometimes act as a
break on scientific progress. What he said was addressed specifically to
doctors and judges, but it is equally applicable to all lawyers. He wrote:
[M]edicine and law and art have an essential affinity. As the artist
himself finds his freedom in the constraints of his medium, in the
canons of taste and in respect for the limitations of his material, so
the judge and the physician too find their freedom in their fetters,
in the symbolic codes that assign them their roles and render it
tolerable to make judgments involving life and death - fetters that
somehow make it possible to surmount the agony and the absurdity
of human decisions.
As a profession we simply cannot be so concerned with victory or the
results achieved as we are today. Instead we must concentrate all of our
talents, energy, and knowledge on the process itself: On making the best
possible case for the client within the rules, but not in spite of them. We
must find our professional freedom-and indeed our personal happiness-in
remaining within the constraints of law as it affects our case. We should
find the consolation of due and zealous performance of our mission in a
healthy respect for our fetters, for the limitations imposed on us by the given
facts, evidence, procedural rules, and substantive law. We will then find our
professional freedom, not in winning or in being the prevailing party in
every instance, but rather in the comfort that we have made the best possible
case within those constraints.
We must be understood by the media and public-as a result of our
own example of unflagging compliance with our ethical and legal codes-as
dedicated to the rule of law. Again, by continued and unfailing compliance
with these restraints, we must erase the current perception that our only
interest is in winning. This must become true even when it is the hardest
thing in the world to do. Even when our own most intimate and directly
personal interests are at stake.
There is no better example of what I advocate than Thomas More. He
was, as I said earlier, the Chancellor to King Henry VIII. He was in effect
the highest lawyer in the realm. The King had long been married to
Catherine, the daughter of the Spanish monarch and the sister of the Holy
Roman Emporer, Charles V. Charles in turn, as an Elector, controlled the
papacy. England had been a Catholic monarchy for nearly 500 years, since
before 1066 and the Battle of Hastings. Queen Catherine had been unable to
bear Henry a son, a male heir to succeed him on the throne. Because Henry
feared a repeat of the civil war that broke out when his ancient predecessor,
Henry I, died and was succeeded by his daughter Mathilda and her husband
1999]
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Stephen, he sought an annulment of his marriage from the Pope. But
pressure from Charles V and the Spanish throne prevented the Pope from
acquiescing. Henry thus sought to use English law, which had no such
authority or precedent, to obtain a divorce from Catherine. In this endeavor
he needed the support of his Chancellor. Thomas More felt himself
obligated by law to oppose his king. At a number of stages in the long affair,
Henry gave Thomas opportunities to make subtle if unprecedented
distinctions and thereby support him. More refused to compromise his
understanding of the law and paid with his life on a charge of treason. At
every stage in the proceeding Thomas More insisted on following the law as
it was generally understood, even when equivocation would have saved his
life.
The most important scene in Bolt's play eloquently portrays More's
dedication to the rule of law. His wife and daughter urge him to use his
office to have a man who represents some danger to him charged with a
crime and arrested. His son-in-law, Roper, argues that God's law would
condemn the man-to which More responds then let God arrest him. Roper
calls that a sophistication, but More replies: "No, sheer simplicity. The law,
Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll stick to
what's legal."
More explains that the man should remain free until he has broken the
law, even if he were the Devil himself. Whereupon his son-in-law protests
that he would cut down every law in England to get after the Devil. It is then
in reply that More articulates, in one of the play's magnificent passages, the
great justification for the rule of law:
And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on
you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat. This
country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's laws,
not God's-and if you cut them down-and you're just the man to
do it--d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my
own safety's sake.
To my ear there is no more eloquent defense of our system.
One of the principal criticisms of lawyers today is that they will do
whatever is expedient. I have often heard a lawyer justify incivility or
unprofessional conduct with the expression that it was only right, that it
would be very unfair for the client not to prevail. It is precisely that attitude
that More rejects in this scene. The mere fact that you represent one of the
sides in a dispute cannot possibly equip you to know where justice truly lies
in a given case. What you do know, however, what you have been trained to
know, is the law-not what is the right outcome for the parties. For the sake
[Vol. 23:809
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of our profession, we simply must return in our daily work habits to that kind
of scrupulous compliance with the law, the ethics, and the canons of our
profession that this passage vividly demonstrates.
Recalling the popular perception of lawyers, especially media lawyers,
we simply must resolve to free our advocacy from invective. It does no good
to mount a personal attack on the other party or lawyer at trial. Judges will
be turned off by it and begin casting around for legally sufficient reasons to
rule against you. In spite of what you see on television, the art of persuasion
does not consist of painting other people in the dispute in the worst possible
light. On the contrary, the civil lawyer will instead present the case with a
generous tolerance for the other side's motives, presentation and positions.
Do not become like one of the talking heads on Katie or Geraldo or
Cokie. Do not ascribe the worst motives to your adversary. If the other side
has misrepresented the record or a case, tell the judge that you understand
the record to show whatever it is you contend that it shows, or the case to
hold whatever you think it does. Do not cast every misstatement as a lie. In
fact do not generally use that term to describe anything but what the
evidence as resolved by the trier of fact has obviously done. If your version
is diametrically opposed to that represented by your adversary, and upon
review you turn out to be correct and your adversay wrong, you will not have
done better for yourself and worse for your adversary than all the invective
in the world would have done.
Ours is an age of hyperbole. Almost any artist, artisan or athlete is the
"greatest." The common inconveniences of modern society are "outrageous"
or "tragedies." Every misstatement is a "lie" or a "fraud." Someone, or
something, is either the "greatest" or the "worst." Ordinary feats of athletic
prowess are routinely described as "awesome." As a society, we are largely
unaccustomed to restraint or understatement in expression; exaggeration
saturates our spoken and written speech. This too pervades legal discourse.
But if you couch everything in the superlative, how indeed do you articulate
the truly exceptional when it really does occur? If you continually refer to
the routine as "awesome" how indeed will you explain when the truly
awesome comes along?
It is time for lawyers in argument to return to the fine art of euphemism,
of the gallant understatement. Instead of saying that the opposing lawyer is
lying about the facts or a case, say that he or she has perhaps overlooked
whatever it is that you contend. Instead of presuming that your opponent is
intentionally misstating something, affect to indulge every presumption of
adversarial good faith and then proceed to demonstrate-in the gentlest
terms-by fact, law, or logic how and where your adversary has gone awry.
Instead of arguing that something is an insult say, as President Kennedy once
did, that it bargains an apple for an orchard. The hardness of the blows that
you strike for your cause should in all events abide in the force of their
1999)
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reason and accuracy, not in the force or color of their invective. Because
hyperbole and grand overstatement are pervasive in our society, a gentle
understatement may do more to persuade than anything else.
Keep the most civil of tongues, and the civil hand in your written
argument. Never, never engage in personal attacks on your opposing
lawyer-not even when the opposing lawyer does it to you. Don't do it the
first time; don't do it ever. While honest emotion can be effective even in
appellate discourse, it should be rare and never directed at another lawyer in
the case. And its use against a party should always be supported by clear
evidence in the record and be logically related to a legitimate issue actually
raised and presented for resolution in the appeal.
Moderate your tone and manner. We have all heard the adage that the
surest way to be heard above the din is to whisper. Being wrong in argument
is bad but being wrong at the top of your voice is unbearable. As I suggested
earlier, from the lawyers on television it seems that all legal argument is at
the top of one's voice. Be marked by the softness of a kind civility of your
tone and manner. Develop a gentle tongue, and thereby improve your own
image.
Never end a case with animosity to opposing counsel. Even when it
hurts the most, when you have just suffered the most stinging defeat in your
career, go over to the other table and congratulate the opposing lawyer on
the good job. Shake her hand; smile, no matter the pain. Do not end that
professional transaction with rancor. If, for no other reason, than you simply
cannot predict when the other lawyer's good will may be helpful.
The English language is wide and deep and rich enough to make your
case zealously without drawing upon the worst in human emotions, without
dealing in anger and petulance and abuse. The professional tools are there
for you to present every cause well within the law and your ethics. You can
be more effective, even with a deference to your adversary. If you examine
your own conscience and find that you have something approximating the
characteristics of lawyers popularly perceived today, then I strongly urge you
to begin the struggle to eliminate them and return to the example of Thomas
More.
Come to law as a process, not with the sole purpose of winning every
cause, but instead with a strong dedication to the rule of law. Make your
client's case in the best way permitted by our law and ethics, but with the
civility and personal restraint that marks the best of our profession. Return
to the understanding that our professional role is most concerned with the
process and with the belief that if we make the best case within the law and
ethics, the probability is that the right result will be reached. Come back to
law as a process.
Look upon your role as that of a teacher, who will lead the court
through the legal thicket. And then, just as Virgil left Dante, leave all legal
[Vol. 23:809
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proceedings with an air of grace, with an indelible perception of all that is
good in legal advocacy. Leave your audience with a lasting impression of
your dedication, not to the goal of victory above all else in the trial or
hearing, but instead of an abiding deference to the rule of law, to the canons
and ethics of professionalism, to the constraints and limits of circumstance
and the primary codes of human conduct. Do that and there is a chance that
we can erase the current low image of our profession and restore ourselves
once again in the minds of fairninded people everywhere that ours is still the
profession that gave the world a Thomas More, an Abraham Lincoln, a Louis
Brandeis, and Thurgood Marshall.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Legislature withdrew from extensive restructuring of the
statutes governing juvenile delinquency during the 1998 session, making
only modest changes to the new chapter, chapter 985, which it introduced in
1997. In the child welfare area, however, the legislature did make more
substantial changes, at least in part, in response to the passage of new federal
legislation governing abuse and neglect matters.
In the appellate courts, there was substantial activity, albeit generally
technical in nature. There were, however, several significant opinions by the
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, FL.; Colgate University, 1967; Boston College Law School J.D., 1970. The author
thanks Tracey McPharlin for assistance in the preparation of this article. This article covers
cases decided through June 30, 1998.
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Supreme Court of Florida, although they too were of a technical nature. The
appellate courts continue their periodic commentary expressing concern with
the failure of the trial courts to comply with rudimentary statutory
obligations.
II. DEPENDENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Admission of out of court statements by child victims in dependency
proceedings is an important probative part of such cases. There is a growing
body of statutory and case law, nationwide, which deals specifically with out
of court statements by youngsters and the development of special hearsay
exceptions.' In Florida, section 90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes governs
hearsay exceptions for the statement of the child/victim.2 In Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services v. M.B.,3 the Supreme Court of Florida had
before it an appeal raising the question of whether a child/victim's prior
unsworn statement, which was inconsistent with the child's in court
testimony, was admissible where the testimony supported a determination
that the earlier unsworn statement met sufficient safeguards of
reliability.4 The statute in question provides that the court must find that
there are sufficient safeguards of reliability in the child's statement and shall
take into account the child's mental and physical age and maturity, nature
and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the
offender, reliability of the assertion, reliability of the child/victim, and any
other factors deemed appropriate.5 The court found that section 90.803(23)
of the Florida Statutes permits a child/victim's prior inconsistent statements
to be admitted as substantive evidence if found to be trustworthy. 6 The court
held that the child's out of court statements could be admitted into evidence,
without the necessity that they be consistent with the child's trial testimony,
so long as strict standards of reliability are applied before admitting the
statements.7 In addition, the court held that the applicable evidentiary
standard in such a case is a preponderance of the evidence, or greater weight
1. See generally MICHAEL J. DALE Er AL, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 7.06
(Matthew Bender 1998).
2. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1998).
3. 701 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1997).
4. Id. at 1156.
5. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1998).
6. M.B., 701 So. 2d at 1162.
7. id.
[Vol. 23:819
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of the evidence, since the proceeding is that of a civil dependency matter
nature.8
Under Florida law, a parent who voluntarily executes a written
surrender of the child, and consents to the entry of order giving custody of
the child to the state or an agency, for purposes of adoption, may only
withdraw the consent, after acceptance of the child by the Department or
licensed child care agency, upon a finding that the surrender and consent
were obtained by fraud or duress.9 In Bailey v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,10 the issue raised was whether a parent could
withdraw consent to a dependency petition.1" In a split opinion, the appeals
court held that absent a showing of fraud or duress, the consent could not be
withdrawn in a dependency proceeding.12 In dissent, Judge Sharp argued
first that the lower court order contained none of the findings as to the
voluntariness and full understanding of the consent required in a termination
13 14
case. Second, he argued that Interest of LB.J., which held that it was not
necessary to show fraud or duress in order to withdraw valid consent in a
dependency proceeding, was still valid.15  Instead, he relied upon Rule
8.315(b) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which provides that at
any time prior to the beginning of a disposition hearing the court may permit
an admission of the allegations of the petition to be withdrawn and, if an
adjudication has been entered, it may be set aside. 16 Thus, in Judge Sharp's
view, the court had discretion to set aside the consent.17
In 1991, in Padget v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,8
the Supreme Court of Florida held that parental rights may be terminated if
the court finds that the child is at substantial risk of imminent abuse or
neglect by the parent, and this finding is based on proof of neglect or abuse
of other children if the evidence shows a substantial risk that the child will
suffer similar abuse.19 In 1998, in Eddy v. Department of Children & Family
8. Id. at 1163.
9. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)2 (Supp. 1998).
10. 703 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
11. Id. at 1225.
12. Id.
13. Id. (Sharp, J., dissenting).
14. 497 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
15. Bailey, 703 So. 2d at 1226 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
19. Id. at 566. See also, Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Juvenile
Law, 16 NOvAL. REv. 333,368-373 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey]; Michael I Dale, Juvenile
Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REv. 189, 216-17 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
Survey].
Dale
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Services, an unmarried father was charged with dependency on the basis of
a ten year old criminal adjudication for sexual abuse of nephews when he
was between thirteen and sixteen years of age. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that prior sexual abuse of other children is insufficient alone to
establish a substantial risk of imminent abuse; there must be independent
22evidence showing that sexual abuse is likely to recur. For example,
independent evidence in the form of "testimony from a mental health
specialist that the parent or custodian suffers from an untreatable problem
would provide the nexus between the prior abuse and the allegation of
prospective abuse. '23 Here, there was no nexus, and the court reversed the
adjudication of dependency.
In S.J. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,25 a mother
petitioned for certiorari review of two post-dependency decisions
challenging, inter alia, an amended order in which the court applied a best
interests of the child standard in the determination to remove a child
previously adjudicated dependent from the mother's home and to place the
26child with an adult relative. The appellate court reversed, finding that the
circuit court had applied an erroneous standard in removing the child from
the mother's care and custody and placing the child in long term relative
placement, without adherence to the statutory requirements. The statutory
authorization for post-disposition placement is found in section
39.508(9)(a)8.b. of the Florida Statutes.28 The appellate court held that
there is no authority to deviate from the statutory requirement, which states
29that the test is endangerment of the safety and well being of the child.
There is no statutory provision for independent judicial consideration of the
best interests of the child.30 The Department had the burden to show that the
20. 704 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
21. Id. at 735.
22. Id. at 736.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 700 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
26. Id. at 72.
27. Id. at 73.
28. FLA. STAT. § 39.508(9)(a)8.b. (Supp. 1998). The relevant section states:
In cases where the issue before the court is whether a child should be reunited
with a parent, the court shall determine whether the parent has substantially
complied with the terms of the case plan to the extent that the safety, well-
being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not
endangered by the return of the child to the home.
Id.
29. S.J., 700 So. 2d at 75.
30. Id.
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child's safety was endangered by remaining in her mother's home.3 1 The
court concluded that while the best interests of the child is an overriding
concern in all chapter 39 proceedings, there is no legislative authorization
for using a best interests of the child legal standard to determine a change in
placement of a dependent child.32
As prior survey articles in this law review have discussed, the appellate
courts have regularly admonished the trial courts in both dependency and
delinquency cases for repeated failures to comply clear mandatory statutes.
33
A particularly egregious example of the appellate courts' reluctant but clear
exposition of concern is Ritter v. Department of Children & Family
Services.34 Ritter involved a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to
issue a ruling in a case in which it had delayed almost twenty-seven months
between the day of the dependency hearing, and the rendering of the order
declaring the children dependent. The appellate court advanced that the
reason for the delay was not explained in the record.36 The court then stated,
"[w]e find this case falls within that class of cases in which trial courts have
been sternly admonished for unnecessarily impeding the prompt
administration of justice, especially in matters involving child custody."37
The court added, that it found that the delay of nearly twenty-seven months
in the case, coupled with the proceeding for mandamus brought by one of the
parties, "casts sufficient doubt upon the wisdom and fairness of the decisions
rendered by the trial judge to require that all of the orders in this matter be
vacated and that a new evidentiary hearing be conducted forthwith."3  The
court then suggested that the case be assigned to another judge.39 Judge
Harris concurred, adding that there should be a bright line standard beyond
which a delayed judgment simply would not be recognized. 40
An important issue in the area of dependency is what happens to
children who have been adjudicated dependent and placed into state care
when they reach the age of eighteen. This issue was raised in L.Y. v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.41 Specifically, the issue in
L.Y. was whether the court could dismiss a dependency case and terminate
31. Id.
32. Id. at 74.
33. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NovA L. REv.
139, 140 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Survey].
34. 700 So. 2d 804,805 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
35. Id. at 804-05.
36. Id. at 805.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Ritter, 700 So. 2d at 805.
40. Id. at 806 (Harris J., concurring).
41. 696 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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juvenile court jurisdiction over a child when she reached eighteen, although
she continued to receive services from the Department. The appellate court
affirmed, without prejudice to the appellant's right to seek appointment of a
guardian pursuant to chapter 744 of the Florida Statutes if there was a
showing of incapacity. 3 The court explained that the issue was a legislative
one and not a judicial one. 44 As the court put it:
Unfortunately for L. Y, the fight is in the wrong arena as the
legislature has not provided for judicial review of these services
still being rendered to a now 18 year old, previously determined to
be dependent, when that individual may not be incapacitated. The
conscientious, concerned trial court properly held that the laws of
Florida currently do not permit retention of continuing juvenile
jurisdiction and review until the individual is 21.45
B. Guardian Ad Litem Issues
Because Florida is a participant in the Federal Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"), the state is obligated to provide a
guardian ad litem for a child in dependency proceedings. The operation of
this program is governed by statutes, court rules, unpublished supreme court
orders, and case law. 7 In cursory opinions devoid of statutory analysis, the
Florida courts have rejected claims that the failure to have a guardian ad
litem in place in the proceeding has been a fundamental error, on a number
of occasions over the past few years. 48 In W.R. v. Department of Children &
Family Services,49 the Fourth District Court of Appeals continued this trend,
and reaffirmed the proposition that the absence of an active guardian ad
litem does not preclude a trial court from adjudicating children dependent.50
42. Id. at 431.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (commenting that the California Legislature has authorized such jurisdictions
under the California Welfare and Institution Code, § 303. CAL. WELFARE & INST. § 303
(1998)).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1998).
47. See generally 1996 Survey, supra, note 19, at 222.
48. Id.
49. 701 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
50. Id. at 652. Ironically, the trial court held that it could not conclude that the grounds for
the termination of parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence because the
absence of an active guardian was fundamental and an impairment of the ability to make the
finding. Id.
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This line of cases is particularly disturbing because a child has no right to
counsel in a dependency proceeding in Florida.
51
H. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
The Florida courts have regularly analyzed the test for termination of
parental rights, the grounds for which are articulated in section 39.464 of the
Florida Statutes. This statute also provides that in a hearing on a petition
for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the manifest best53
interests of the child. In Department of Children & Family Services v.
J.A., 54 a case of apparent first impression, the Department appealed on the
ground that the court failed to make a best interest finding, even after the
state failed to prove grounds to terminate under section 39.464 of the55
Florida Statutes. The appellate court recognized that terminations must be
56based upon both provisions. However, it concluded that even if the statute
required a best interest finding in every case, including those where
termination was rejected, the court's failure to do so would be harmless error
and would not affect the ultimate denial of the petition. 7
Application of the Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services standard also came up recently in a termination of parental rights
case, Gaines v. Department of Children & Families.5 9 The issue was one of
"prospective" abuse or neglect. The court held that there must be a showing
in the record that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parent's control,
likely to continue, and placed the child, who was the subject of the
proceeding, at risk.60 In the case at bar, there was no showing between the
prior abuse of siblings, and the allegation of prospective abuse against the
child who was the subject of the proceeding.6'
Confidentiality is a significant issue in both dependency and
termination of parental rights cases in Florida. Section 39.471 of the Florida
51. In re D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (Supp. 1998).
53. FLA. STAT. § 39.4612 (1997).
54. 701 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
55. Id. at 658-59.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Id.
58. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
59. 711 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
60. Id. at 193.
61. Id. at 194.
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Statutes governs confidentiality in termination cases and provides that all
information obtained by judges, employees of the court, authorized agents of
the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and law
enforcement agents shall be kept confidential unless authorized by the62 63court. Stanfield v. Department of Children & Families, involved an
appeal by the adult half-sister of the children before the court in a
termination case.6 She challenged an injunctive order enjoining her from
disclosing information about the case to the media or other persons. The
appeals court held that the statutory authority to limit persons from
discussing or talking about what they learned from sources other than court
documents does not allow for an injunction. 66 "The court cannot prohibit
citizens from exercising their First Amendment right to publicly discuss
knowledge that they have gained independent of court documents even
though the information may mirror the information contained in court,,67. ..
documents. The court also indicated that it could enjoin lawyers from
discussing the proceedings.
68
B. Right to Counsel Issues
In J.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services,69 a father
appealed from a court order denying him counsel in a termination of parental
rights proceeding on the ground that he had not previously appeared and was
therefore deemed to have consented to termination of his parental rights.70
The appellate court reversed, finding that the failure to advise the father of
his right to counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, coupled with the failure to
continue the adjudicatory hearing for the purposes of allowing the father an
opportunity to obtain counsel, warranted reversal under the then applicable
provisions of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes for appointment of counsel
71in termination cases. The failure to advise occurred after the advisory
72hearing, at which the father did not appear. The court recognized that the
case should be remanded, to allow the parent an opportunity to appear with
62. FLA. STAT. § 39.471 (Supp. 1998).
63. 698 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
64. Id. at 321.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 323.
67. Id.
68. Stanfield, 698 So. 2d at 323.
69. 703 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
70. Id. at 1209.
71. Id. at 1210; FLA. STAT. §§ 39.465(1)(a), l(b)(3) (1997) and FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2)
(1997).
72. J.B., 703 So. 2d at 1210.
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the assistance of counsel to challenge the consent to termination of parental
rights by default, and to present evidence at the adjudicatory hearing.73
Chapter 39 was amended during the last legislative session to require
appointment of counsel to all parents in dependency cases.
74
A minor mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights
on the ground that without counsel she signed a surrender and consent,
giving the child to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for
subsequent adoption.75 In J.E.F.L. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
76Services, the mother who, after executing a voluntary surrender, was
appointed counsel, sought a continuance of the final adjudicatory hearing so
that she could attend the hearing and contest termination.77 However, she
was unable to do so because she could not find transportation.78 The trial
court denied the motion and the appeal ensued.79 The appellate court found
that this was the only opportunity to challenge the conditions under which
the minor mother executed the voluntary surrender, the grounds for which
would be fraud or duress. 80 In addition, the court held that the validity of the
waiver of counsel in order to sign the voluntary termination would also be at
issue before the court.81 The court reversed and remanded so that, with
appointed counsel the minor could show fraud or duress in the execution of
the surrender.82
C. Appellate Issues
In G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families,83 the Supreme Court of
Florida resolved the conflict between the districts on the question of
whether, in a child dependency proceeding, an adjudication order which
terminates parental rights is immediately appealable as a final order or
reviewable only upon appeal from the disposition order.8 The first district,85 . 86
in G.L.S., held that it was, whereas the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
73. Id.
74. See infra Part IV.
75. J.E.F.L. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 700 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. J.E.F.L, 700 So. 2d at 4..
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4-5.
83. 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
84. Id. at 1182.
85. 700 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Moore v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services87 and Lewis v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, held "that it is the second
or dispositional order which is the final order for purposes of appeal." 89 The
Supreme Court of Florida held "that the First District erred in holding that an
adjudication order which initially terminates parental rights in a child
dependency case may not be challenged upon appeal from a subsequent
disposition order."90
IV. STATUTORY CHANGES INVOLVING DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
The Florida Legislature made a number of changes in 1997 that effect
dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings. Perhaps in an
effort to integrate child abuse and neglect legislation with chapter 39, the
legislature inserted many child protection provisions from chapter 415 into
chapter 39.91
The legislature made a dramatic change in the dependency field by
amending section 39.013 of the Florida Statutes, to provide that indigent
parents must be appointed counsel at the dependency stage of the
92proceedings. The change is significant in a number of respects. As a
constitutional matter, the case goes beyond the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,93 in which the
high court said that there was no absolute right to counsel under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in termination of parental
rights cases.94 As a practical matter, the Florida Legislature now provides
parents with a protection that should ease the appellate docket, which in past
years contained many appeals from termination of parental rights because,
under the old law, the lack of counsel at the dependency stage rendered the
86. Id. at 99.
87. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
88. 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Moore, 664 So. 2d at 1139.
90. G.L.S., 724 So. 2d at 1182.
91. FLA. STAT. § 39.001 (6)-(8) (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.501 (1997)); FLA. STAT. §
39.0015 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.5015 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (Supp. 1998) (former
§ 415.504 (1997)); FLA. STAT § 39.203 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.511 (1997)); FtA. STAT. §
39.204 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.512 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.205 (Supp. 1998) (former §
415.513 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.303 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.5055 (1997)); FLA. STAT. §
39.304 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.507 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.305 (Supp. 1998) (former §
415.5095 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.307 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.50171 (1997)).
92. See FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1), (8)-(10) (Supp. 1998).
93. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See also DALE, Er AL., supra note 1 at 7 (discussing Lassiter).
94. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
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finding of termination of parental rights invalid.95 The failure to provide free
counsel to indigent parents in dependency cases under the old law was the
subject of discussion in this survey on numerous occasions. 96 Under the new
statute, the compensation scheme of attorneys representing indigent parents
in dependency proceedings shall be established by each county. The
compensation scheme in termination of parent rights cases is a maximum of
$1,000 at the trial level and $2,500 at the appellate level.98
As a matter of case review, and in compliance with the changes in the
CAPTA, section 39.710 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
when the court extends any case plan beyond twelve months, rather than
eighteen months under the prior law, judicial reviews must be held at least
every six months. 99 In the area of termination of parental rights, the
legislature also amended chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes to contain a
much more detailed procedure for the identification and location of unknown
parents after the filing of a termination of parental rights petition.10° The
diligent search requirement should help in situations where a parent
subsequently comes forward to challenge the termination of parental
rights.11
The legislature also changed the provisions governing injunctions
pending disposition of a petition in a dependency proceeding, to effectively
provide for ex pa2e injunctions where the child is reported to be in
imminent danger. Under such circumstances, notice to the parties as
provided by Rule 8.305 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure may be
waived. 03 However, when an immediate injunction is issued, the court shall
hold a hearing on the next day of judicial business either to dissolve the
injunction, or to continue or modify it.1°4
Section 39.501 of the Florida Statutes was amended to include a new
sub-part four which now provides that with regard to the petition for
dependency, the child's parent, guardian, or custodian must be served with a
95. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NovA L. REv.
179, 209-10 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Survey].
96. Id. at 209; 1996 Survey, supra note 19, at 218; 1994 Survey, supra note 33, at 146.
97. See FLA. STAT. § 39.0134(1) (Supp. 1998).
98. See id. § 39.0134(2).
99. See also id. § 39.703(2).
100. Ch. 98-403, § 85, 1998 Fla. Laws 3081, 3201 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.803
(Supp. 1998)).
101. FLA. STAT. § 39.803(5)--(8) (Supp. 1998).
102. Ch. 98-403, § 65, 1998 Fla. Laws 3081, 3165-66 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.504(2) (Supp. 1998)).
103. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305.
104. FLA. STAT. § 39.504(2) (Supp. 1998).
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copy of the petition at least seventy-two hours before the arraignment
hearing.
105
The Florida Legislature made a specific and provocative change in the
provisions of chapter 39, governing the activities of the guardian ad litem, at
section 39.807 of the Florida Statutes.1°6 It removed a section of that law
which previously provided that the court order a guardian ad litem to
perform other duties and undertake other responsibilities such as the court
may direct. 1°7
The legislature amended the section of the dependency statute
governing abandonment based upon imprisonment' °8 to provide that a parent
who is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution may be found
to have abandoned a child when "[t]he period of time for which the parent is
expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period
of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years."' 9
The legislature passed a new section of chapter 39 of the Florida
Statutes dealing with protective investigations of institutional child abuse,
abandonment, or neglect.11 Section 39.302 of the Florida Statutes is a very
important addition to the statutory scheme, containing a rather detailed
investigation procedure including a notification system to the state attorney
for criminal investigation."' The law provides for restricted access of
individuals to the child if there is threatened harm to the youngster
12
The legislature also made amendments at various places in chapter 39,
to include abandonment together with abuse and neglect as dependency
grounds.! 3 Oddly, at diverse places in the statute the terms abuse and
neglect are found, but abandonment is not when the reference is to the forms
of dependency. The legislature also focused on the specific setting of the
placement of a child in an independent living arrangement when the
youngster is sixteen years of age or older.1 4 The legislature mandated
continuing court review. 15
105. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(4) (Supp. 1998).
106. FLA. STAT. § 39.807 (Supp. 1998).
107. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(b)4. (1997) (recodified at § 39.807(b) (Supp. 1998)).
108. Ch. 98-417, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 3332, 3336-7 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.806
(Supp. 1998)).
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(I)(d)1 (Supp. 1998).
110. FLA. STAT. § 39.302 (Supp. 1998).
111. Id.
112. Id. at (2)(a).
113. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (Supp. 1998).
114. FLA. STAT. § 39.508(9)(a)6.e. (Supp. 1998).
115. Id.
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V. CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES/FAMILIES IN NEED OF SERVICES
The Florida courts have rarely rendered opinions interpreting the
Children in Need of Services/Families in Need of Services ("CINS/FINS")
statute 6which has been in place for ten years.' 7 The statute provides for
services to children and families focused on counseling and medical,
psychiatric and psychological services.' 18 In Department of Juvenile Justice
v. C.M.,119 the question before the court was whether the trial court could
order payment by the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") to a hospital to
which the child was placed for assessment purposes.120 The court held that it
could find no case on point authorizing the court to order payment of
expenses in CINS/FINS proceedings.121 It held that DJJ showed at the trial
level that "it had no appropriated funds to pay for [the] expense[s]. 122 The
court concluded that the order interfered with both legislative discretion in
determining what funds are required of an agency and executive discretion in
spendin,_ the appropriated funds under the doctrine of separation of
powers.
VI. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Florida's detention statute provides for both secure and nonsecure
detention and for both pre- and post-adjudication and disposition
detention.124 All determinations and court orders concerning placement into
detention are based upon a risk assessment instrument ("RA') developed by
DJJ. Application of the instrument has generated a substantial amount of
appellate law.126
116. FLA. STAT. §984.04 (1997).
117. See 1995 Survey supra note 109, at 219, 221.
118. FLA. STAT. § 984.04 (1997). For a discussion of recent changes in the CINS/FINS
statute, see 1997 Survey, supra note 95, at 205-06.
119. 704 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
120. Id. at 1125.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213 (Supp. 1998).
125. Id. at (2)(a), (b)1.
126. See 1997 Survey, supra note 95, at 181-83.
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N.E.W. v. Portesey,127 is a detention case evidencing the appellate
courts' ongoing need to clarify the detention law for the trial courts. In
N.E.W., the appellate court, on a motion for rehearing, affirmed its opinion
granting petitions for writs of habeas corpus for two children who were
detained as the result of a policy adopted by DJJ.'2 During the term of
community control, the children were charged with new misdemeanor level
offenses that did not involve domestic violence and which otherwise would
not allow for secure detention. 29 The court rejected the policy adopted by
DJJ and endorsed by the juvenile judges presiding over the detention
hearings in Hillsborough County finding no statutory foundation for the
approach. 3 DJJ had scored earlier third degree felony offenses on its risk
assessment instrument, which would have fulfilled the obligations of the
state statute had they been new offenses.13 1 But, the new offenses were only
132misdemeanors . Thus, the court concluded that "there [was] no statutory
authority to score a delinquent offense that has already been the subject of an
adjudicatory hearing when a juvenile is picked up for a new offense.' '133
A child may only be placed in detention after an adjudicatory hearing
when newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances are reflected on
the amended risk assessment instrument which mandates confinement. 34 In
K.K. v. Taylor,135 a child brought a writ of habeas corpus challenging her
136post-adjudication secure detention. The court held that, "the state elevates
the provision of the form to suspend the access of our citizenry to the writ of
habeas corpus, a daring proposition born more from reflexive advocacy than
reasoned legal thinking."1  The Court then added that, "[e]ven more
alarming than the state's reliance on a sentence from a form to legitimize
confinement clearly proscribed by statute is the fact that in the case at bar
the language 'must be detained' had not even been checked during the initial
preparation of the [risk assessment] form."' 38
The Florida detention statute now provides that when a child is
committed to DJJ and awaiting a dispositional placement the child must be
127. 712 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
128. Id. at 1159.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. N.E.W., 712 So. 2d at 1159.
133. Id.
134. See S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
135. 703 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1065.
138. Id. The court granted the writ because the statute forbid detention of the child. Id.
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removed from the detention center within five days of the commitment. 39
However, where a child is committed to a lower moderate risk residential
program, DJJ may apply for an order from the court for continued detention
for a maximum of fifteen days excluding weekends and legal holidays for
the purpose of finding an appropriate facility."4° In A. W. v. State,' and J.M.
v. State,142 the child sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
court on its own motion had ordered the child to remain in secure detention
for ten 43 and fifteen' 44 days respectively, while awaiting placement. The
appeals courts held that the trial court could only extend the detention
beyond the five days pending placement in a moderate risk facility if the
Department applied to the court and demonstrated that it was necessary for145 ..
placement purposes. The extensions were not for purposes of maximizing
punishment. 146 The appellate courts reversed. 147
Another use of detention in Florida is for the placement of juveniles
who are held in direct or indirect contempt. Section 985.216(2)(a) of the
Florida Statutes provides that a juvenile may be held in a secure detention
facility for five days for a first offense or for fifteen days for a second or
subsequent offense. 14s In G.S. v. State,149 juveniles in four consolidated
cases appealed from their placement in secure detention pursuant to
contempt findings arguing that the community control statute states that
violations of community control require placement in a "consequence
unit."'I5 The consequence unit is a term introduced in the 1997 amendments
to the Florida Juvenile Code, but without definition. 151 According to the
appeals court in G.S., DJJ has not implemented the amendment.152 Nor,
according to the court, did it appear that the statute mandated the creation of
such units, and it further concluded that no funds were appropriated for the
construction of such units. 153 The court therefore held that under those
circumstances it was hesitant to say that the juvenile detention center cannot
139. Fla. Stat. § 985.215(10)(
140. Id.
141. 711 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th
142. 705 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th D
143. A.W.,711 So. 2d at 599.
144. J.M., 705 So. 2d at 99.
145. Id.; A.W.,711 So. 2d at,
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. FLA. STAT. § 985.216(2)
149. 709 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 5thI
150. See FtA. STAT. § 985.231
151. Id.
152. G.S., 709 So. 2d at 123.
153. Id.
a)l. (Supp. 1998).
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
)ist. Ct. App. 1998).
599.
(a) (Supp. 1998).
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
(1)(a)l.c.(I) (Supp. 1998).
1999]
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serve as a consequence unit for juveniles who violate community control or
aftercare. 54  The court concluded that "[clontempt appears to be an
alternative permissible procedure to address juvenile violators of community
,,155
control. It noted that the legislature had passed section 985.216(1) of the
Florida Statutes to obviate the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling in A.A. v.
Rolle,156 which had held that the court could not use secure detention to
punish juveniles for contempt of court.1 57 The court concluded in G.S. that
the contempt procedure is a free standing separate provision of the law,
distinct from the violation procedures and remedies under community
control. 58 Thus, while the juveniles in the case at bar had not been charged
with violating community control, they were held to have been in contempt
of court. 59 The appeals court thus affirmed the placement in securedetention.16 °
B. Adjudicatory Issues
Florida's speedy trial rule in juvenile cases provides that the case must
be brought to trial within ninety days.161 The Third District Court of Appeal
recently held so in State v. Meza,16 a case in which the trial court discharged
a juvenile when the information was filed on the ninetieth day because, in its
view, ninety days means ninety days. 63 Relying on an earlier Supreme
Court of Florida opinion in P.S. v. State,164 the court held that the state may
not file or re-file charges after the ninetieth day of the juvenile speedy trial
period but may file on the ninetieth day. 65 66
A second case dealing with the speedy trial rule is P.G. v. State. After
the expiration of the ninety day speed' trial period the state nolle prossed a
charge of battery against a juvenile. Subsequently, the state filed a new
petition charging the child with resisting an officer without violence. 68 The
154. Id.
155. Id. at 123-24.
156. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
157. Id. at 818-19.
158. G.S., 709 So. 2d at 124.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a).
162. 697 So. 2d 968 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
163. Id. at 968.
164. 658 So. 2d 92,94 (Fla. 1995).
165. Id.
166. 711 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
167. Id. at 189.
168. Id.
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defense attorney filed a motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule
which was denied and the child pleaded with the reservation of a right to
appeal. 169 Under Rule 8.090 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
every child charged with a delinquent act shall be brought to an adjudicatory
hearing without demand within ninety days of the earlier of the date the child
was taken into custody or the date the petition was filed. 17 The district court
of appeals held that the time limitations contained in the rule cannot be
avoided by the filing of a nolle prosequi by the prosecutor.171 In the case at
bar, the state entered the nolle prosequi after the ninety day period had run
and there being no requirement that the failure to request a discharge by the
child after the initial ninety days had run constitutes a waiver, the
government could not reinstitute delinquency proceedings.172
Florida has an expansive statute dealing with the transfer of juveniles to
adult court which provides for both direct filing and transfer from the
juvenile court. 17 In State v. Davis,174 over the state's objections, the trial
court in the juvenile division conducted a bond hearing for a custody release
after the state had advised the court that the matter was set for arraignment
before a judge in the adult felony division.175 The appeals court held that the
lower court departed from its statutory obligation to immediately order that
the juvenile be transported to the adult county jail upon the state's
announcement that the charges had been direct filed in the adult division
where the child would subseuently be booked, processed, and released in
the normal course as an adult.
r 6
In an important decision, the Supreme Court of Florida recently upheld
as constitutional the Florida statutory rape statute 177 as it applied to two
fifteen-year-old boys who engaged in consensual sex with two twelve-year-
old girls in J.A.S. v. State. The court had previously dealt with the
question in the context of adults charged with consensual sexual intercourse
with persons under the age of sixteen in B.B. v. State179 and Jones v. State. 80
In J.A.S., the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in a consensual
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. P.G., 711 So. 2d at 189 (citing State v. T.W., 679 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
172. Id. at 189-90.
173. See generally FLA. STAT. § 985 (1997).
174. 699 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
175. Id. at 848.
176. Id. See FLA STAT. § 985.215(4)(a) (Supp. 1998).
177. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1997).
178. 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
179. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
180. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
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setting finding that the state had a compelling interest in intervening to stop
sexual misconduct even when consensual. The court also refused to
extend the minor's privacy rights which had been established in the abortion
context in In re T.W.182 In B.B., the court had found section 794.05 of the
Florida Statutes unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case,
specifically as both the charged defendant and the alleged consenting victim
were age sixteen.183 The question there was whether the statute which
applied to two juveniles in the context of claims of juvenile delinquency
involved intimate acts which fell within the zone of privacy recognized by
both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution under theS184
T. W. holding. The court held that it did, specifically distinguishing the
185
adult/minor situation from the minor/minor situation. However, in J.A.S.,
the court recognized what it viewed as the fundamental distinction that the
defendants were two fifteen-year-old boys and the two victims were two
twelve-year-old jirls, as opposed to all of the youngsters being sixteen-year-
olds as in B.B. 1 6 The court concluded in J.A.S. that on a balancing of
interests, the state's compelling interest in protecting children from harmful
sexual conduct outweighed the right of privacy of the defendants. 187 The
state had a compelling interest in protecting twelve-year-olds from older
teenagers and from their own immaturity in engaging in harmful conduct.1
88
The appellate courts have been faced on a number of occasions with
appeals from adjudications of delinquency for disorderly conduct based
upon findings that the child used loud, obscene, and/or verbal protests. In
K.S. v. State,189 a juvenile appealed from an adjudication based upon a
finding that the child cursed at a police officer for what he felt was an
unjustified accusation. 19° Relying on a long line of cases, the court reversed,
holding that the child's words did not inflict injury or constitute intent to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.i9' On the other hand, in K.A.C. v.
State,192 the court upheld the adjudication for resisting an officer without
181. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1383.
182. Id.; 551 So. 2d 1186 (FIa. 1989).
183. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260. See also 1995 Survey supra note 109, at 197-98.
184. Id. at 258.
185. Id. at 259.
186. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1383-85.
187. Id. at 1386.
188. Id.
189. 697 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
190. Id. at 1276.
191. Id. See also H.K. v. State, 711 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); L.A.T. v.
State, 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Livingston v. State, 610 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
192. 707 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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violence because the essence of the offense was the refusal to respond to
questions that officers had a right to ask as opposed to, as in prior cases, a
charge based upon what the youth said in the form of loud profanity directed
at the police.
193 "
The appeals courts have made clear that when multiple offenses
constitute the basis for a delinquency adjudication, separate disposition
orders for each offense must be used. Nonetheless, the trial courts
continually fail to comply with this provision. For example, in DA.D. v.
State,194 the state filed three separate petitions for delinquency against the
child. 195 The court used a single commitment order for all three offenses in
clear violation of prior case law.
196
Section 874.03(3) of the Florida Statutes provides that in a course of
the commission or solicitation of two or more felonies or violent
misdemeanors on separate occasions within a three-year period an individual• •197 198
can be declared a member of a criminal street gang. In S.L. v. State, a
juvenile appealed from the declaration that he was a member of criminal
street gang.199 The appeals court reversed finding that there was no
demonstration of a pattern of criminal street gang activity necessary to make
the law applicable. 2°° The court held that gang membership alone is
insufficient to declare a person a member of a criminal street gang.21 Here,
only the gang membership was proven. The officers testified that the
juvenile admitted to being a member of the "Latin Lords" and when he was
arrested had "Latin Lords" graffiti in his book bag.202 But there was no
showing that the Latin Lords committed, or attempted to commit two or
more felonies or violent misdemeanors. 203
The issue of proper application of Miranda warnings in the context of
juveniles comes up regularlyn Florida appellate case law. This year was no
different. In State v. R.M., the state appealed from an order suppressing
193. Id. at 1177 (citing L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Livingston v. State, 610 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
194. 697 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing D.D.M. v. State, 662 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1995); T.A.R. v.
State, 640 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); see also A.V.B. v. State, 715 So. 2d 954
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
197. FLA. STAT. § 874.03(3) (Supp. 1998).
198. 708 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
199. Id. at 1007.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1008.
202. Id. at 1007.
203. S.L, 708 So. 2d at 1008.
204. 696 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997).
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evidence and the appeals court affirmed, applying the Florida rules that the
confession must be shown to be voluntary, °5 and the burden is on the state
to establish voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence 2°6 based upon
the totality of the circumstances. In the R.M. case, the court upheld the
suppression in light of the facts of the case which were described as a
fourteen-year-old who had been in a home with a younger sister when the
detective arrested her for strong arm robbery.208 The child was handcuffed,
placed in a squad car, and taken to the police station to a brightly lit
interrogation room where the detective said it would be in the child's best
interests to give a statement because he would go to court and tell the judge
that she had been cooperative. The child's mother was not called and the
detective did not tell the child that she could have her mother present. The
youngster said she talked to the officer because her mother had told her in
the past that it was proper to cooperate with people and to be polite to
adults. 209
In juvenile delinquency proceedings certain discovery is permitted
under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.21° The issue before the Third
District Court of Appeal in State v. D.R. was whether the respondent child,
through counsel, could issue a subpoena duces tecum.212 The State filed a
motion for a protective order to quash on the ground that subpoenas duces
213tecum are not permitted without leave of the court. The appeals court held
that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure governing discovery
depositions in criminal matters do not allow such subpoenas without
permission of the court and that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
governing depositions are identical to the criminal rule.2 14 Because the
Supreme Court of Florida approved the construction of the criminal rule, the
same construction should apply in juvenile court.215
A recent enactment dealing with youth crime was the passage in 1994
by Dade County of a Comprehensive Anti-Graffiti Ordinance which made it
216illegal to sell spray paint cans and broad tipped markers to minors. A
205. Id. at 451; see Coffee v. State, 6 So. 493, 496 (1889).
206. State v. Kettering, 483 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
207. See Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1958).
208. R.M., 696 So. 2d at 451.
209. Id.
210. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.060.
211. 701 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 121.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Heath v. Becktell, 327 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976) (construing FIA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220
(1976)).
216. DADE COUNTY CODE § 21-30.01 (1994).
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minor challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, which makes it a
misdemeanor to have broad-tipped markers or spray paint with the intent to
draw graffitti, in D.P. v. State.217 The Third District Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of the anti-graffiti ordinance because it did not
place an outright ban on the possession of spray paint or jumbo markers by
minors and thus did not violate the juvenile's due process or equal
protection rights. 1 Judge Green dissented, finding the ordinance facially
unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of both the state and
federal Constitution. 9
C. Dispositional Issues
An important form of disposition in Florida delinquency cases is
restitution. Trial courts have had difficul applying the principles of
restitution in such cases.220 In D.J.R. v. State, 1 a juvenile was charged with
attempted burglary and pleaded to the lessor crime of petit theft.22
Specifically, he pleaded to cutting an alarm wire at a commercial business. 223
The wire was subsequently repaired and yet six hours later an unrelated
burglary and theft occurred at the same business. 4 At that time, the alarm
was functioning properly and was triggered .2m Incredibly, the trial court
imposed restitution for items stolen in the burglary the following morning at
the same location.226 The appellate court held that the state may not require
the child to pay restitution for damages that were not caused by or related to
the child's criminal episode and were not included in the child's plea.
227
The Florida statutory provisions concerning restitution provide that the
amount of restitution may not exceed an amount the child and the parent or
guardian may reasonably pay.22M However, the court has flexibility in
fashioning the restitution requirements. In M.H. v. State,229 the court entered
217. 705 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
218. Id. at 596-97.
219. Id. at 598 (Green, J., dissenting).
220. See 1997 Survey, supra note 95, at 199-201; 1995 Survey, supra note 109, at 199-
200.
221. 701 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. D.J.R., 701 So. 2d at 383.
227. Id. at 384 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(b)2 (1995)).
228. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)l.d.6. (Supp. 1998).
229. 698 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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230a restitution order liquidating the restitution. As to actual payment, the
court held that the child would begin to pay no later than thirty days
following either her sixteenth birthday or gaining employment, whichever
came first 231 The court of appeals approved this determination finding that
a flexible statutory scheme encourages restitution both to compensate
victims and to serve the rehabilitative and deterrent rules of the juvenile
justice system. The court added that a reasonable reading of the statute
allows the court to revisit the payment schedule issue as the child ages and
life skills and earning capacity crystallize.233
Restitution orders must also be made in timely fashion. The Supreme
Court of Florida has said that restitution may be ordered within sixty days of
sentencing although the determination and amount to be paid may be made
23423beyond the sixty day period. In LO. v. State,235 the court ordered a child
to pay $1,060 in restitution for injuries resulting when the respondent hit a
fellow student breaking the student's tooth. 236 While the trial court did not
enter a written order of restitution at the time of sentencing or within sixty
days thereafter, the appeals court concluded that the trial court put the child
and counsel on notice that the juvenile would be responsible for restitution
as the trial court made a timely reservation of jurisdiction to award
restitution in its oral pronouncement and then some months later set the
exact amount to be paid.237 The court rejected several First District Court of
Appeal cases which held that an oral reservation of jurisdiction would be
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court of Florida case
law.23
8
An important dispositional issue recently came before the Supreme
Court of Florida in P.W.G. v. State.239 The issue was whether the trial court
in a delinquency case can order placement in a particular facility based upon
criminal conduct for which the child had not been charged. 2F4 The childclaimed that such a basis for disposition violated his right to substantive due
230. Id. at 396.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 397.
234. State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993).
235. 697 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1275.
238. See T.W.L. v. State, 684 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Campbell v. State,
614 So. 2d. 600 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993); King v. State, 611 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
239. 702 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1997).
240. Id. at 490.
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process of law under both the state and federal constitutions. 241 There had
been substantial evidence in the predisposition report of the child's unproven
prior sexual abuse and sexual battery of relatives.242 The pre-disposition
report concluded, in light of the child's history, that he could benefit from a
treatment program focused upon sexual offenders.243  But, because such
treatment is only available in programs classified as high risk restrictiveness
level, the recommendation was that he be committed to the Department at
such a level.244 In light of the distinction between the goal of the juvenile
delinquency system and the adult criminal justice system-rehabilitation in
the case of the former toward the end of preventing delinquent children from
becoming adult offenders-it was constitutionally permissible for the trial
court to impose whatever treatment plan it concluded was most likely to be
effective for the particular child.245 This comported with the court's parens
patriae approach.
Under Florida law, when an alleged juvenile delinquent has been
determined to be incompetent, the trial court may order commitment of the
child accused of delinquent acts to DCF, but only where the alleged act
constitutes a felony.247 Significantly, as the court held in Department of
Children & Family Services v. A.A.S.T.M., 4 the DCF may not receive a
child determined to be incompetent where the charge is merely a
misdemeanor.249 The court said nothing about what happens to a child under
these circumstances.
The Florida disposition statute in delinquency cases provides for a
variet of legislatively authorized dispositional alternatives. In C.M. v.
State, a child entered a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated fleeing or
attempting to elude a law enforcement officer but objected to a condition of
community control requiring him to write a letter of apology to the driver of
the car he was following and to have no contact with his or her property.
2
The appeals court held that, under the facts of the case, the disposition met
the appropriate standard of being reasonably related to the offense, to
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. P.W.G., 702 So. 2d at 490.
245. Id. at 491.
246. Id.
247. FLA. STAT. § 985.223 (Supp. 1998).
248. 706 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
249. Id. at 367.
250. FLA. STAT. § 985.231 (1997).
251. 696 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
252. Id. at 1350.
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rehabilitation of the child, or protection of the public, and was therefore, a
valid condition of probation or community control.5 3
Under Florida law it has been held that conduct which is offensive to
the court and which shows a lack of contrition or remorse is not sufficient to
overcome the burden placed upon a trial court when it disregards placement
recommendations by DJJ. In R.D.S. v. State,55 the court elected to
disregard the minimum risk placement recommendation of DJJ.2 5 6 The court
found the child's body language disrespectful and contemptuous.25 7 The
appeals court held that in order to disregard such a recommendation the
court's reasons must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
therefore, it reversed. 8
As a general proposition, in Florida, the disposition in a juvenile court
proceeding can be no longer than the sentence of an adult convicted of a
crime.25 9 In M.G. v. State,2w the court adjudicated a child to have committed
the offense of battery and ordered her to serve an unspecified period of
community control as a sanction. 261 The appeals court held that because the
trial court adjudicated her delinquent, an independent period of community
control was improper. 262 The disposition imposed must be limited to the
amount of time for which an adult could be sentenced for the same crime.
2 63
It is only when a juvenile has had the adjudication withheld that an
indeterminate period of community control is a proper disposition.2
4
The Florida statute contains five restrictiveness levels of placement as
to which the DJJ makes recommendations. 265 The First and Second District
Courts of Appeal differ as to whether the court must seek an additional
recommendation from DJJ after rejecting a recommendation of a particular
restrictiveness level. The First District takes the position that a
recommendation of community control is not a "restrictiveness level" so that
the court's decision not to follow a recommendation requires a re-
253. Id. at 1351.
254. See generally R.D.S. v. State, 696 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
255. 696 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
256. Id. at 1189.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See M.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
260. 696 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
261. Id. at 1341.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. FLA. STAT. § 985.03(46) (Supp. 1998).
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submission to the Department for a recommended restrictiveness level.266
The Second District takes the view that a recommendation of community
control is a restriction and thus, no further submission to the Department is
required when the trial court decides to depart from the recommended
sanction.' In H.H. v. State, 8 the Fifth District Court of Appeal referenced
the opinions from the two other districts but found, under the facts of the
case, that the Department had recommended a particular restrictiveness
level, and the court departed from the prior holdings of the first and second
districts.269 Thus, where community control played no part in the trial court
opinion, the departure was appropriate.270 Finally, in L.R.J. v. State,27' the
First District Court of Appeal certified the question of whether alternative
recommendations are necessary as follows:
DOES THE TRIAL JUDGE, ACTING AFTER A DISPOSITION
HEARING AND BASED ON SPECIFIC REASONS, HAVE
AUTHORITY TO REJECT THE DEPARTMENT'S
COMMUNITY CONTROL RECOMMENDATION WITHOUT
REMANDING THE CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION?272
The appellate courts continue to admonish the trial courts on appeals
relating to the trial courts' commitments of delinquent children to restrictive
levels greater than those recommended by the DJJ because the court believed
the children had lied at trial. In D.A.J. v. State,273 the appellate court
reversed, explaining once again that such action by the court would
impermissibly chill the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the
child at trial.274
266. See T.M. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997); C.A.J. v. State, 706
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
267. See D.L.B. v. State, 707 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 720 So.
2d 202 (Fla. 1998).
268. 712 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
269. Id. at 1203-04.
270. Id. at 1204.
271. 706 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 720 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1998). See
also P.A. v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D429 (lst Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1998), rev'd, 720 So. 2d
210 (Fla. 1998); E.D.P. v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D348 (1st Dist. CL App. Jan. 27, 1998),
rev'd, 724 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1998).
272. LR.J., 706 So. 2d at 73.
273. 699 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
274. Id. at 813.
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The Florida statute governing juvenile proceedings contains an
extensive provision governing contempt and contempt sanctions.275 In
276N.M.R. v. State, a juvenile appealed from a contempt citation for failure to
complete court-ordered sanctions and community control that resulted in a
sentence of ninety days in jail for indirect criminal contempt.277  The
appellate court held that the contempt statute does not provide for jail as an
alternative sanction. 278 Because the appellant was under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, the appellate court held that the trial court erred by
sentencing her as an adult for violation of a court-imposed order while she
was under the age of eighteen. 9
D. Appellate Issues
The Supreme Court of Florida recently cleared up a question of
appellate procedure that had been troubling the intermediate appellate
280 281courts. The question in State v. T.M.B. was whether sections
924.051(3)-(4) of the Florida Statutes, which describe the procedure for
preserving appeals in criminal cases, applies to juvenile delinquency
cases.282 The court held that the sections did not apply because the juvenile
system is different from the adult system, focusing on rehabilitation rather
than punishment.2 3 In addition, the terms and conditions of juvenile appeals
are addressed exhaustively in chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and the
legislature intended chapter 39 to govern delinquency proceedings.5
E. Statutory Changes
The legislature made a number of modest changes relating to
delinquency matters during the 1998 session. It amended section 985.231 of
275. See FLA. STAT. § 985.216 (Supp. 1998); see also discussion supra at p. 14-15.
276. 711 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
277. Id. at 145-46.
278. Id. at 148.
279. Id.
280. See J.D.B. v. State, 720 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 720 So. 2d
211 (Fla. 1998); T.M.B. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1997), aft'd, 716 So.
2d 269 (Fla. 1998); R.A.M. v. State, 695 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 716
So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1998).
281. 716 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1998).
282. Id. at 269.
283. Id. at 270-71.
284. Id. See also State v. A.L.W., 717 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1998); State v. B.D.W., 717 So.
2d 460 (Fla. 1998). In 1997, the legislature moved the delinquency provisions from chapter 39 to
chapter 985. See Dale, supra note 96, at 202-205.
844 [Vol. 23:819
37
: Nova Law Review 23, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
1999]
the Florida Statutes to provide that the trial court may order a juvenile to
undergo random substance abuse testing during the dispositional phase of a• 285
delinquency case upon recommendation of DJJ. Testing may also occur
after the disposition in the case of a petition alleging a violation of
community control or aftercare.28 6 The legislature also amended section
985.309 of the Florida Statutes to continue providing local funds to operate
boot camps that are to be operated under the supervisory authority of sheriffs
under contract with the DJJ.2 7 The continued funding is interesting in light
of the fact that there is a growing bog of national literature questioning the
rehabilitative benefits of boot camps. 
8
A separate change in dispositional alternatives is the provision for court
jurisdiction to place a child who violates community control or aftercare into
a residential consequence unit which is a secure location used for children
violating community control or aftercare or for youth determined by the
court to have violated conditions of community control or aftercare if there
is a consequence unit available.289 The legislature changed the title of intake
counselors and case managers to juvenile probation officers with the result
that the terminology now matches that found throughout the country. 290 The
legislature also took a first step toward dealing with juvenile sexual
offenders by establishing a task force to make recommendations for
standards relating to licensed professionals who work with juvenile
offenders and victims.291 The legislature further authorized a local child
protection team or state attorney to establish a sexual abuse intervention
network, in order to collaborate on programs for juvenile offenders and
victims and to obtain funds from the Office of the Attorney General or other
funding sources. 292 The law now requires DCF and DJJ to disclose to school
superintendents the presence of a juvenile with a known history of predatory
sexual behavior who is an adjudicated juvenile sexual offender. Finally,
the legislature passed a bill authorizing the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board
285. Ch. 98-55, § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 361, 362 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1
(Supp. 1998)).
286. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1 (Supp. 1998).
287. See generally Ch. 98-282, 1998 Fla. Laws 2495-99 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.
309 (Supp. 1998)).
288. See generally Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders, OFFICE OF JUVENLE JUSTICE &
DEIjNQUENCY PREVENTION (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 1997, at 32-33.
289. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)lc (Supp. 1998).
290. FLA. STAT. § 985.03(32) (Supp. 1998).
291. FtA. STAT. § 985.403 (Supp. 1998).
292. Id.
293. See FLA STAT. § 39.411 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 490.012 (Supp. 1998); FA.
STAT. § 490.0145 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 985.308 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 985.04 (Supp.
1998).
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to conduct a study on a number of educational matters in the juvenile justice
system.294
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida appellate courts continue a long tradition of admonitions to
the trial courts to comply with the statutory mandates of chapters 39 and
985. At the same time, the appellate courts continue the laudable process of
statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court of Florida has handed down
several important cases including its most recent interpretation of statutory
295
rape.
Finally, the legislature, while not active in the delinquency field to the
extent it has been in prior years, did make a number of significant changes to• 296
the dependency and termination of parental rights statute. The most
significant was the expansion of the right to counsel for indigent parents in
dependency proceedings, a long overdue change.
297
294. See generally FLA. STAT. § 230.23 (Supp. 1998).
295. See J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
296. See, e.g., 1998 Fla. Laws 98-403; 1998 Fla. Laws 98-417.
297. FLA. STAT. § 39.013 (Supp. 1998).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sam Brown is in his early twenties. He has a drug problem and has
been in and out of courts throughout his life, once on a murder charge. Sam
moves to a small town in upstate New York, and over the course of two
years, he goes on a killing spree. He selects his victims from among the
town's most vulnerable youths. He finds them outside schools and in the
local park. He picks teenagers with family problems, high school dropouts,
and even a thirteen-year-old ninth-grader. These kids go with him
voluntarily. They do not know the danger they are in or that Sam is carrying
a deadly weapon with him wherever he goes. One at a time, Sam kills ten of
* Mona Markus is a 1998 cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School. She will be a
legal writing instructor at the University of Miami School of Law in the 1999-2000 school
year. Ms. Markus extends her thanks to David Markus, Prof. Carol Steiker, and her family.
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the girls. Although his crimes are detected, Sam is not put on trial. Why
does Sam escape prosecution?
Sam Brown's real name is Nushawn Williams.! Mr. Williams, who is
HIV-positive, is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with at least forty-
eight females2 after having learned of his HIV status in 1996, and to have
kept a tally of the women with whom he had intimate relations.3 At least
thirteen of these females (ages thirteen to twenty-two) are believed to have
contracted the HIV virus from Mr. Williams,a ten of them after he learned he
was HIV-positive. Two of these women have given birth to HIV-positive
babies.5 One young man was also infected when he had sex with one of the
females.6 Absent a medical breakthrough, these sixteen people will die of
HIV7 as a result of Mr. Williams' actions.'
1. With only minor alterations, this could be the story of other HIV-transmitters as well.
For example, in Vicksburg, Mississippi, 52 women identified an HIV-positive man as the
source of their venereal disease infection, and 12 of them, ages 14-20, also have tested
positive for HIV. See Shannon Brownlee et al., AIDS Comes to Small-Town America, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 10, 1997, at 52.
In Missouri and Illinois, a man named Darnell McGee, who tested positive for HIV in
1992, infected at least 30 women and had sex with hundreds more. See Kristina Sauerwein,
Some HIV Carriers Don't Care Who They Have Sex With, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 23,
1997, at B1.
In Traverse City, Michigan, an HIV-positive man named James Jones had sex with at
least 10 females, ages 15-35, without disclosing his HIV-infection and usually without using
condoms. See Jim Dyer and Kristin Storey, In Traverse City: HIV Carrier Ignites Town Sex
Scandal, THE DErROrT NEwS, Dec. 19, 1997, at Cl. It is not known whether any of these
women actually contracted the disease. See John Flesher, HIV-Infected Man to be Charged
With Failing to Notify Partners, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL
4897239.
2. Henry L. Davis, Latest Tests Reveal Williams Allegedly Infected 13 Women,
BuFFAO NEwS, Dec. 10, 1997, at B4. These 48 women had sexual relations with 85 other
people. Id. In addition, 10 of Mr. Williams's sexual partners in New York City have tested
positive for HIV, but it is not known if they contracted the disease from Mr. Williams or from
someone else. See Richard Perez-Pena, Two Births Lengthen List in One-Man H.I. V. Spree,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at B5.
3. See Brownlee, supra note 1.
4. See Davis, supra note 2.
5. See Perez-Pena, supra note 2.
6. See Davis, supra note 2.
7. Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") is the name given to a virus that invades
the body's immune system. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") describes a
number of related conditions that are usually, but not always, the actual cause of death in the
people infected with the HIV virus. See Eric L. Schulman, Sleeping With the Enemy:
Combatting the Sexual Spread of HIV-AIDS Through A Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 957, 962-63 (1996). For the purposes of this article, both AIDS and HIV
will be referred to as HIV.
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Nonetheless, the only crime for which Mr. Williams has been charged
thus far is statutory rape for his sexual relationship with the thirteen-year-old
girl who contracted HIV from Mr. Williams. Prosecutors likely will not
charge him with murder or attempted murder because they would be unlikely
to get a conviction. 9 There is strong circumstantial evidence that these
women contracted HIV from Mr. Williams, in light of the women's youth,
their relatively limited number of sexual partners, and the fact that these
crimes took place in a small town.' ° Yet, proving murder or attempted
murder will be difficult for other reasons. For one thing, the women are still
alive and are likely to outlive Mr. Williams, who contracted the virus before
the women. Additionally, evidence of intent to kill, an element of both
murder and attempted murder, is unavailable.
Mr. Williams may be charged with assault in the first degree and/or
reckless endangerment, which carry maximum sentences of twenty-five and
seven years, respectively."1 However, proving these crimes will also be
difficult, because they require a showing of present physical injury, which
might require proof that the victims are showing symptoms. Furthermore,
the prosecution would have to show that the victims contracted the disease
from Mr. Williams, which is also challenging to prove. Similar prosecutions
in other states, against other modem day "Typhoid Harrys, ' ' 2 have not been
successful for these reasons. 3 Thus, Mr. Williams may well serve no time
for the deaths of these women. Moreover, Mr. Williams' conduct as to the
numerous other women who were put at risk of contracting the disease, but
did not actually contract it, will go unpunished.
8. While new treatments such as protease inhibitors have improved the conditions of
HIV-infected people, there is no cure for the disease. See id. at 959. It is invariably fatal.
9. Jennifer Tanaka & Gregory Beals, The Victims' Stories, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1997,
at 58-59.
10. Unlike larger, more populous areas, Chautauqua County employs only one full-time
contract tracer. Because this one individual was informed of each positive test result from Mr.
Williams' victims, he was able to identify the links between them and therefore to determine
Mr. Williams' identity. See Richard Perez-Pena, Tracing an HIV Outbreak, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Nov. 16, 1997, at A27. Had this epidemic occurred in a jurisdiction with more contact
tracers, Mr. Williams might not have been identified as the source of the infections. Id.
11. See Brian A. Brown, The Charge is Murder, the Weapon AIDS, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 1997, at 10.
12. Tanaka & Beals, supra note 9, at 55.
13. See, e.g., Linda Deutsch, Attempted-Murder Charges Dropped in AIDS-Blood
Case, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 2, 1987, at A03 (discussing dismissed attempted murder
charge against a defendant who sold AIDS-infected blood to a plasma bank); Joseph Perkins,
HIV Nushawn: A New Age Typhoid Mary, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at 15B
(discussing failure of prosecutors to obtain felony convictions against HIV-positive men who
had unprotected sex without disclosing HIV-infection).
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If Mr. Williams had infected these women in a different state, a far
more effective tool might be available to prosecutors. At least twenty-nine
states 1 4 have statutes that criminalize exposing an individual to the HIV virus
without disclosing HIV-positive status ("HIV transmission/exposure"
laws). While these statutes vary in terms of the particular conduct prohibited
and the degree of specificity of the statutory language, they share a common
purpose: to deter and punish those who spread a fatal disease ("HIV-
transmitters"). 5 Of course, their application is not limited to individuals like
Mr. Williams who have exposed only casual contacts, but extends to any
HIV-positive individuals who do not take care to protect others, including
loved ones, from exposure to the disease.
These statutes do have their drawbacks. 6 For example, they may
discourage testing, as an individual can only be guilty of the offense if he or
she knows he or she is HIV-positive. Also, enforcement of the statutes
may impede efforts to preserve the confidentiality of medical records. Fur-
thermore, broader statutes, such as those that include exposure to sweat and
other noninfectious bodily substances among the list of prohibited activities,
may further public misconceptions about what activities can spread the virus.
Also, these broad statutes arguably criminalize conduct having no possibility
of infecting a partner."8
Despite these significant disadvantages, HIV transmission/exposure statutes
are preferable to traditional criminal statutes as a means to punish and deter HIV
transmission and exposure 9 for several reasons. First, these statutes remove
many of the barriers to conviction posed by traditional criminal statutes to ensure
that guilty perpetrators will be punished. Addi-tionally, they signal to the public
14. According to the National Conference on State Legislatures, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington make it a felony to knowingly
transmit or expose another to HIV. Alabama, Kansas, Maryland, and Montana consider this a
misdemeanor offense, and North Dakota considers it an infraction. Lee Sanchez & Stephanie
Wilson, Criminalization of HIV Transmission and Exposure (Mar. 31, 1998)
<http://www.stateserv.hpts.orgtpublic/issueb.nsf/97e745f9e5ddca852564fOOO7b3abd/8921
b028fca1962852565c5005b60ad?OpenDocument>.
15. Most HIV transmission/exposure statutes, including the model statute contained in
the Appendix, prohibit other kinds of conduct like needle sharing or organ selling in addition
to exposure through sexual conduct. For the most part, consideration of other prohibitions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
16. See discussion infra Part III.C.
17. The issue of what constitutes knowledge is addressed infra Part III.A. 1.
18. See Thomas W. Tierney, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV. An
International Analysis, 15 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 475,487 (1991).
19. See id. at 512-13.
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that spreading the HIV virus is criminal conduct that will not be tolerated. By
specifically delineating to HIV-positive individuals what activities are prohibited,
states send a clear message that people who engage in risky behavior will be
prosecuted through the criminal laws.20 This is actually advantageous to HIV-
positive individuals, because they know exactly what conduct is, in fact,
prohibited, and what conduct is permissible. Under general criminal offenses,
HIV-positive individuals may avoid many non-risky activities because a broad
range of behavior could potentially satisfy the elements of an offense.
After awareness was raised by the Jamestown epidemic allegedly
caused by Mr. Williams, New York legislators began pushing for such a
law. Assemblyman Stephen B. Kaufman (82d District, Albany, NY) has
introduced legislation creating the crime of aggravated reckless
endangerment for individuals who knowingly expose others to IV through
uninformed sexual contact or needle sharing. The crime would be
punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment.21 The remaining twenty
states should follow suit, and establish the offense of "HIV
transmission/exposure,"' ' to ensure that those who knowingly expose others
to a fatal disease will be brought to justice.
II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE CRIMINAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH REMEDIES
A. General Criminal Offenses
It is sometimes possible to prosecute those who knowingly transmit the
HIV virus through existing criminal statutes.23 In fact, such prosecutions
1 20. Despite continued efforts at public education, there is disturbing evidence that
people are engaging in risky sexual practices. For example, a recent NEWSWEEK article reports
that there is a growing number of gay men, known as barebackers, who do not practice safe
sex. See Marc Peyser, A Deadly Dance, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1997, at 76-77. And a recent
Gallup poll shows that the number of Americans concerned about contracting AIDS has
dropped from 42% in October 1987 to 30% in October 1997. See Charles W. Henderson, HIV
Transmission (Health) Fear and Appraisal of Safe-Sex Warnings in NY Scare, AIDS WEEKLY
PLUS, Nov. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14715036.
21. Other HIV-related bills have been introduced in New York, including one that
would impose mandatory testing for prison inmates who attack prison guards (A.5795, 220th
Leg. (N.Y. 1997) (introduced by Assemblyman Daniel L. Feldman, D-Brooklyn)), and another
that would weaken confidentiality laws to aid health agencies in their efforts to locate sex
partners of infected people (A.6629, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997) (introduced by Assemblywoman
Nettie Mayersohn, D-Queens)).
22. For a proposed statute, see Appendix infra.
23. Additionally, the victim of an HIV-transmitter may seek recourse through tort
law. For a discussion of tort recovery for HIV transmission, see Schulman, supra note 7, at
968-71.
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have been made in the past, sometimes successfully.24 Many of these
prosecutions involved HIV-positive individuals who knew of their respective
infections, and who bit other people, usually police officers or prison
guards.2 Depending on the conduct involved, criminal offenses such as
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, assault, or
reckless endangerment might be used to prosecute those who expose others
to the HIV virus.
Some commentators have argued that these general criminal statutes are
appropriate for use in prosecuting HIV-transmitters. 26 A traditional murder
statute, for example, is generally applied to all sorts of homicides, regardless
of the particular circumstances or the weapons used. According to this
argument, the HIV virus is a deadly weapon like any other.27 Just as killing
someone with the use of a gun, knife, or hammer is considered to be murder,
so should killing someone with the use of the HIV virus be considered
murder. Under this view, general criminal statutes are as well suited for use
in HIV prosecutions as in any other crime.
However, HIV prosecutions are unlike those arising under other
circumstances. They involve unique considerations that render them ill
fitted for prosecution under general criminal statutes. Not only does each
general criminal offense contain elements that are difficult to prove in the
context of HIV prosecutions, but also the use of general criminal statutes is
disadvantageous to defendants and potential defendants.
24. See, e.g., State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the assault
convictions of an HIV-positive defendant who had engaged in unprotected oral, anal, and
vaginal intercourse); Zule v. State, 802 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the
conviction of an HIV-positive man who had anal intercourse with a minor). Additionally,
knowing exposure of others to HIV is sometimes considered an aggravating factor for
purposes of sentences imposed for the commission of other crimes such as sexual assault or
rape. See, e.g., State v. Guayante, 783 P.2d 1030, 1032 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987) (upholding the
assault conviction of an HIV-positive inmate who bit a corrections officer); State v. Smith,
621 A.2d 493 (N.J. 1993) (upholding the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions
of an HIV-positive inmate who bit corrections officers); Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding the aggravated assault with intent to murder conviction of a
person who bit a police officer).
26. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen & Jeffrey S. Deutschman, A Proposal to Repeal the
Illinois HIV Transmission Statute, 78 ILL. B. J. 592, 596 (1990).
27. In fact, in Texas, an HIV-positive defendant's penis and bodily fluids have been
held to be deadly weapons sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. See
Najera v. State, 955 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The Model Penal Code defines
"deadly weapon" as "any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance,
whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is
known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury." MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.0 (1985).
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The application of murder statutes to IV transmission demonstrates
that general criminal statutes are undesirable for use in prosecuting these
cases. Under the Model Penal Code,2' a defendant is guilty of murder where
he purposefully or knowingly caused the death of another human being, or
where such death is caused by an action "committed recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life."29 A conviction for murder requires that three elements be proved:
1) conduct; 2) state of mind; and 3) causation.30
The first element, proof of conduct, is the easiest to establish.31 It
requires a showing that the defendant engaged in the conduct that resulted in
I-V transmission. For example, it might involve the presentation of
evidence that the defendant did have sexual relations with the victim. It is
the second and third of these elements that pose barriers to effective
prosecution. 2
As to the second element, the perpetrator must have the intent to kill
through transmission of the IV virus. For first degree murder, the actor
must know of his or her IV-positive status, and must desire to spread the
virus to another person. This element may not be present in many IlV
transmission cases, as the goal of the perpetrator may not be to spread the
virus, but just to have sexual relations.3 Even where the perpetrator did plan
or hope to spread the virus, this is difficult to prove absent an admission by
the defendant.
Lesser degrees of murder require a knowing or reckless state of mind,34
which are perhaps easier to establish but are nonetheless
28. While many states do not follow the Model Penal Code, this paper will refer to
Model Penal Code definitions because of the wide variety of statutes that have been enacted
by the fifty states.
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1985). In states that have enacted the common
law, murder is defined as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought.
30. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1), (2) (1985).
31. For instance, in the Nushawn Williams case, Mr. Williams admitted to having had
sexual relations with many of the victims. James Barron, Officials Link Man to 11 Teen-Agers
With H.IV., NEw YoRK TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1997, at A2. In fact, he himself identified many of
them to public health officials. Id.
32. See Marvin E. Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is Being Criminalized, 3 CRIM.
JUST. 6, 8 (1988).
33. When an individual discharges a gun at someone's head or thrusts a knife at a
person's chest, the intent to injure or kill usually can be readily inferred from the conduct
itself. However, when an HIV-positive individual engages in sexual activity, such an intent
can not be presumed.
34. Common law states such as Maryland generally indicate what types of murder
constitute first degree, such as that committed in perpetration of a rape, see MD. CODE
ANN., Crimes and Punishments §§ 408-10 (Supp. 1998), and classify all types of murder that
do not fall into these categories as second-degree murder, see id. § 411.
1999]
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
challenging. Reckless murder, for example, requires conscious awareness
both of HIV-positive status and of the risk of infecting another through the
contested behavior, accompanied by "extreme indifference to the value of
human life. 35  And knowing murder, which requires knowledge that the
conduct will result in death, is probably impossible to establish in light of
the fact that the virus is not transmitted by every sexual or other bodily
contact.36
Even where the requisite degree of intent can be shown, the third
element, causation, often presents an insurmountable barrier to conviction. It
is difficult to establish that the disease was contracted from the defendant,
especially where the victim has had multiple sexual partners or numerous
possible sources of infection.37 The potentially long period between
exposure and detection exacerbates this problem. It can take as long as ten
years before a victim develops symptoms of the HIV virus. Unless the
victim goes in for an HIV test before this time, he or she will not know until
long after that the criminal act has taken place. Even where the victim does
go in for testing absent symptoms, it can take as many as six months or more
before the victim is seropositive, meaning that the IIIV virus is detectable in
the blood.39  Given these obstacles, establishing causation may not be
possible.4°
The final challenge in prosecuting HIV-transmitters under traditional
murder statutes is that the prosecution cannot proceed until the victim
dies. Although HIV is invariably fatal, the victim may not die for many
years.4 Clearly, such a delay will significantly hinder both the prosecution
and the defense in a case brought under a murder statute. Also, many states
still follow the year and a day rule, whereby murder cannot be charged
unless the victim dies within a year and a day of the criminal activity.42
Further, given that the defendant also has the HIV virus, and necessarily
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1985).
36. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the
State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 162-63 (1988).
37. For a discussion of the issues involved in proving even the relatedness of two
individuals' HIV-infections, much less evidence of causation. See State v. Schmidt, 699 So.
2d 448 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
38. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 966.
39. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 480-81.
40. See id. at 493.
41. According to research current in February 1996, 95% of people with HIV will die
within 12 years of contracting the disease. See Najera v. State, 955 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1997).
42. See State v. Minster, 486 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Md. 1985) (citing jurisdictions
retaining the year and a day rule).
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contracted it before the victim, it is likely that he or she will have died before
the prosecution can go forward, rendering the prosecution moot.
43
Prosecutions for HIV transmission under traditional murder statutes are
also unfair to defendants. In addition to the fact that they may take place
long after the actual exposure occurred, there may be no protection for
defendants who warned victims of their HIV-positive status. Because
consent is not a defense to murder, even those sexual contacts that took place
after full disclosure by the HIV-positive individual, and after a conscious
affirmance of the desire to proceed with the sexual encounter by the
"victim," would be considered criminal.44 Thus, HIV-positive individuals
are effectively banned from engaging in any sexual contact whatsoever, at
least with uninfected individuals. Any sexual contact, despite the degree of
disclosure and consent that might be present, would constitute murder under
traditional criminal murder statutes.45
Manslaughter prosecutions pose similar difficulties. Although a first
degree manslaughter prosecution does not require proof of an intent to
transmit the virus, but merely consciousness that certain conduct might result
in transmission, the mens rea element is still difficult to
establish. Moreover, the difficulties with causation that are present in
murder prosecutions are identical in manslaughter cases.
46
As with murder statutes, the use of manslaughter statutes is also
detrimental to the defendant. The jury must evaluate how a defendant
should have acted, resulting in the risk of prejudice and selective
enforcement.47  It is possible that a person could be convicted of
manslaughter even absent knowledge of BIV-positive status if the factfinder
determines that infection was due to behavior involving "a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation." A jury that disapproves of certain lifestyles might
consider the commonplace practices of people who live that lifestyle as a
deviation from law-abiding conduct even where that conduct is perfectly
legal.
Use of negligent homicide statutes is also ill-advised. Since an
individual is guilty of negligent homicide when he ignores a risk of which he
should be aware, this offense could be used to prosecute those who do not
know of their HIV-positive status. While negligent homicide might be easier
to prove than murder, it would permit factf'mders, usually juries, to impose
43. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 492.
44. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 165.
45. Id.
46. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 494.
47. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 164.
48. MODELPENALCODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
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their interpretations of what constitutes "reasonable" conduct, and would
allow prejudice and discrimination to govern the determination of guilt.4 9
Prosecution under an assault statute can proceed before the death of the
victim, making both prosecution and defense easier in some
respects. However, similar requirements of intent and causation exist. The
defendant must have known of his or her HIV-positive status and have
believed that the disease could be spread through the conduct in question.50
Unless "likeliness" of transmission can be demonstrated, assault
prosecutions may not succeed. Additionally, "likeliness" may be hard to
establish. In Guevara v. Superior Court,51 a California judge granted the
defendant's motion to set aside the information as to the assault charges
because of the lack of proof that "one or two individual incidents of
unprotected sex between an HIV-positive male and an uninfected female
[was] ... 'likely to produce great bodily injury."' 52 Given that one incident
of unprotected sexual contact is not, in fact, "likely" to result in contraction
of the disease,53 jurisdictions that contain "likeliness" in their definition of
the crime may not be able to use assault to punish HIV-transmitters.5
One advantage of using assault statutes to prosecute HIV transmission
is that consent, participation in consensual sexual contact after disclosure of
HIV-infection, is probably a defense to assault.5 In Guevara, the court held
that the defendant, who knew he was HIV-positive, could not assert that the
victim, a minor, consented to the assault merely by participating in a
consensual sexual encounter with the defendant 6  The Guevara court,
however, did not address the situation where the defendant has disclosed his
HIV-infection status to the victim, leaving open the argument that disclosure
of HIV-positive status and procurement of consent to proceed before
engaging in sexual relations constitutes a defense to assault charges.
An additional, and substantial, disadvantage with each of the above
discussed criminal offenses (murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and
assault) is that risky behavior that does not actually result in transmission
49. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 164-65.
50. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 498.
51. 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
52. Id. at 424.
53. There may be as little as a 1 in 500 risk of contracting HIV through sexual activity
absent aggravating factors like the presence of another sexually transmitted disease. See
Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure
Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921, 961 (1994).
54. Even where assault can be proven, it is only a misdemeanor crime. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 211.1(1) (1985). Assault may carry insufficient punishment, especially in those
circumstances where the transmission was purposeful or knowing.
55. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 168.
56. See Guevara, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423-24.
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will go unpunished. Unless the victim contracts the disease, the HIV-
infected individual is guilty of no crime, regardless of whether he intended to
infect or consciously disregarded the risk of infecting the victim. His
behavior, however, may be just as reprehensible as that of the individual
who actually did infect his partner. For this reason, murder, manslaughter,
and other criminal offenses requiring actual transmission are an insufficient
means of punishing those who expose others to ILv.
Attempt crimes such as attempted murder have the advantage that they
can be used to charge defendants where no actual transmission occurs. Even
absent transmission, a person who "does... anything with the purpose of
causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further
conduct on his part" may be guilty of an attempt crime." Thus, attempt
crime prosecutions can be pursued against individuals who engage in risky
behavior. Defendants who engage in like behavior are treated equally
regardless of whether HIV transmission occurs. Also, because actual
transmission is not required, the element of causation that poses such
problems in prosecutions for the choate crimes discussed above is
eliminated.
However, attempt crimes have disadvantages. They are hard to prove
because they require a strong showing of intent. Because attempt generally
requires a purposeful or knowing state of mind, at least under the Model
Penal Code, a person would have to have the goal of infecting another
individual, or knowledge that infection would, in fact, occur in order to be
found guilty.5s Not only is this a relatively rare occurrence within the scope
of HIV transmissions, 9 but it is also difficult to prove.6°
57. MODELPENALCODE § 5.01(1)(b) (1985).
58. In State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1996), for example, a conviction
for attempted murder and attempted assault was affirmed, but only because there was evidence
both that the defendant had stated his intent to spread the virus and that the defendant took
precautions including condom usage and disclosure when having relations with his future
wife, but not when intimate with other women. Id. at 925.
In another case, an attempted manslaughter charge against a prostitute was dismissed on
the grounds that attempt to engage in prostitution despite knowledge of HIV-positive status
could not be equated to the intent to kill. See State v. Sherouse, 536 So. 2d 1194, 1194 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
59. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 167.
60. In Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512 (Md. 1996), for example, the Maryland Court
of Appeals reversed an HIV-positive defendant's conviction for attempted murder and assault
with intent to murder because the court found that there was insufficient evidence of intent.
Id. at 514. The court noted the absence of a statement of intent by the defendant,
distinguishing the case from others where the defendants "have either made explicit statements
demonstrating an intent to infect their victims or have taken specific actions demonstrating
such an intent and tending to exclude other possible intents." Id. at 516. While the defendant
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Additionally, because impossibility generally is not a defense, 61 attempt
crimes may be used to prosecute intent to transmit through biting or
spittin 6 2 These are activities that are unlikely to actually transmit the HIV
virus. Criminalizing these activities, then, reinforces erroneous beliefs
about transmission, thus undermining public education efforts.6' Further-
more, it punishes individuals who have not actually harmed anyone and who
could not have harmed anyone by the activity for which they are being
prosecuted.65 Prosecutions for this conduct may be warranted because some
of the perpetrators do, in fact, desire to infect another and may be quite
dangerous. The problem is that HIV-positive individuals prosecuted for
biting or spitting may not actually have intended harm, and may have been
fully aware that their actions were incapable of spreading the disease. This
concern is especially high where there is limited or no direct evidence, such
as incriminating statements, that reveal an intent to kill.
Reckless endangerment is arguably the easiest of traditional criminal
offenses to establish. It does not require a finding of actual transmission, 66
and thus, no proof of causation must be presented. Additionally, no intent or
purpose is required, but only that the defendant recklessly engaged in
conduct "which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.' 67
Reckless endangerment is also easier to establish than other crimes
because actual knowledge of HIV status may not be needed where the
defendant had symptoms and/or engaged in risky behavior. However, this
would probably have been found guilty under an HIV transmission/exposure law, as the court
noted that they "ha[d] no trouble concluding" that the defendant had knowingly exposed the
victim to the risk of an infection, the conviction for attempted murder had to be dismissed
because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had an intent to kill. Id. at 517 n.4.
61. See Closen, supra note 53, at 930.
62. Of the more than 10 attempted murder convictions for HIV transmission or
exposure around the country, most have involved biting or spitting. See Brown, supra note
11, at 10.
63. See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health,
and Civil Liberties, 49 O1-1O ST. L.J. 1017, 1023-25 (1989).
64. See Closen, supra note 53, at 933-34.
65. In State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 495 (N.J. 1993), for example, an attempted murder
conviction was affirmed despite the appellant's contention that he did not intend to transmit
the virus and did not believe it was possible to transmit the virus through a bite. Id. at 495-
96. The defendant specifically appealed his conviction to no avail on the grounds that HIV
could not be spread through a bite. Id.
66. In fact, prosecution under reckless endangerment statutes is possible even absent
any evidence that the defendant himself is actually infected. See Tierney, supra note 18, at
495. A sexually active homosexual male with HIV-like symptoms who engages in
unprotected intercourse may satisfy the elements of the crime. Id.
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1985).
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poses a risk to potential defendants. There are serious negative ramifications
to holding people responsible for knowledge of HIV status merely on the
basis of their conduct, for this gives factfinders a dangerous opportunity to
discriminate against disfavored groups. 6' For example, it permits a
factfinder to equate homosexuality with BIV-positive status. Use of the
reckless endangerment statutes raises the possibility of a huge scope of
enforcement against all those who engage in high risk behavior. Like
manslaughter, this offense allows for a subjective jury determination of what
constitutes "reckless" behavior.
Not only can the offense of reckless endangerment be used to the
detriment of a criminal defendant, it also imposes burdens on the criminal
justice system in light of the difficult and potentially prejudicial evidentiary
requirements like past sexual history that might be implicated. 69 And like
assault, reckless endangerment is a misdemeanor, not a felony, which may
undermine its punitive and deterrent effects.70
In addition to the disadvantages in the use of general criminal offense
statutes as discussed above, there are no limitations on what conduct can
trigger a prosecution. With lIV transmission/exposure laws, prohibited
conduct is clearly delineated. 1 Under general criminal statutes, however,
prosecutors have broad discretion to pursue cases involving conduct that
should not be considered criminal. Not only is this situation disadvan-
tageous to potential criminal defendants, but it also creates a risk that the
public will harbor a negative view about the advisability of criminalizing
HIV transmission/exposure.72
B. Public Health Crimes
In several states, it is a crime to expose others to contagious diseases,
and in others, to expose others to sexually transmitted diseases.73 In some
respects, these statutes seem suitable for use in prosecuting HIV-
transmitters, as EIV is both sexually transmitted and contagious in certain
circumstances. Generally speaking, these crimes capture activity only by
those who knew of their infection, thus limiting the role of prejudice in lIlV
prosecutions.
68. See discussion infra Part IIM.A.1.
69. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 495-96.
70. See id. at 496.
71. See discussion infra Part III.
72. See Closen, supra note 53, at 935-36.
73. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-401(2) (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-29-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (1998).
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However, these statutes do not take into account the severity of the HIV
virus and the inevitability of death upon contraction. Unlike most other
sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") and most contagious diseases, HIV is
incurable and is invariably fatal. Many of these statutes are inadequately
lenient in terms of the punishment they impose on offenders, in some cases
providing for only a small fine for violations.
Additionally, like some of the statutes that are specific to HIV
transmission,74 some of these public health statutes are overly broad in the
sense that they criminalize conduct that cannot spread the HIV virus. 75
Sexually transmitted disease statutes are also, by definition, underinclusive
in light of the fact that HIV can be transmitted by nonsexual contact such as
needle sharing or blood transfusions.76
Finally, as with the use of murder statutes, which would, in effect,
criminalize all sexual contact regardless of consent, 77 many of these public
health statutes would require permanent abstinence. 78 Given that it is
possible to prevent or greatly limit the risk of contracting the disease through
safe sex practices, a permanent and unequivocal restriction on all sexual
contact is unnecessary.
C. Public Health Regulations
Some states seek to control HIV transmission through regulatory rather
than criminal provisions. Delaware, for example, has a number of regulatory
provisions governing the state's ability to quarantine infected persons or to
prohibit certain conduct by infected persons, in addition to provisions
relating to reporting, confidentiality, and required treatment.79 Like those of
other states, Delaware's public health provisions are not restricted to HIV,
but govern all contagious diseases.
74. See infra Part III.A.2.
75. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 170. For example, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
14:43.5(B) (West 1997) provides that "[n]o person shall intentionally expose another to any
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus through any means or contact," (emphasis
added), without defining what is meant by these terms. Because medical science often cannot
rule out the possibility, however infinitesimally small, that the virus cannot be transmitted by a
particular type of conduct, this statute could be interpreted to criminalize such things as a kiss.
76. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 170-71.
77. See discussion supra Part II.A.
78. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 254-401(2) (West 1997) (stating: "It is
unlawful for any person who has knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect that he is
infected with a venereal disease to... knowingly perform an act which exposes to or infects
another person .... ").
79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 701-712 (1997).
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Some of these provisions give the state the power to isolate individuals
with the HIV virus from contact with other people.80 Because these
provisions are regulatory, not punitive, they are not subject to constitutional
restrictions barring cruel and unusual punishment or excessive bail under the
Eighth Amendment.8' Although it is conceivable that a state might seek to
segregate all those people infected with the IV virus,82 such a broad-
reaching provision is unlikely to be politically accepted,83 and it is not
constitutionally permissible under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 4 Quarantine provisions that provide for restriction only of those
lIV-infected individuals whose actions fall within the statute's guidelines,
on the other hand, might be constitutionally permissible.85  Those HIV-
positive individuals described as "incorrigible" or "recalcitrant," who
continue to engage in high risk behavior, might be subject to these behavior-
16based quarantines.
The goal behind these provisions is similar to that of using criminal
laws to control HIV: to prevent the spread of the disease and to deter HIV-
positive individuals from engaging in behavior with a high risk of
transmittal.87 However, there are several drawbacks to these provisions that
render them inferior to criminal prosecutions.8 These shortcomings include
constitutional concerns, insufficient protection of individual rights because
of lower evidentiary burdens, and the serious risk of selective enforcement.
For example, the standard of proof for civil confinement and other civil
public health remedies, which is "clear and convincing evidence," offers less
protection to the infected person than does the criminal "beyond a reasonable
80. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-4-1401 to 1410 (West 1997); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-603 (1997).
81. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 145.
82. For example, Proposition 64 on the California Ballot, which was defeated on
November 4, 1986, would have allowed authorities to confine IV-positive individuals to
places designated for such purposes. After the AIDS Vote, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1986, at 4.
83. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 146-47.
84. Id. at 147.
85. See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1036.
86. Id. While a behavior-based type of quarantine provision is in many respects
superior to a status based system, it poses the significant problem of requiring individualized
assessments of behavior. Because personal protections are minimal in the civil context,
behavior-based quarantine is undesirable.
87. One benefit of using quarantine provisions over criminal imprisonment is that,
because the individual will be in the company only of other HIV-positive individuals, the
individual cannot spread the disease to others, which could occur if he is imprisoned.
88. As Larry Gostin observes, "[b]ecause the virus is primarily transmitted by
intentional behavior that is within the control of the carrier, it is seen as susceptible to a legal,
rather than a public health, solution." See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1019.
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doubt" standard.89 Especially where there is the risk of prejudicial or selective
enforcement, and where people's liberty may be infringed by the proceedings,
the state should be held to a higher burden of proof. Because H1V is incurable,
use of these provisions might constitute a "civil life sentence," 9 and should be
subject to restraint and careful application.
Behavior-based quarantine is also ill-advised because it is unnecessarily
broad in terms of the restrictions it imposes. Unlike other contagious
diseases, HIV is not airborne nor is it transmitted by casual contact such as
touching or kissing.91 Thus, quarantine is an unnecessary remedy where
there is no evidence of behavior that has the capacity to transmit the virus. If
an individual has actually engaged in conduct that puts others at risk of
contracting a disease, he or she deserves to be punished. If not, the person is
merely an innocent victim of a terrible disease who is suffering enough
without being forced to submit to a proactive limitation on liberty through
quarantine. As Sullivan and Field observe, "AIDS is spread by acts, not by
mere proximity .... Criminal law punishes culpable acts, not statuses such
as being ill or infected. 92 As such, criminal laws more accurately restrict
only that behavior that is prohibited.
HIL HIV TRANSMISSION/EXPOSURE LAWS
Because traditional criminal statutes, public health offense statutes, and
public health regulations pose the difficulties discussed in Section II above
when applied to HIV exposure and transmission, statutes specifically
designed to capture the unique set of circumstances and issues surrounding
HIV exposure and transmission should be passed and utilized.93
A. What Are HIV Transmission/Exposure Laws and What Do They
Prohibit?
At least twenty-nine states have enacted statutes that specifically
criminalize knowingly exposing others to the HIV virus.94 These statutes,
89. See Closen, supra note 53, at 969-70.
90. Gostin, supra note 63, at 1029.
91. See id. at 1027.
92. Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 156.
93. In 1988, the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Epidemic concluded, after more than 48 hearings and a year of deliberation, that "HIV
infected individuals who knowingly conduct themselves in ways that pose significant risk of
transmission to others must be held accountable for their actions." Report of the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic at XVII (1988).
94. See discussion supra Part I. For a discussion of international statutes addressing the
issue, see Tierney, supra note 18, at 502-10.
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while all attempting to serve a similar purpose, vary in several significant
respects. For one, some are broadly worded while others are very
specific. Also, there is variation as to what conduct is prohibited. For
example, some bar just the sale of IRV-tainted blood. Others punish those
engaging in a wide range of activities. The basic purpose of these statutes is
to criminalize specified conduct that poses a risk of spreading the HIV virus,
such as sexual intercourse, unless the infected party discloses his or her
IlV-positive status and obtains consent.
There are three elements that must be satisfied to be guilty of criminal
HIV transmission/exposure. 95 The first element is knowledge.96 A defendant
cannot be guilty of the crime unless he or she knows, or arguably should
know,97 that he or she is HIV-positive. The second element is that the
defendant must have engaged in prohibited contact such as intercourse or
oral sex. 98 The final element is the absence of a defense such as consent or,
95. A good statute will clarify, either in the text or legislative history, that it is meant to
be used in place of, not in addition to, traditional criminal offenses. See Closen, supra note
53, at 936. While such a provision raises questions about separation of powers and
prosecutorial discretion, see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979), it
seems that state prosecutors would be bound to obey it, see People v. Ford, 417 Mich. 66, 80
(Mich. 1982) (looking to "several indications that the Legislature did not intend these [two]
statutes to be exclusive chargeable offenses"); People v. Ramsey, 218 Mich. App. 191, 193
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting defendant's claim that legislative enactment of a new statute
precluded conviction under other statute because language of new statute did not support
defendant's argument that other statute was precluded); People v. Little, 434 Mich. 752, 760
(Mich. 1990) (upholding prosecutor's decision to prosecute under two provisions because
"[t]he Legislature's enactment of [the two statutes] does not indicate any legislative intent to
limit the prosecutor's charging discretion.").
96. Another method of achieving the same goal is through a strict liability provision.
Such a law would provide that anyone who infects another with HIV is guilty of a criminal
offense, regardless of whether the perpetrator knew he or she was HIV-positive. This type of
provision would have several advantages to existing criminal transmission/exposure laws. It
would be easier to prove because no evidence of intent or mens rea of any kind would need to
exist nor would proof that the defendant had received notification of his HIV-positive status
be admissible. Additionally, there would be a strong deterrent against unprotected
sex. Similarly, a strict liability provision would encourage people to get tested frequently so
that they could be sure they were not putting others at risk of contraction of the
virus. However, there are also numerous disadvantages that militate against adoption of strict
liability criminal laws of this nature. A primary drawback is that, like most general criminal
offenses such as murder, proof of causation would be required. See discussion supra Part
II.A. Also, criminal remedies should not be applied where the defendant was not aware of the
criminal nature of his behavior, as this has no deterrent effect.
97. See discussion infra Part IlI.A.1.
98. This element of the crime poses the most difficulties from a drafting standpoint, and
is the subject of much of the disputes on criminal HIV exposure statutes.
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perhaps, condom usage.99 States take different approaches to resolving the
disputes around what satisfies these three elements)°° Some seek to provide
more precise guidelines, while others offer only a broad definition of the
offense.'0 '
1. Knowledge
HIV transmission/exposure statutes provide for criminal liability only
where the defendant knows of his HIV-positive status.1'2 Not every statute,
however, is specific as to what constitutes knowledge. 10 3 Some statutes
indicate that the knowledge provision can only be satisfied by positive
results from a blood test.' °4 Others do not specify what will be deemed
"knowledge."'
0 5
Where an individual has been tested and has been informed by medical
or public health personnel that he or she is HIV-positive, it seems
uncontroversial that the knowledge element of HIV transmission/exposure is
satisfied.' °6 The question is whether less than actual knowledge can satisfy
99. In a report published by the Archives of Internal Medicine, 40% of HIV-infected
people surveyed indicated that they did not disclose their HIV-positive status to sexual
partners, and 57% of these people also indicated they do not always use condoms. See Steven
Gray, Debate Looms on HIV Disclosure Laws: Is It Use of Deadly Weapon or Rights
Breach?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 22, 1998, at 204.
100. States also provide different penalty levels for violations of their HIV
transmission/exposure laws. Of the 29 offenses established by state laws, 25 are felony crimes
of varying degrees, four are misdemeanors, and one is an infraction. See supra note 14.
101. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 1997). Because broad statutes may be
both vague and overbroad, see Closen, supra note 53, at 950-51, states should seek to draft
statutes with specific, precise prohibitions such as the one found in the Appendix.
102. There are two issues with regard to proof of infection. The first, addressed in this
section, involves the issue of when an individual has knowledge of his infection sufficient to
consider his actions criminal. The second relates to evidence of infection that can be admitted
at trial. It is in conjunction with this second area of HIV testing that disputes over the
advisability of mandatory testing arise.
103. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(1) (West 1997) (providing that creating risk
of infecting another with HIV is unlawful where the individual is "knowingly infected with
HIV"), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie 1995) (providing that a "person commits
the offense of exposing another to human immunodeficiency virus if the person knows he or
she has tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus").
104. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1995); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.205
(1995); see also Appendix infra for Model Statute.
105. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1997).
106. Even positive test results might not be challenged as failing to satisfy the
knowledge requirement in some circumstances. For example, Nushawn Williams has claimed
that, although he did receive positive test results when he was tested by the Chautaqua County
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the statutory requirements. Is constructive knowledge sufficient? Gener-
ally, a person can be held to have constructive knowledge of a fact if the
exercise of reasonable care would have revealed that fact to that person.
10 7
There are three scenarios that might be sufficient to establish constructive
knowledge: symptoms, high-risk behavior, and a prior positive
partner. However, the use of any of these three means for establishing
constructive knowledge is ill-advised.
The first possibility for establishing constructive knowledge, the
existence of symptoms, is unsatisfactory because in many cases the
symptoms of HIV are similar to those of other common ailments such as the
common cold or flu.'08 Nonetheless, at least in the civil context, the
presence of symptoms may be enough to hold a defendant to constructive
knowledge.' 9 However, common symptoms such as weight loss, fatigue,
fevers, night sweats, diarrhea, and enlarged lymph glands"0 are insufficiently
distinctive to provide notice to the individual that he or she is infected with
the HIV virus.
Health Department in August 1996, he did not believe that these results were accurate. See
Barron, supra note 31, at A24. Instead, he believed that they were fabricated because officials
were 'just trying to get [him] out of town." Man With HIV Says Numbers Overstated, DALLAS
MORNiNG NEws, Nov. 6, 1997, at A28.
In the civil context, positive test results constitute actual knowledge sufficient to
establish a duty. See, e.g., Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
107. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 987 (citing Attoe v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins.
Co., 153 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Wis. 1967) (defining constructive knowledge as "that which one
who has the opportunity, by the exercise of ordinary care, to possess")). It is possible to argue
that persons who intentionally decline to determine their HIV-positive status can be imputed
with that knowledge. See Closen, supra note 53, at 965. In other words, a person who
deliberately avoids HIV testing, in the face of strong indications that he or she might be
infected, might not be able to point to the lack of official notification of HIV-positive status as
a lack of knowledge.
108. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 479.
109. See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
110. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 987 n.206.
111. Some cases of HIV do involve identifiable symptoms such as lesions which, at
least when coupled with other things like long-term cold like symptoms or a history of high
risk activity, could reasonably provide a warning that an HIV test is advisable. See id. at 987-
88. Schulman proposes that constructive knowledge be deemed to exist where there are
identifiable or long-term symptoms, especially when coupled with conduct carrying a high risk
of transmittal in the absence of other possible medical explanations for the
symptoms. Id. Under Schulman's proposal, the existence of these factors should require an
immediate HIV test and abstention from sexual or other activity with the possibility of
transmittal of the virus until a negative result is obtained. Id. Schulman would also
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An individual might also be held to have constructive knowledge that
he is HIV-positive where he has engaged in high risk activities in the
past. This is the most controversial of the three possibilities for constructive
knowledge, as it looks not to actual warning signs but merely class wide
identifications. For example, under this method, anyone who had ever
engaged in anal intercourse might be deemed to have constructive
knowledge of HIV-infection. 12 Because of the serious risk of prejudicial
application, and the potential far-reaching coverage of such a definition of
knowledge, prior high risk activities should not be considered to provide
constructive knowledge of HIV-positive status.
113
The final circumstance under which an individual might be held to have
constructive knowledge of his or her HIV-infection is where that person is
aware that a previous sexual partner has the HIV virus. 14  Establishing
constructive knowledge by a prior sex partner's status is somewhat circular
in the sense that it raises the question of what would establish knowledge of
the other person's status. Is actual knowledge of positive results from a
blood test necessary? This method of constructive knowledge would require
an evidentiary showing that the person was informed of the prior partner's
status. It also requires an individual to assume infection from a wide range
of activities that might characterize someone as a prior sexual partner. Some
of these activities might carry a very negligible risk of transmission.
implement a "duty to investigate" in cases where even commonplace symptoms are coupled
with a history of high risk behavior. Id.
While this proposal has the advantage of encouraging testing and responsible sexual
behavior, it does not account for the potential unfairness of holding an individual responsible
for knowledge that he or she does not actually have, especially in the case of an uneducated
individual.
The model statute contained in the Appendix defines knowledge as actual knowledge of
a positive test result, or as having been told by a medical doctor that symptoms suggest an
HIV-infection and that HIV testing is advisable. This provision is designed to encourage
testing and to minimize an individual's ability to avoid prosecution by refraining from
obtaining actual knowledge through a positive test result.
112. For example, in one case, a Florida court held that a man's homosexual orientation
and activity should be sufficient for the man to believe himself to be HIV-positive. See
Cooper v. State, 539 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
113. See Closen, supra note 53, at 966.
114. See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1993). This language
is criticized in Schulman, supra note 7, at 990, on the grounds that it is unclear whether a
prior sex partner constitutes anyone with whom an individual has had some sort of sexual
contact, or only those with whom vaginal intercourse has taken place. Id. Schulman would
require testing of anyone who had engaged in vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse with an
infected person. Id. Schulman's proposal is thus more of a mandatory testing proposal than
one of constructive knowledge.
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In a given case, some combination of symptoms, risk factors, and
knowledge of direct exposure from an infected partner might provide
sufficient evidence that the individual had knowledge beyond a reasonable
doubt of his or her infection. However, the risk of allowing consideration of
such variable factors is that they will be used prejudicially and
arbitrarily. For example, a factfinder might determine that prior homosexual
intimate conduct with the use of a precaution like a condom was nonetheless
sufficient to provide constructive knowledge. Another factfinder might
decline to find constructive knowledge where unprotected heterosexual
intimate conduct was a part of the individual's history. For this reason,
constructive knowledge should not be satisfactory to establish criminal
culpability.
A good HIV transmission/exposure statute will be specific as to what
constitutes knowledge. It will provide that only actual knowledge obtained
from a test conducted on the individual's blood by medical or public health
personnel, or strong indications from a doctor that testing is advisable
because of tell-tale HIV symptoms,"15 will constitute knowledge sufficient to
establish criminal culpability.
2. Prohibited Activity
Another area where specificity is valuable is in determining what
activities are prohibited under the statute. Some statutes lay out very clearly
the types of contacts that will suffice to establish criminal culpability, while
others are not as precise.11 6  Prohibited activities may include vaginal,
genital, or anal intercourse, the sale or transfer of blood, sperm, tissue,
organs, or plasma, and exchange of unsterile needles.
Because these statutes criminalize exposure, not merely transmission, it
is important to specify what activities are prohibited. 7  Otherwise, the
specter of possible prohibited activity looms too large. For example, could
shaking hands constitute criminal conduct where both people's hands are
sweaty?" 8 What about an lIlV-positive person who sneezes on someone
accidentally? Does a pelvic exam by an obstetrician/gynecologist constitute
"sexual penetration" under the statute?119 A good statute will lay out in
115. See Appendix infra for Model Statute.
116. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (1997) (providing detailed list of
prohibited activities), with NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.205(1) (1995) (prohibiting engaging in
"conduct in a manner that is intended or likely to transmit the disease").
117. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 498.
118. See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 26, at 592.
119. See Closen, supra note 53, at 952-53.
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detail what conduct is prohibited, and will restrict prohibited conduct to that
which actually poses the risk of transmitting the HIV virus.
Some of these provisions criminalize acts like biting or spitting. In
some respects, biting cases do involve some of the most clear-cut HIV
transmission cases because there is often evidence of the intent to
transmit.'2 On the other hand, there are no documented cases of
transmission from a bite, even where the skin has been broken.121 Similarly,
spitting has not been shown to have caused HIV-infection, as saliva contains
very small quantities of HIV.1
22
Because there are no confirmed cases of HIV transfer from these
activities, they should not be criminalized in HIV transmission/exposure
laws.2 3 While the common law doctrine of impossibility would not bar a
conviction under most HIV transmission/exposure laws, the fact that it is
medically impossible to transmit the virus through biting or spitting render
these activities inappropriate for inclusion in HIV transmission/exposure
laws.
Some of these provisions would also criminalize the prenatal transfer of the
HIV virus from a mother to a child.12 Childbirth has one of the highest rates of
120. In many of the biting cases, there is evidence that the defendant verbalized his
intent to transmit the virus. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 669 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D.
Minn. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that after the biting incident,
"defendant stated that he intended to kill the officers"); State v. Cummings, 451 N.W.2d 463
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had stated his intent to
transmit AIDS even though defendant did not have the disease).
In another case, where the defendant had "sucked up excess sputum" before biting a
police officer, the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for aggravated
assault with intent to commit murder. Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990).
121. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 484.
122. See id. at 485.
123. In the right circumstance, a person could be prosecuted under a general criminal
statute if his conduct did not fall within the state's HIV transmission/exposure law but
nevertheless was criminal in nature. For example, in United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163
(8th Cir. 1988), the court affirmed the assault conviction of an HIV-positive inmate who bit
two corrections officers, even though "the medical evidence in the record was insufficient to
establish that AIDS may be transmitted by a bite." Id. at 1167-68. The court justified this
result on the grounds that the jury was entitled to consider the defendant's mouth and teeth to
be a deadly weapon even if the defendant was not HIV-positive. Id. at 1167.
124. However, prosecution should remain possible where appropriate under general
criminal laws for the actual activity in which the individual has engaged, e.g., assault for a
bite.
125. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1995). For a complete discussion
of the subject of the criminalization of prenatal transfer of HIV, see Deborah A.
Wieczorkowski Wanamaker, From Mother to Child... A Criminal Pregnancy: Should
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transmission, ranging between twenty and fifty percent, as compared with a 1 in
500 risk of contracting the disease through sexual activity.126 However, because
transmission from mother to child occurs before birth as well as during birth,
prenatal transfer should not be included within HIV transmission/exposure
statutes because it would effectively bar HIV-positive women from bearing
children despite the fact that they have a better than even chance of delivering a
healthy baby.127 Additionally, it might be used to prosecute women who discover
they are HIV-positive after conception, thereby forcing women to obtain
abortions so as to avoid criminal liability.28 Furthermore, given that no
contraceptive is foolproof in preventing pregnancy, criminalization of prenatal
transfer might effectively require permanent abstinence. Finally, such a ban
would logically have to be extended to couples with a high risk of passing a
genetic disorder to a child. For these reasons, prenatal transfer should be
exempted from inclusion in HIV transmission/exposure laws.
Breast-feeding, however, should be considered a prohibited
activity. Although the risk of HIV transmission is slight, it is possible that
the virus can be spread through breast milk.129 Because there is a viable
alternative to breast-feeding, namely the use of formula, the health of
children should not be endangered by this activity.
3. Defenses - Consent and Condom Usage
Many HIV transmission/exposure statutes provide that consent is a
defense to the crime.130 In other words, if the defendant informed the victim
that he or she was IV-positive and the victim consented to participating in
the sexual contact despite this fact, the defendant is not guilty of a crime. At
least as to sexual conduct,' 31 this is as it should be, because the goal of
Criminalization of the Prenatal Transfer of AIDSIHIV Be The Next Step In the Battle Against
This Deadly Epidemic?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 383 (1993).
126. See Closen, supra note 53, at 960-61.
127. On the other hand, the argument can be made that women should not have the
right to bring numerous HIV-positive babies into the world, putting a huge stress on the health
care system, and costing the public millions of dollars.
128. See Wanamaker, supra note 125, at 404.
129. See Closen, supra note 53, at 977-78 (citing Van de Perre et al., Mother to Infant
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus By Breast Milk: Presumed Innocent or
Presumed Guilty, 15 CaNIcAL INFEouS DISEASES 502 (1992)).
130. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(a)
(1997). Even those statutes that do not specifically establish consent as a defense may
implicitly allow for such an argument to be raised. See Closen, supra note 53, at 945.
131. As to other activities such as needle sharing, consent should not necessarily be a
defense. Consent is not even a consideration in the context of prenatal transfer, as a fetus is
obviously unable to consent to the risk of infection.
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criminal transmission/exposure provisions is to ensure that no unsuspecting
person is exposed to the HIV virus without being given the opportunity to
take precautions or to avoid the risk. The purpose of the laws is not to
require an HIV-positive person to be abstinent for the remainder of his or her
life. As Closen, et al., observed, society often allows participation in even
132dangerous activity when consent is given.
A further issue is whether consent is an affirmative defense or
whether absence of consent is an element of the crime that needs to be
proven by the prosecution. Some statutes specifically provide that consent
is an affirmative defense, thereby putting the burden on the defendant to
prove consent.1 33 Other statutes include lack of consent as an element of
the offense, indicating that it is the prosecution's burden to prove absence
of consent.134 Many HIV transmission/exposure cases turn on the issue of
consent, and thus the placement of the burden of proof may be
dispositive.1 35 Because the ramifications of falsely convicting a defendant
are so serious, the burden of proving consent should not be shifted to the
defendant, but rather should remain on the prosecution, as it does for other
crimes, like rape, where consent is often the contested issue. Lack of
consent is best seen as an element of the offense, not an affirmative
defense.
In addition to consent, another potential defense is that the defendant
used a condom when engaging in sexual contact, thereby preventing
transmission of the disease. A defendant might try to offer this as a
defense even where no disclosure of infection was made. The advantage of
allowing this as a defense is that HIV-positive individuals could preserve
their privacy and confidentiality. The problem is that condoms are not
132. See Closen, supra note 53, at 947-48.
133. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(a) (1997) (stating: "It is an affirmative defense
that the sexual activity took place between consenting adults after full disclosure by the
accused of the risk of such activity."). A Florida judge, in the course of sentencing an HIV-
positive man to one year of probation for having sex with a minor, ordered the man, who had
boasted about his active sexual lifestyle, to obtain written consent from partners before
engaging in sex. See Man With HIV Must Get Written Consent For Sex, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
1998, at A28.
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie 1995) ("A person commits the
offense of exposing another to human immunodeficiency virus if the person... exposes
another.., without first having informed the other person of the presence of the human
immunodeficiency virus.").
135. See Closen, supra note 53, at 945.
136. A supplemental question is whether condom usage should be required of all sexual
contact involving HIV-positive individuals.
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infallible when it comes to preventing IUV transmission, 137 and so the use of
condoms should not be able to suffice as a defense. In other words, the use
of a condom should not replace the need to disclose HIV-positive status.
B. Advantages of HIV Transmission/Exposure Laws
In general, ILV transmission/exposure statutes have many advantages
over generally applicable criminal laws as applied to IUV transmission and
over public health related criminal and regulatory provisions. They are
preferable in that they make prosecution easier and more successful, they
offer better protection to society from HIV-transmitters, and they are more
fair to the criminal defendant.
Because criminal HIV transmission/exposure does not require that the
victim actually contracts the HIV virus, but rather that the defendant engages
in an activity that puts the victim at risk of such transmission, many
problems associated with the use of general criminal laws are avoided. For
one, there is no need to prove that a victim contracted the HIV virus from the
defendant, thereby avoiding difficult evidentiary issues involving the
victim's other sexual contacts or potential sources of infection. Prosecution
can be pursued immediately rather than only after HLV antibodies are
detectable in a victim's blood. Thus, no lag in charging will exist. Also,
unlike with murder or manslaughter, there is no need to wait for the death of
the victim before charging or prosecution.
138
Criminal transmission/exposure laws also allow legislatures to
determine what the proper degree of punishment is for exposing another to
HIV. These statutes can provide for punishment less strict than murder,
which should be treated more harshly in light of the fact that it requires a
showing of intent. On the other hand, punishment can be more severe than is
provided for assault or reckless endangerment, which is appropriate because
FHV exposure will often result in the death of the victim.
Guilt is also easier to establish than with general criminal offenses
because there is no intent requirement. The defendant need not have wanted
or planned to spread the IV virus or even have thought about whether
transmission may result from their actions. Because responsible behavior
and conscious consideration of the risks of transmission on the part of IV-
137. "[C]ondoms are susceptible to breakage, spillage, seepage, defective
workmanship, and improper usage." Schulman, supra note 7, at 986. Nonetheless, the risk of
transmitting HIV from one sexual encounter with the use of a condom, assuming a 90%
effective rate, is estimated to be 1 in 10,000. See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1022.
138. See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1042 n.129.
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positive individuals is desirable, this aspect of HIV transmission/exposure
laws benefits society.
39
Another advantage to HIV transmission/exposure laws is that there is
greater deterrent effect by having a specific statute.140 Even absent a public
prosecution of a criminal HIV exposure offender, the existence of an HIV
specific statute on the books makes it clear to putative offenders that risky
conduct will not be tolerated. Absent such a clear signal, some HIV-
transmitters may not even be aware of the criminal nature of their conduct.
Not only is this advantageous to society because undesirable behavior
will be deterred, it is also beneficial to those HIV-positive individuals who
are engaging in conduct that puts them at risk of prosecution under a general
criminal statute. While the illegality of uninformed sexual contact may not
be apparent in a jurisdiction without an HIV transmission/exposure statute, a
jurisdiction that does have such a law provides notice to HIV-positive
individuals that they are at risk of being prosecuted if they engage in certain
specified conduct. Thus a deterrent effect will be realized even if
prosecutions are not more frequent or more successful than under general
criminal laws, simply because of the public educational benefit of enacting
an HIV transmission/exposure law.' 4'
Potential defendants also benefit from the existence of an HIV
transmission/exposure statute in the sense that it is less subject to
prejudicial application.' Because the statute itemizes what conduct is
prohibited, selective prosecutions are more apparent. In contrast, a
prosecutor's decision to forgo prosecution against one individual under a
general criminal statute while pursuing it against another may escape
detection. At a minimum, the non-specific nature of a general criminal
statute may allow the prosecutor to justify his actions. A specific law is,
therefore, less arbitrary.
139. In light of the fact that individuals are held responsible for realizing the dangers of
transmittal through certain contact, medical and public health personnel should inform people
of methods of transmission at the time that positive test results are given.
140. Some commentators have argued that this deterrent effect may not actually exist or
that it is overstated. See, e.g., Closen & Deutschman, supra note 26, at 593.
141. Deterrence through education of the illegality of HIV exposure is especially
significant because HIV-positive individuals, as a group, are likely to be less susceptible to
deterrence than the general population because of their short life expectancy. Coupled with
the increased likelihood that prosecutions will be successful under a transmission/exposure
law, the tendency of many people to avoid criminal activity makes public education of the
illegality of exposure an effective route to achieving deterrence.
142. See Closen, supra note 53, at 950.
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C. Disadvantages of HIV Transmission/Exposure Laws
Despite the many advantages of HIV transmission/exposure laws, there
are some drawbacks. 43 The primary one is that there is the potential that the
existence of such statutes may discourage individuals from getting
tested. 44 Especially under a statute that provides for criminal culpability
only where there is actual, and not merely constructive, knowledge of HIV-
positive status, people may avoid receiving official notification of their
infection so as to be able to engage in behavior which otherwise would be
prohibited. 45 The model statute in the Appendix seeks to limit this problem
by holding people responsible for knowledge where they have been told by a
doctor that their symptoms may indicate HIV-infection and that they should
be tested.
Another disadvantage of the use of HIV specific laws is that it raises
issues with regard to the confidentiality of medical records. In their efforts
to prosecute HIV transmission/exposure, prosecutors must obtain evidence
that the defendant knew of his or her EIV-positive status. However, in some
states such information is protected by confidentiality statutes that protect146
the defendant's medical records. Even where not protected by statute, the
preservation of confidentiality is of crucial importance in encouraging
people to get tested. By the very act of prosecuting an individual for
criminal HIV transmission/exposure, the state is disclosing that individual's
IV-infection. 47  Because of concerns about confidentiality, HIV
transmission/exposure prosecutions should only be permitted where the
crime is brought to the government's attention by a complaining witness or
some other means outside the public health reporting system. The disclosure
of confidential medical records in pursuance of a prosecution should be as
143. Some of these issues can be resolved with a carefully drafted statute. See
Appendix infra for Model Statute.
144. See Closen, supra note 53, at 964-65.
145. See id. at 967. One method of avoiding this problem is by providing for
mandatory testing of certain individuals such as those accused of another crime. For
discussion of the issues raised by mandatory testing provisions, see Michael P. Bruyere,
Damage Control for Victims of Physical Assault-Testing the Innocent for AIDS, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 945 (1994).
146. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1404 (West 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-502.2 (West 1997). Some confidentiality statutes provide that prosecutors do have
access to otherwise confidential test results. See State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109, 112-13 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West 1992)).
147. In fact, an Illinois court held in In re Multimedia KSDK, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 911 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991), that the Illinois confidentiality statute did not bar a television station from
broadcasting the identity of an HIV-positive individual because she was a defendant in a case
being pursued under Illinois' HIV transmission/exposure statute. Id. at 912.
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limited as possible, and conducted in a manner designed to preserve the
defendant's confidentiality.
It should be noted that confidentiality concerns are not reserved to
prosecutions involving HIV-specific statutes. Any prosecution for exposing
or transmitting the HIV virus may necessitate the disclosure of medical
records. In fact, even where no prosecution takes place, issues of
confidentiality may arise. For example, in order to publicize Nushawn
Williams' HIV-positive status and the epidemic of HIV cases that were
cropping up in Jamestown, New York, public health officials utilized a
previously unused statute that permitted the disclosure of confidential Hv
test records upon court order.'
41
Not only do these confidentiality provisions pose serious privacy issues
with regard to HIV-transmitters, but they also may require disclosure of
victims' private medical information. 49 It is possible that, in an effort to
track the criminal activity of an HIV-transmitter, police and prosecutors may
attempt to trace back exposure and transmittal of the disease through
victims. 50 Where transmission has occurred, this infringement on privacy
might even extend to other sexual partners of the victim in order to rule out
other possible sources from which the victim might have contracted the
disease.' 5' However, the privacy of third parties is less likely to be infringed
by HIV transmission/exposure prosecutions than by general criminal offense
prosecutions, because a finding of guilt under a transmission/exposure law
requires only exposure, not actual transmission, so the victim's HIV status is
not a necessary piece of evidence.
Because HIV transmission/exposure crimes often arise in the context of
intimate personal situations, constitutional privacy concerns are also
148. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2785(2)(c) (McKinney 1997), which took effect in
1988, allows broad public disclosure of the identity of an infected person in cases of "clear
and imminent danger to the public health." See Bill Alden, Albany Begins Drive to Lift HIV
Confidentiality, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at 1; Lynda Richardson, Public Health Cited in
Breaching H.IV. Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1997, at B8. Statutes like this one are
found in many states.
149. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 188-89.
150. Id.
151. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 488. However, in Weaver v. State, 939 S.W.2d 316
(Ark. Ct. App. 1997), the court declined to allow the HIV-positive defendant to ask questions
relating to the victim's other sexual encounters. Id. at 318. The defendant, who had
intercourse without disclosing his HIV-positive status despite the fact that he was informed
that this would be a crime, was convicted under ARK. CODE. ANN. 5-14-123 (Michie 1993),
and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Id. at 317.
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implicated.1 52 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that states may
regulate consensual sexual activity between adults. 53 Additionally, several
courts have held, in various contexts, thatprivacy concerns can be trumped
by the state's interest in public health.'5 At least one state court, the
Supreme Court of Illinois, has upheld the constitutionality of its H1Y
transmission/exposure law in People v. Russell,155 where it was challenged
on First Amendment grounds. 56
The existence of these criminal laws may also undermine efforts to
extend treatment to all infected individuals. Many of these people are
already hesitant to bring their disease to the attention of public health
workers and medical personnel, and may go even further underground.
Finally, as with prosecutions under general criminal offense statutes,
HIV transmission/exposure laws could be used discriminatorily against
politically disfavored groups like homosexuals. Although selective pro-
secution is less likely under an H1V transmission/exposure law than under a
general criminal statute, it is still a possibility. Even in states where sodomy
is legal, the existence of EIV transmission/exposure laws might allow
government agents to prevent such activity. 5 7 Not only is this discrimin-
atory behavior unfair to those groups that are negatively impacted by it, but
also it may be counterproductive to the overall goal of slowing the spread of
the disease. Homosexuals, for example, may avoid obtaining testing and
treatment for fear of being targeted for investigation and/or prosecution.
51
To minimize the potential for selective enforcement, HIV
transmission/exposure laws should be drawn to limit prosecutorial
discretion, 59 and the legislative histories of such laws should clearly indicate
that the goal is to prevent prohibited conduct by all groups equally.
152. An individual's right to privacy in matters involving procreation and sexual
activity was recognized in such cases as Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969),
and Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
153. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
154. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that
privacy right is "outweighed by the state's right to enact laws which promote public health and
safety"); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
the right of privacy is sometimes "subordinate to the state's fundamental right to enact laws
which promote public health, welfare and safety, even though such laws may invade the
offender's right of privacy") (citing Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal.Rptr. 422, 430 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983)).
155. 630 N.E.2d 794(111. 1994).
156. Id. at 795-96.
157. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 488-89.
158. See idL at 489.
159. One method for limiting prosecutorial discretion is for the statute to permit
enforcement only upon a victim's request to law enforcement authorities. See id. at 512. This
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the disadvantages discussed above, an HIV transmission/
exposure law should be passed and utilized in every jurisdiction because it
best ensures that those individuals who expose others to a fatal disease will
be held responsible for their actions. HIV is a fatal disease, one which is
currently both unpreventable and incurable. Without the use of HIV
transmission/exposure laws, many Americans will be exposed to the disease,
both by those who do not know that exposure is illegal and by those who do
not care. Many of these people will contract the disease and die. Simply by
adopting HIV transmission/exposure laws, the message will spread,
hopefully faster than the disease itself, that society considers HIV exposure
to be unacceptable behavior. And where prosecution is nonetheless
necessary, use of the laws will offer prosecutors an increased likelihood of
success, but only in those cases where prosecution is truly warranted.
To be certain, the effort to prosecute HIV-transmitters and exposers will
necessitate some infringement on confidentiality and privacy. However, this
disadvantage, while significant, should not deter the enactment of HIV
transmission/exposure laws. The same criticism applies to general criminal
laws, perhaps to an even greater extent, as HIV transmission/exposure laws
do not require proof of actual transmission and offer better protections
against discriminatory enforcement. When balanced against the certainty of
death if the HIV virus is spread to uninfected individuals, the interests of
confidentiality and privacy must be trumped.
The model statute contained in the Appendix seeks to capture the
benefits of HIV transmission/exposure laws while minimizing their
disadvantages. Specifically, it provides clear definitions of what constitutes
knowledge, what activities are and are not prohibited, what will be
considered a defense to the crime, and when the statute should be
utilized. This HIV law is superior to general criminal laws because it
provides notice to potential defendants, reinforces societal norms against
dangerous behavior, deters individuals from engaging in such behavior,' 6°
and punishes those who do so anyway.
Nushawn Williams might not have engaged in unprotected intercourse
with so many women had he known that such activity was illegal. And if he
limitation is not without downsides of its own, most notably that it permits or perhaps even
encourages people to threaten former or current partners with the prospect of
punishment. The remedies for this concern, which is by no means exclusive to
transmission/exposure laws, is merely a careful prosecutorial screening process and the
placement of the burden of proof for all elements of the crime, including lack of consent, on
the prosecution.
160. See id. at 486-87.
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had nevertheless done so, prosecutors in New York would have a much
greater chance to get a conviction and to put him in prison for his despicable
actions. While punishing Mr. Williams will not give his victims back the
lives he allegedly took, it will help treat the disease that afflicts America
today: the willingness of some HIV-positive individuals to expose others to
a fatal disease. HIV transmission/exposure laws cannot cure our nationwide
problem of HIV transmission and the difficulties of punishing and deterring
it, but until a medical cure for HIV is found, ILV transmission/exposure
laws are the best options we have available.
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V. APPENDIX - MODEL STATUTE
Sec. 1 - Criminal HIV transmission/exposure.
A. A person is guilty of the crime of HIV transmission/
exposure when that person has knowledge that he or she is infected
with the HIV virus and exposes another person to that virus without
the consent of that other person.
B. Violation of Sec. 1.A is a class B felony, punishable by
[insert incarceration term consistent with that of other offenses].
C. Prosecution for conduct that constitutes exposure under this
Section precludes prosecution under any other Section of the State
Code for the same conduct.
D. Definitions to be applied to Sec. .A.:
1. "Knowledge" means that the person has been
informed by a medical or public health official, including but
not limited to a doctor, nurse, health department worker, or
designated representative of a home HIV testing company
licensed by the Federal Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), that his or her blood tests positive for the antibodies
indicating that he or she is infected with the HIV virus; or that
the person has been informed by a medical doctor both that he
or she has symptoms indicating the possibility that he or she
has been infected with HIV and that he or she should obtain an
HIV test to confirm or disprove this potential diagnosis.
Prosecution under this Section shall not proceed in the
absence of knowledge of HIV infection as herein defined.
2. "Infected with the HIV virus" means that the person
has the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), or any related virus
or syndrome such as AIDS-Related Complex.
3. "Exposes" means that the person engages in one of
the following types of conduct, and no other type of conduct:
a. Sexual activity consisting of any direct contact
between the mouth, tongue, genitals, or anus of one person
and the genitals or anus of another, regardless of whether
condoms or other protective measures are utilized.
[Vol. 23:847
71
: Nova Law Review 23, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Markus
b. Exchange, donation, sale, or any other type of
transfer to another individual of a drug needle or syringe
that has been utilized by the HIV-infected individual for
injecting a substance or otherwise piercing his or her skin
and has not subsequently been sterilized.
C. Donation, sale, gift, or any other type of transfer
to another person or entity of the tissues, blood, organs,
semen, breast milk, or other bodily substance for the
purposes of transplantation, transfusion, insemination, or
feeding. Transfer of bodily substances to medical
professionals for the purpose of testing or medical research
shall not constitute prohibited conduct under this Section,
nor shall in utero transmission from a mother to a child
constitute prohibited conduct under this Section.
4. "Consent" means that a person over the age of
majority has disclosed his or her HIV-positive status to the
other person and that other person has affirmatively agreed to
participate in the conduct constituting exposure under Section
1.D.3. Agreement by a minor to participate in the conduct
constituting exposure does not constitute consent. The
prosecution bears the burden of proving lack of consent.
5. A person is guilty of criminal HIV
transmission/exposure if Section 1.A. is satisfied, regardless of
whether or not actual transmission has taken place.
NOTES AND HISTORY
The purpose of this section is to prohibit conduct that has the potential
of transmitting the HIV virus. As such, it has been drawn to specifically
delineate the conduct that constitutes criminal behavior and to exclude types
of conduct, such as biting or spitting, which do not have the capacity to
transfer the virus.
It is the goal of the legislature that this section will be applied evenly
against all types of people and that it will not be used selectively against
certain groups. As such, prosecutors should use careful discretion when
applying this section in the absence of a complaint from a victim.
Additionally, this section does not circumvent or in any way alter the
provisions of the state's confidentiality statute. Prosecutors must adhere to
the provisions laid out in that section of the state code and should take every
precaution to preserve the confidentiality of offenders and victims alike.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that at least seven million people regularly use
prescription drugs without medical supervision, the majority of which are
addictive.1 This led to a 1983 figure of $60 billion to treat drug abuse in the
United States.2 Who is watching the licensed practitioners who serve as the
gatekeepers of these drugs?
Licensed health care professionals are governed in their practice by a
maze of incongruent rules and regulations. The administrative agency
("Board") in the state where the professional is licensed has authority to
sanction the licensee for inappropriate behavior.3 In addition to Board
* Associate, Law Offices of David Krathen, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, J.D. 1998; Veterans Affairs Medical
Center, Miami, Florida, Residency 1992-1993; Southeastern College of Pharmacy, Doctor of
Pharmacy, 1992. The author wishes to thank Judge Lorana Snow, United States Court of
Appeals, 1 lth Circuit, for her encouragement and instruction.
1. Drug and Alcohol Abuse Treatment, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-160(a)(2)
(1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 801 (1994), Historical and Statutory Notes).
2. Id. at 3207-160(a)(4).
3. In Florida, the state administrative agency for physicians is the Board of Medicine at
the Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, Florida ("Board"). The Board's
disciplinary actions follow the Florida Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 458.327, 329
(1997). They follow the court proceedings of the Administrative Procedures Act, FLA. STAT.
§§ 120.57(1), (2) (Supp. 1998), and the sentencing guide of FLA. ADMiN. CODE (1999)
(formerly FLA. ADMIN. CODE 59 r. 8.001).
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penalties, a health care professional who violates federal or state law in the
course of her practice may also be governed by the respective criminal laws.4
Although an abundance of enthusiastic legislation is available for use in
regulating licensed practitioners, when applied, these laws lead to
inconsistent, unforeseeable, and usually insufficient punishments in
comparison to the culpability of the professional's actions.
Generally when a health care professional prescribes or dispenses
controlled substances inappropriately, a criminal investigation of the
suspected individual will begin. The state prosecutor then has the
responsibility to recognize the individual as a licensed health care
professional and report the criminal charge to the Board. Theoretically, the
criminal trial and state administrative proceeding run concurrently and may
result in dual judgments. However, professional culpability could be
overlooked if the prosecutor either neglects to inform the administrative
agency or the practitioner holds a license to practice in more than one state
and the prosecutor errs by only reporting to the state agency in which the
practitioner was currently working when criminally charged.
Statutes vary among the states and this note is therefore limited to an
exploration of the inequities of sanctions of cases in Florida. In addition,
federal rules that govern physicians who inappropriately prescribe controlled
substances in Florida will be reviewed.5 Part II reviews the legislative
history of the statutes that govern physician prescribing. Part III weighs
criminal charges and defenses. Part IV reviews civil liabilities. In
conclusion, Part V provides an illustration of the inequities of sanctions
towards the more fortunate professional as compared to nonprofessional
defendants.
4. In Florida, the State Attorney General is responsible for criminal charges under the
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. § 893 (Supp.
1996) (amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 by the Controlled Substance Act, Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970), and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, § 2Dl.1 (1998) ("Guidelines"). If there is ever a conflict in these
rules, the statutes prevail over the Guidelines.
5. This note only reviews cases involving validly licensed physicians. Controlled
substances, for purposes of this note, are prescription drugs including narcotics found in
schedules II-IV of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. § 893.03 (Supp.
1996), having a recognized medical use. For a review of pharmacist liabilities see, for
example, P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Revocation or Suspension of License or Permit to
Practice Pharmacy or Operate Drugstore Because of Improper Sale or Distribution of
Narcotic or Stimulant Drugs, 17 A.L.R. 3d 1408 (Supp. 1998). For a review of nursing
liability see, for example, Emile F. Short, Annotation, Revocation of Nurse's License to
Practice Profession, 55 A.L.R. 3d 1141 (Supp. 1998).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The first Congressional attempt to regulate both the distribution and
marketing of dangerous drugs was the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,6
which was likewise repealed in 1938.7 In 1914, two attempts at regulation
were passed. The Harrison Act, which was repealed in 1970,9 and the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act,'0 which was repealed in 1970.
Finally, in 1970, Congress repealed all prior federal drug control legislation
and enacted the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 ("Act")." Title II of the Act is the Controlled Substance Act.'
2
Fourteen years later, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 was
passed to revise the Act, thereby allowing stricter penalties for violating
narcotics laws.' 3 The idea behind the combination Act, as stated by the
United States Supreme Court in a 1975 case against a physician, was to
create uniformity between the state and federal laws, thereby enabling more
effective communication in the war against drugs and less subjective
sanctions.1
4
The Act requires all persons who manufacture and distribute controlled
substances to register with the Attorney General of the United States.
15
Physicians who prescribe controlled substances and who fail to register are
subject to criminal penalties under section 822 and 841(a)(1) of the United
6. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938), primarily created to prevent
interstate commerce of adulterated drugs.
7. Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 63-230, 38 Stat. 275 (repealed 1970).
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-901 (1970) [hereinafter Act].
12. 21 U.S.C. § 801.
13. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 revised the Act of 1970 to allow
real property in the scope of civil forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). See, e.g., M.
Lynette Eaddy, How Much is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the Excessive Fines Clause
After Austin v. United States, 45 FLA. LAW REv. 709 (1993).
14. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975). In Moore, it was argued that a
registered physician cannot be prosecuted under section 841 because section 841, which
carries much harsher penalties, is reserved for an individual "outside the 'legitimate
distribution chain."' Id. at 130. Other sections such as sections 842 and 843, which are more
lenient were proffered as the correct avenue of prosecution. Id. at 131. The Court held that
section 841 is applicable when the activities fall outside the normal course of professional
medical practice and congressional intent is not to set up distinct sections for punishment of
differing classes of individuals. Id. at 124, 132. Moore was charged under 21 U.S.C §
841 (a)(1) with the unlawful distribution of methadone, a schedule II narcotic. Id. at 124.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 822 (1994).
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States Code.16 Under the Act, physicians are also required to keep records of
controlled substance distribution. Failure to comply with the Act can result
in criminal sanctions.1 8 In United States v. Betancourt,19 the court explained
that once registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), the
physician is required to prescribe controlled substances in the usual course
of professional practice and for legitimate medical purposes. 2° The Act
defines "dispense" as "to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate
user... pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the
prescribing .... administering[, ... packaging, labeling or compounding" of
a controlled substance.21 "Dispense," therefore, connotes a lawful order. If
a physician unlawfully prescribes a controlled substance he has not
dispensed under this statute, he has "distributed" in violation of law. 22
In addition to the Act, there are parallel state administrative rules
imposed by the medical licensing board that could result in physician
liability.23 The Board has been empowered to discipline a licensee b 4
suspending or revoking the practitioner's license, by reprimand, or by fine.
16. See United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (lth Cir. 1984), which involved a
physician's refusal to register in order to dispense Schedule II N drugs, which included
methaqualone. Id. at 1427. The Court explained that:
To possess or dispense a controlled substance, doctors must be licensed to
practice medicine and register annually with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). 21 U.S.C.A. § 822. Doctors may acquire and
dispense controlled substances "to the extent authorized by their registration."
Id. § 822(b). The registration application contains a separate box denoting
each schedule and directs applicants to check each box which is applicable in
registering for desired schedules. The statute mandates that the DEA register
physicians in every schedule they check if the physicians are authorized by
state law to dispense the substances included in that schedule.
Id. at 1427 n.1.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 830 (1994).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 822).
19. 734 F.2d 750 (11 th Cir. 1984).
20. Id. at 757. In Betancourt, the court reasoned that prescribing methaqualone
excessively, without further medical inquiry, is in violation of section 841 as not a legitimate
medical purpose. Id. at 757.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1996).
22. United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. TIMOTHY S. JOST ET AL., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A
Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 330 (1993); The Medical Practice
Act, FLA. STAT. § 458 (1993).
24. Jost, supra note 23. This note will only look at section 458.331(1) of the Florida
Statutes:
(c) Being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere
to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction which directly
relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine.
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Once the Board decides to cite a physician for misconduct, the case becomes
public record.25 Formal disciplinary sanctions must be initiated by citation,
thereby placing the physician's reputation on the line. 26 The Board's final
decision to cite a physician is a reflection of the serious nature of the
offense.27 In an Ohio study of 200 complaints lodged against physicians,
only2 five (2.5%) resulted in formal disciplinary action by cita-
tion. Potential concurrent liability of a practitioner under the numerous
Board rules and inconsistent criminal statutes has lead to much controversy
and confusion, leaving the practitioner with ripe arguments focused on
constitutional invasions, legislative intent, and statutory interpretations.
III. CRIMINAL LABIrrY
Many criminal defenses for physicians are founded in the area of
statutory interpretation. For example, section 893.13(1)(a) of the Florida
Statutes uses the word "selling" to define the criminal act of dispensing
29 30
controlled substances. In the case of Cilento v. State, a physician,
Cilento, dispensed controlled substances by means of a prescription issued in
bad faith, not in the course of medical practice.31 He claimed his actions
were "prescribing" and not "selling," therefore, not in violation of the Act,
which expressly requires selling of a controlled substance for sanctions.
32
The court held that prescribing in bad faith is "selling" through statutory
interpretation.
33
(q) Prescribing, dispensing, administering, mixing, or otherwise preparing a
legend drug, including any controlled substance, other than in the course of
the physician's professional practice. For the purposes of this paragraph, it
shall be legally presumed that prescribing, dispensing, administering, mixing,
or otherwise preparing legend drugs, including all controlled substances,
inappropriately or in excessive or inappropriate quantities is not in the best
interest of the patient and is not in the course of the physician's professional
practice, without regard to his or her intent.
FLA. STAT. §§ 458.331(l)(c), (q) (Supp. 1998).
25. Jost, supra note 23 at 326.
26. Id. at 327.
27. Id. at 330.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(a) (1997).
30. 377 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979).
31. Id. at 664.
32. Id. at 666.
33. Id.
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Therefore, a physician who is alleged to have prescribed a controlled
substance in violation of the Act can only be found criminally liable if the
prescriptions were written in bad faith.3 4 Bad faith can be proven when the
prescribing was done in opposition of proper medical standards. 35 However,
it should be noted that nonconformity to the standard medical practice is
only evidence in support of bad faith and must further be proven by medical
expert testimony. 36 The burden of going forward with evidence to challenge
the Act and establish an exception or exemption to the Act rests with the
defendant.37 This must be distinguished from the burden of persuading the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did commit the crime, as
this burden always remains with the prosecution.
By contrast, other courts have held that a physician could not be
prosecuted for selling controlled substances when the physician has
prescribed the drugs to another.38 These courts stated that the term "selling"
did not adequately describe the physician's action of rescribing within the
course of patient treatment.39  In Ex parte Evers, when the physician
prescribed amphetamines to a patient for alleged fatigue, it was found that
while the statute could apply to a licensed practitioner, the issue was whether
it is applicable to a physician who writes a prescription in the course of
41practice. In reaching its holding, the court stated that the criminal statutes
are to be strictly construed in a light most favorable to the defendant.42
Testimony, in this case, could not establish the actual selling of pills by the
physician under the statutory construction, and the statute should not be
extended by construction.43  Statutory interpretation varies among the
districts making conclusions of law difficult to ascertain.
A license to practice medicine is the basic requirement to prescribe
substances that may be otherwise illegal. A license does not, however,
protect thephysician from state intervention by the police. In United States
v. Moore, a licensed physician argued that he could not be prosecuted
34. Id.
35. Cilento, 377 So. 2d at 666.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1) (1970).
37. Id.
38. Ex parte Evers, 434 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 1983), rev'd, 434 So. 2d 817 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983). See also Rudell v. State, 453 So. 2d 1329 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding statute
does not apply to a licensed physician who writes a prescription within the scope of his
registration).
39. Evers, 434 So. 2d at 816.
40. 434 So. 2d at 813.
41. Id. at 816.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 816-17.
44. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
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under the federal Act 5 for distribution or dispensing a controlled substance
because he was acting within his professional practice.' The Court
disagreed, holding that Congress did not intend two separate and distinct
penalty systems, one for a licensed physician and the other for a "pusher.
4 7
The Court stated that the defendant was exempt under section 841(a)(1) of
the United States Code from only the legitimate dispensing of controlled
substances.48 There was nothing in the statute to infer that a registrant is
exempt from prosecution when he acted like a "pusher" outside of the usual
course of professional practice.
49
Additionally, statutory interpretation has uncovered the fact that
prescribing controlled substances constitutes a "delivery" if such act of
prescribing could be reasonably contemplated to result in actual transfer to
the patient by a pharmacist.5  Delivery is defined by the Florida
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act to include
constructive and attempted transfers as well as actual delivery.
51
In the case of Felker v. State,52 the physician argued he was permitted to
carry cocaine and admitted to having more at his medical office when he was
found to have cocaine residue in a nasal spray bottle, on a straw, and a
knife5 3  A search of his office revealed three bottles of cocaine
hydrochloride, a schedule II controlled substance, in his personal desk
drawer.54 The court stated that the Act makes it unlawful for any person to
have possession of any controlled substance in a "carte blanche" fashion.,55
The court further stated that allowing physicians to possess controlled
substances for their own personal, nonmedical use, was not the legislature's
intention.56 However, in this case, despite the drug residue evidence, the
physician was found not guilty because there was not enough evidence to
prove he was in actual possession of the drug at the time of the arrest.57 This
case demonstrates that the statutory authority is available to convict
45. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
46. Moore, 423 U.S. at 131.
47. Id. at 132.
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id.; see also United States v. Steele, 105 F.3d 603 (lth Cir. 1997) (extending
violations from physicians to pharmacists).
50. State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
51. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 893.02(5) (1997).
52. 323 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. App. 1984).
53. Id. at 819-20.
54. Id. at 820.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Felker, 323 S.E.2d at 821.
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physicians criminally, but the professional seems to elude the law with
loopholes.
A. Constitutional Challenge
The Act has been challenged by criminally charged physicians on
constitutional grounds. These grounds have included vagueness, invasion of
Tenth Amendment residual state police powers, right to privacy in the
physician/patient relationship, due process, and cruel and unusual
punishment. Historically, statutory challenges based on constitutional
grounds have been unsuccessful. As early as 1914, contentions that statutory
terms, such as "legitimate use," were void for vagueness, were without
success. 58 The court held, in Commonwealth v. Gabhart, that the mere fact
that "legitimate use" remained undefined by the statute, did not warrant
finding the statute void for vagueness.
59
Another unsuccessful constitutional argument arose when the
Department of Professional Regulation ("DPR") performed a warrantless,
routine administrative search of a pharmacy and found suspect prescriptions
for Quaaludes (methaqualone) written by an oral surgeon. The surgeon
attacked the constitutionality of the search as a violation of his reasonable
expectation of privacy.61 The court found that the physician had no grounds
for attacking the constitutionality of the search and upheld the physician's
thirty-day suspension.
62
Vagueness has also failed as a constitutional argument. The good faith
standard of section 893.05(1) of the Florida Statutes states that a licensed
physician, in the course of his practice, may prescribe, mix, dispense, and
administer controlled substances. 63 When a physician wrote a prescription
for a patient, subsequently found not written in "good faith," he challenged
this clause as unconstitutionally vague.64 The Supreme Court of Florida held
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it passed the test that
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." 65
In controlled substances cases, even where the suspected physician is
visited by undercover agents posing as patients, the defense has not been
58. Commonwealth v. Gabhart, 169 S.W. 514 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914).
59. Id. at 516.
60. Cushing v. Department of Prof'l Reg., 416 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
61. Id. at 1198.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 893.05(1) (1997).
64. State v. Weeks, 335 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1976).
65. Id. at 276.
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successful. It has been established that these actions by undercover agents
are not grounds for suppression of evidence, although entrapment has been a
successful defense.66  The key to entrapment is to determine if the
undercover agents induced the defendant to act, or if the defendant was
predisposed, and was merely given the opportunity to do so.' If a68predisposition to act can be established, entrapment may fail.
Other states have challenged other aspects of the Act on constitutional
grounds, without avail.69  Typically, a physician who is indicted for
unlawfully prescribing a controlled substance is more likely to prevail if the
defense avoids the constitutional issues and focuses on weak construction
and interpretation of the Act.
B. Criminal Charges: Double Jeopardy?
Physicians' actions are investigated both criminally and by a board,
thus arguments have arisen that findings of the board are final, collaterally
estopping the prosecution from proceeding.70 The argument that the state is
estopped from prosecuting the defendant is usually rejected. In the case of
State v. Fritz,7 the court explained that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
does not apply because there is a lack of privity between the State Attorney's
office and the state's administrative department.
72
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
and when a civil penalty is considered punishment for the purpose of double
73jeopardy. In United States v. Halper,74 Halper was working as a manager
of a medical laboratory and submitted sixty-five false claims to Blue Cross
66. White v. State, 247 S.E.2d 536, 538 (Ga. App. 1978).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1975) (Missouri), the court found
the failure to delineate parole terms not vague. Id. at 986. In United States v. Atkinson, 513
F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1975) (North Carolina), the court held a 12-year sentence does not violate
the Eighth Amendment as unusual or excessive punishment. Id. at 42. "[I]n the course of
professional practice" was held not void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment; further,
the Act, as applied to physicians, does not violate the Tenth Amendment by invading state
police powers. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1973) (Georgia); United
States v. Rosenburg, 515 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1975) (California).
70. State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157 (Conn. 1987).
71. Id. at 1157.
72. Id. at 1166.
73. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "[Nior
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
74. Halper, 490 U.S. at 435.
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and Blue Shield.75 Blue Cross mistakenly paid the claims and passed the
76
charges over to the Federal Government Medicare division. Halper was
convicted on sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false claims statute,
imprisoned for two years, and fined $5000.77 The Government then brought
Halper up on charges of violating the Civil False Claims Act,78 and fined him
$130,000. 71 The district court held that due to Halper's criminal conviction,
an additional civil punishment of $130,000, when actual damages were
significantly smaller, would amount to double jeopardy.80
The Government argued on appeal that double jeopardy only applies
when the second punishment is also criminal.81 The Court reasoned that
punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy can be both criminal and• - 82 . ..
civil. Civil judgments can impose punitive damages that far exceed
remedial goals and therefore serve punishment purposes.83 The court held,
that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, if a defendant has already been
punished criminally, he may not be subjected to a civil sanction for the same
offense if the civil penalty is retributive and not remedial in nature.84 The
civil punishment of $130,000 was found to violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause and the case was remanded for adjustment to a remedial amount. 5
The finding in Halper clouds the seemingly bright line of double
jeopardy. An assessment must be made of whether the completeness of the
punishment under one statute is a potential bar to liability under another
applicable statute. When it comes to a physician, where is that line drawn?
Who decides if a simple suspension of a medical license accompanied by a
fine is adequate "punishment," thereby barring criminal sanctions? This
note by no means purports to answer these questions, but attempts to bring
these issues to the forefront for examination.
86In 1996, in Borrego v. Agency for Health Care Administration, a case
of first impression in Florida, a physician was previously convicted of
federal Medicare fraud, then using some facts of this underlying conviction,
he was later subjected to a licensure suspension by the Board. The court
75. Id. at 437.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994).
79. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
80. Id. at 438.
81. Id. at441.
82. Id. at 448.
83. Id.
84. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
85. Id. at 452.
86. 675 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
87. Id. at 667.
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88held the suspension did not constitute double jeopardy. This holding was
based on the much accepted reasoning that disciplinary actions of the state
Board are designed to protect public welfare rather than punish the
individual.89 Although this recent case is promising in that, as Congress
intended, crimes are not going without dual sanctions, the civil sanctions
imposed on the physician in Borrego were only a $5000 fine and a
suspension of his license for eighteen months. What if the physician had
received a license revocation or imprisonment previously, would this have
been civil "punishment" enough to constitute double jeopardy for the second
offense?
Another avenue the prosecution may take is that of the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine. This doctrine allows successive state and federal
prosecutions for the same crime.91  However, this avenue, although
supported by the United States Supreme Court, is littered with as much, if
not more, controversy than double jeopardy, and outside the scope of this
note.
92
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE REVIEW
State Boards' investigations of physicians originate from two primary
sources: Letters or telephone calls from patients, relatives, or friends
complaining of mismanaged care or inappropriate conduct; other notices
from hospitals, insurance companies, and similar entities, as well as criminal
convictions and similar information.9 3  When an action is taken and a
physician's license is revoked or suspended by the Board for inappropriately
prescribing a controlled substance, the cases can generally be divided into
two categories. The first category involves the practitioner that has been
88. Id.
89. Id. at 668. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 n.2 (1938); Munch v.
Davis, 196 So. 491, 493-94 (Fla. 1940). "The purposes of the imposition of discipline are to
punish.., deter [and] rehabilitate." FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r 8.001 (1997).
90. Interview with David Osterhouse, Regulation Specialist II, Office of the Agency
Clerk, Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, Fla., Board of Medicine Final
Orders Involving Improper Prescribing or Criminal Convictions (March 14, 1997).
91. Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C.L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1994).
92. Id. Dual sovereignty is supported by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91-94 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332
(1978).
93. Jost, supra note 23, at 310-11. The number of complaints and referrals to the state
medical licensing boards has been increasing. Id. The number of complaints has almost
doubled in eight years, ranging recently from 5000 to 7000 per year. Id.
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convicted of a prior criminal offense in the course of medical practice.94 The
second category involves those practitioners that are charged solely under
95the rules of the administrative agency.
Based on information acquired from Florida's Agency for Health Care
Administration, 109 physicians have been cited under the state's
96
administrative agency rules between January 1992 to December 1996.
Ideally, the criminal proceeding is instituted or the criminal judgment
reached before the administrative proceeding begins. However, it has been
acknowledged that the Board may actually begin the investigation in some
cases and subsequently report the alleged criminal violations to the state
attorney. 97 Additionally, it is well known that few proceedings ever reach
the courts. Cases not published in the reporters or available in electronic
databases are not reflected in this summary. Also, given that in a license
revocation or suspension proceeding, the hearing officer's findings of fact
need be based only on "competent substantial evidence," the civil charges
may be dropped under certain circumstances upon termination of the
98
criminal proceeding.
Since the authority to revoke or suspend a physician's license for
inappropriate prescribing of controlled substances is vested in an
administrative agency-in Florida, the Florida Board of Medicine-the
courts generally defer to the agency. Findings are generally affirmed unless
they are excessively harsh, shocking, or do not involve an element of intent
or moral turpitude.
9
The following examines a few examples of a court overturning the
Board's recommendations for sanctions. In the first example, the Board
gave a doctor a six month suspension which was set aside by the court on the
grounds that it was too harsh.1° The Board found that the doctor violated
federal law by prescribing morphine "for office use only" and administering
94. The Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. § 458.33 1(1)(c) (Supp. 1998).
95. Id. § 458.331(1)(q).
96. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90. Seventy-five physicians were cited
under section 458.331(1)(q) of the Florida Statutes for inappropriate prescribing. Id. Thirty-
four physicians were cited under section 458.331 (1)(c) of the Florida Statutes for conviction
of a crime relating to the practice of medicine or ability to practice medicine. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1382-83 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Arthurs v. Stem, 560 F.2d 477 (Mass. 1977).
99. See generally Richardson v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the Board's penalty was too harsh, and dismissing the
Board's comparison of facts to a case which involved grossly immoral conduct).
100. Id. at 236.
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it to his patients.101 The court said that although he did violate federal law
by inappropriate use of morphine, he did it without the intent to conceal. 102
In even more recent examples, sanctions by the Board upon finding
physicians prescribing excessive or inappropriate controlled substances have
also been met with opposition by the courts. 10 3 In Hoover v. Agency for
Health Care Administration, 1 4 the court found that the agency failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence, that Hoover, the physician,
prescribed controlled substances in violation of section 458.331(1)(q) of the
Florida Statutes.105 Hoover was treatinj0patients with intractable pain with
large quantities of controlled substances. An investigation was conducted,
however, and insufficient evidence was presented by expert testimony to
disprove the actual disease of the patients. 0 7 The sanctions by the Board
were subsequently reversed.108 Despite these few cases, because the courts
typically defer so much authority to the administrative agency it is important
for counsel to be familiar with the administrative procedures.'6
When a physician prescribes excessive quantities of controlled
substances, a suspension or revocation of the license to practice medicine is
usually warranted; the prescription will be deemed inappropriate unless the
physician can show through expert testimony that the controlled substances
he prescribed were: 1) for patients with serious medical problems requiring
the control of pain; 2) in amounts not beyond recommended doses; and 3)
for a patient who was already tolerant of such doses.110
In a case involving unprofessional conduct where a physician
prescribed unlawfully, or in excessive quantities, a controlled substance to a
known addict, the court looked to the surrounding circumstances. The Board
found that the physician's treatment was incomplete and did not meet
community standards. Unfamiliar with the treatment of narcotics addicts,
101. Id. at 234-35.
102. Id. at 236.
103. See Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1382. See also Reese v. Department of Prof'l Reg., 471
So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. -1985); Sneij v. Department of Prof 1 Reg., 454 So. 2d
795,796 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
104. 676 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
105. Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1385. See also Jost, supra note 23.
106. Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1381.
107. Id. at 1385.
108. Id. at 1380.
109. Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57(1), (2) (1997).
110. See generally Johnston v. Department of Prof I Reg., 456 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the prescribing of Dilaudid
was improper because it may have been reasonable under the circumstances). Id. at 944.
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the Board reprimanded and limited the physician's riAht to prescribe
controlled substances when he treats this class of patients.
Suspension of a physician's license for prescribing controlled
substances without adhering to minimum community standards, which may
involve first giving a physical examination, for example, is usually upheld by
the courts. In a case where a physician prescribed phentermine and
phendimetrazine, schedule IV controlled substances, to patients under his
continued care without a physical exam, his license was suspended and the
Board's proceedings were upheld by the court, which found that this practice
did not meet the minimum community standard.'
13
In 1993, a physician appealed a six-month suspension of his medical
license and a fine of $3000 for violation of section 458.331(1)(q) of the
Florida Statutes, in addition to other sections. a14 The physician stated that
due to the inadequacies of the state administrative agency in compiling an
index of prior decisions to use as precedent, the judgment was potentially
prejudicial.' 15  The court upheld the complaint stating that although the
administrative agencies are not bound by prior decisions, the core of the
judicial system is the doctrine of stare decisis, which was not readily
available to the defendant. 16  Ironically, while escaping liability on a
technicality in 1993, this physician was again cited by the Board in
December of 1995 for the same charges. This time the physician
voluntarily relinquished his license. 18 Despite the frequency of citations in
Florida, the Board, although it does impose sanctions, often fails to
implement penalties that are sufficient to deter misconduct. 19 Probably the
most paradoxical case in Florida involves a psychiatrist who fought the
emergency suspension of his license in 1991, calling the suspension an
unconstitutional procedure. The psychiatrist was addicted to Demerol
111. Id. at 943.
112. Scheininger v. Department of Prof 1 Reg., 443 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
113. Id.
114. Gessler v. Department. of Bus. & Prof 1 Reg., 627 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
115. Id. at 503.
116. Id. at 504.
117. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin., Board of Med. v. Blender, 18 FALR
916 (1995) (physician self injected Darvocet and Valium for four years and received only a
license suspension); Agency for Health Care Admin., Board of Med. v. Royce, 18 FALR 941
(1995) (psychiatrist's patient died after she self injected herself with controlled substances at
her home. The doctor was charged with a record-keeping violation and was issued a letter of
reprimand).
120. Garcia v. Department of Prof 1 Reg., 581 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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(meperidine), a schedule II controlled substance, and denied the problem. 2 1
He also aided in the escape of a minor from a mental institute, took her to a
motel, and injected her with Demerol.' 22 The court held that emergency
suspension of his license under section 120.60(6) of the Florida Statutes was
not unconstitutional and the suspension was upheld.'2 During research, it
was subsequently learned that the psychiatrist in this case was cited by the
state agency once again, five years later. 24 In December of 1996, he was
charged with eight counts of violations of sections 458.331 and 458.327 of
the Florida Statutes, including failure to maintain records for injectable
Demerol and practicing with a revoked license.12 This time, the sanctions
imposed by the Board were $5000 and a reprimand. 26 Public records to date
show no criminal procedures pending on this psychiatrist, and although
reprimanded, his initial suspension in 1991 is not permanent.
Using this case as an example to determine potential penalties from
plain statutory application, the conduct of this psychiatrist, at a minimum,
violated: 1) multiple sections of the Florida Medical Practice Act; 27 2) The
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act; 12 3) the
Controlled Substance Act;129 and 4) the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. 30 ("Guidelines"). The Guidelines equate one gram of Demerol
as equivalent to fifty grams of marijuana.13 ' Simple calculations for a five-
year addiction would conservatively place the psychiatrist at a base level of
fourteen of the Guidelines, for 6.5 kilograms of marijuana. 13  In addition,
121. Id. at 961.
122. Id.
123. Id. If the Board finds an immediate, serious danger to the public health, safety,
and welfare, it can require emergency suspension or limitation of a physician's license. FLA.
STAT. § 120.60(6) (1996).
124. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90.
125. Section 458.327 of the Florida Statutes includes: 1(a) practicing without active
license; l(b) practicing with a suspended or revoked license; and 2(d) leading the public to
believe one is licensed without holding an active license. FLA. STAT. §§ 458.327 (1)(a), (b)
(1993).
126. Interview with Osterhouse, supra note 90.
127. FLA. STAT. § 458 (1993).
128. FLA. STAT. § 893 (1997).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
130. UNrrED STATES SENTENCING GUIDiNES MANuAL § 2D1.1 (1998).
131. See Commentary to section 2Dl.1 of the Guidelines (providing drug equivalency
tables equating 1 gram of meperidine to 50 grams of marijuana). Id.
132. Using a conservative calculation, if the physician used a 50 milligrams-per-
milliliter injection one weekly for five years, this is 130 grams of Demerol. Then converting
to marijuana, per the guidelines, would require multiplying by a factor of 50, thus equating to
6.5 kilograms of marijuana. In Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), the Court
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appendix to section 3B1.3 of Title 18, of the United States Code, mandates
an upward departure of two levels from the base offense where the defendant
abuses a position of public or private trust in violation of section 841 of Title
21, of the United States Code.133  Therefore, using these conservative
calculations, this psychiatrist is at level sixteen of the Guidelines. The
Guidelines also require that prior convictions be considered. 134 Though he
was not criminally indicted for his 1991 offense, it will be used in this
calculation despite the oversight by the state, resulting in a sentence
calculation of twenty-one to twenty-seven months of imprisonment.
However, the Guidelines are not the only rules that apply. The application
of section 841(b)(1)(c) of The Act is for controlled substances in schedules I
and II, and mandates a sentence of not more than thirty years imprisonment
and a fine not to exceed $2,000,000.135 Congressional statutes prevail over
the sentencing guidelines if there is a conflict; therefore, the latter
calculation under section 841 should control. 136 Amazingly, the calculation
is still not complete until the Board has a chance to impose its sanctions.
Rule 59R-8.001 of Florida Administrative Code,'37 and the Medical Practice
Act, 138 would cite the physician with multiple violations resulting in a fine
from $500 to $10,000 and from one-year probation to a license revocation. 139
This example portrays the incongruency in the rules, and the potential
difficulty in prevailing with a fair and foreseeable sentence. Which of the
punishments above is appropriate, and if one sanction was imposed, is that
sanction enough to constitute "punishment" therefore barring, via double
jeopardy, further prosecution? Perhaps the legislation itself is the reason for
the reluctance to sanction licensed professionals.
held that the court of appeals reviewed the sentencing scheme and found it is rational. Id. at
456.
133. 18 U.S.C. app. § 3B1.3 (1995).
134. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.1 (1995).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c) (1994). See also, supra note 4.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
137. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59R-8.001 (1997).
138. The Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1997).
139. Under rule 59R-8.001 of the Florida Administrative Code Annotated and section
458.331 of the Florida Statutes, inappropriate or excessive prescribing requires a fine from
$250 to $5000 and from one-year probation to revocation; self prescribing a scheduled drug
requires a fine from $250 to $5000 and from one-year probation to revocation; improper
prescribing of a schedule II controlled substance requires a fine from $250 to $5000 and
probation, or two year suspension and probation. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59R-8.001
(1997); FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1997). However, the Board reserves its right to deviate from
these guidelines for multiple violations and trade or sale of a controlled substance.
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V. CONCLUSION: ARE ALL "PUSHERS" TRULY EQUAL?
Ultimately, the physician maintains an unwritten affirmative defense by
the mere fact that he or she is a physician. Consider, for example, the
infamous case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. His killing machine used a controlled
substance, Thiopental, which he acquired and maintained illegally, in
violation of civil and criminal laws. Although Dr. Kevorkian's license to
practice medicine was suspended by the Board on November 20td, 1991,140 it
was not until March 26, 1999, that Dr. Kevorkian was found guilty of second
degree murder. 41 Over 130 lives were lost during that eight year delay, and,
even then, Dr. Kevorkian was free on bond for three weeks while awaiting
sentencing.'42 Judge Jessica Cooper, who issued the order, seemed to
endorse the idea that while Dr. Kevorkian had killed illegally, he is still not
really a murderer. 143
In Florida, a license to practice medicine is considered a privilege
which may be withdrawn by the sovereign to preserve the health and welfare
of the public and maintain good order in society.144 The purpose of enacting
section 458 of the Florida Statutes is to protect the public from practitioners
that cannot comply with standards of safe practice. 145  However, once
remedial penalties are imposed and the practitioner's license is revoked by
the Board, the practitioner becomes a person. Therefore, protecting the
public from the practitioner is not enough; the public also needs to be
protected from the person. The various arms of the criminal rules are looked
to at this point for help in actual punishment. As stated boldly in a Senate
Report in 1983, "a sentencing guideline system is intended to treat all classes
of offenses committed by all categories of offenders consistently."'146 The
legislature admits, in reports such as this, that society consists of differing
classes of criminals. To overcome this pitfall, Congress has enacted and
supported broad rules with the good faith intent to treat all "pushers" equal,
however, little effort is exerted by the state to use this machinery handed to
them by Congress.
140. Detroit Free Press, Key Dates in Kevorkian's Crusade (March 26, 1999) (last
visited April 9, 1999) <http://www.freep.coni news/extra2/qkchron26.htm>.
141. Detroit Free Press, Convicted of Murder (March 27, 1999) (last visited April 9,
1999) <http://www.freep.com/news/extra2/qkevo272.htm>.
142. Id.; Key Dates in Kevorkian's Crusade, supra note 140.
143. National Post Online, Medical Hit Man's Mission Stopped (March 27, 1999) (last
visited April 9, 1999) <http:llwww.nationalpost.comlnews.asp?s2=national&s3--reporter
&f--990327/2418065.html>.
144. Munch v. Davis, 196 So. 491,493-94 (Fla. 1940).
145. FLA. STAT. § 458.301(1993).
146. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 45-46 (1983).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The agreement combining Citicorp and Travelers Group Inc. is a
seventy billion dollar dare.1 The 1933 Glass-Steagall Act2 and the 1956
1. Blue-Chip Issues Continue Retreat as Dow Falls by 65.02, N.Y. TIMEs, April 9,
1998, at D6. The merger was estimated as a seventy billion dollar deal on both sides before
stock prices rose. Id. at D6.
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Bank Holding Company Act 3 forbid combinations of banks and insurance
companies, but Citicorp and Travelers are betting that Congress will finally
move to modernize banking regulation rather than stand in the wake of such
a mega merger and the force of the modem financial marketplace.4
This note will discuss both the historical and current state of banking
law in the United States. It will also address the impact the announced
merger will have on financial reform. Part II will provide a background of
banking history and introduce the need for the Glass-Steagall Act. Part III
will address the amendments to the Act in order to explain the current
provisions of the Act. Part IV will present the current proposed financial
modernization legislation, as approved by the House of Representatives. The
insurance and banking industries' positions on the proposed financial
modernization legislation will be discussed in Part V. Part VI will explain
the turf war between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department over
the proposed legislation. Part VII will discuss the impact of the Citicorp-
Travelers merger on Congress to pass financial modernization legislation
and/or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. Part VIm will conclude that the
Citicorp-Travelers Group merger will be the catalyst that finally forces
Congress to modernize banking regulations to meet global challenges.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROVISIONS OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The Glass-Steagall Act5 remains as the centerpiece of banking law since
its passage in 1933 when it built a wall separating commercial banking and
investment banking. Actually, there are two Glass-Steagall measures. The
first was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932,6 a mere bookkeeping measure that
2. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to §§ 16, 20, 21, 32 of
the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994 & Supp. 111997), 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378
(1994).
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. 111997).
4. Financial Services Mergers: Hearing Before the House Banking and Financial
Services Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John J. Roche, general counsel for
Citicorp).
We believe we can retain the insurance distribution side ... if we are not able
to manufacture it internally. And should the day come when we need to
conform, and the only choice is to divest those insurance manufacturers, if
you will, underwriters, then we will do that, a spinoff or some sort of
divestiture for the benefit of the stockholders, obviously... [a]nd we hope
that we can continue with them.
Id.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994 & Supp. II 1997); 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378 (1994).
6. See generally The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, 58 STAT. 56 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 111997); 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378 (1994)).
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allowed the Treasury to balance its account. 7  What is commonly known
today as the Glass-Steagall law is actually the Bank Act of 1933,8 which
contains the provisions separating the banking and securities businesses. 9 It
also laid the foundation for legislation that would allow the Federal Reserve
to let banks into the securities business in a limited way.10
Fundamental to an understanding of the passage of the Glass-Steagall
Act is the fact that by 1933 the U.S. was in one of the worst depressions of its
history."' A quarter of the formerly working population was unemployed.
12
7. Id. § 5136.
8. Ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
9. Id.
10. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56-
58 (1981) (granting "greatest deference" to Federal Reserve Board and upholding Board's
amending Regulation Y to permit affiliates of commercial banks to act as investment advisors
to closed end investment companies although not allowed under Bank Holding Company Act);
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984)
(upholding Board approval of Bank of America's purchase of Charles Schwab, arguing that
affiliates engaged principally in retail securities sales do not violate Glass-Steagall because
their business is limited to the purchase and sale of securities "for the account of customers" as
permitted in section 16 of the Act); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 152 (1984) (holding that commercial paper is a security under §§
16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall and therefore commercial banks may not privately place
commercial paper). On appeal from remand, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987), that
commercial paper could be placed by a commercial bank since a private placement is not the
same as an underwriting, which is a public offering prohibited by § 16 of Glass-Steagall. See
also Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252, 253 (D.D.C.
1983) (upholding Comptroller's decision authorizing discount brokerage services and
indicating that discounting securities, in contrast to underwriting, does not involve the risks of
investment banking that the Glass-Steagall Act sought to prevent), aff'd, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (upholding Comptroller of the
Currency's approval of discount brokerage services through a bank's securities subsidiary);
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d 810, 811 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988) (upholding Board decision that banks may
combine securities brokerage services and investment advice in an affiliate); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1059 (1988) (upholding Board decision allowing bank holding company subsidiaries to
engage in limited underwriting of commercial paper based on the Board's construction of the
phrase "engaged principally" in § 20 of Glass-Steagall, which was construed to mean that
underwriting is permissible if it accounts for no more than ten percent of the affiliate's gross
revenue); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360,
363 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (upholding Board ruling which extended securities underwriting powers
to select banks for most types of securities, including corporate debt and equity securities).
11. LSER V. CHANDLER, AMERICA'S GREATEST DEPRESSION 1929-1941 (1970).
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The nation's banking system was chaotic. From 1930 to 1933, more than
9,000 commercial banks had failed.'3 The governors of several states had
closed their states' banks, and in March, President Roosevelt closed all the
banks in the country. 14  Congressional hearings conducted in early 1933
deduced that the bankers and brokers committed gross misuses of the
public's trust and engaged in disreputable and seemingly dishonest
dealings.' 5 Some historians, in retrospect, have come to a different
conclusion about the role such abuses had in bringing down the banks.'6
Some historians now say the primary cause of bank failures was the
Depression itself, which caused real estate and other values to fall, thereby
undermining bank loans.17 Securities abuses played a minor role in the
collapse of banks, these historians say, and caused few failures among the
New York banks which had the largest Wall Street operations.
18
The Banking Act of 193319 was probably the newly elected Roosevelt
administration's most important answer to the extensive breakdown of the
nation's financial and economic system.20 But the Act did not affect the most
12. GEORGE J. BENTSON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING:
THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 1 (1990). At the height of the
Depression, unemployment hit twenty-five percent, forty percent of the nation's banks failed
or were merged and President Roosevelt temporarily closed down the national banking system
to halt a panic. Id.
13. CARTER H. GOLEMBE & DAVID S. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 37
(1981).
14. Proclamation No. 2038, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933). Congress ratified the President's
emergency actions within three days. Bank Conservation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1994).
15. ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 27 (1987) (citing Stock Exchange
Practices: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S.
Res. 84 and S. Res. 239, 72d Cong. (1933)). Hearings led by Ferdinand Pecora, chief counsel
of Senator Glass's banking subcommittee, documented major abuses involving large
commercial banks and their securities affiliates. Id. These included banks making loans to
securities purchasers to support artificially elevated securities prices and the dumping of
poorly performing stocks in trust accounts managed by the bank. Id.
16. See, e.g., Robert J. Rogowski, Commercial Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds,
95 BANKING L.J. 155, 159 (1978); MARK J. FLANNERY, An Economic Evaluation of Bank
Securities Activities Before 1933, in DEREGULATING WALL STREET: COMMERCIAL BANK
PENETRATION OF THE CORPORATE SECURrrmS MARKET 67-69 (Ingo Walter ed. 1985);
Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 56-58 (1987) (statement of Edward J. Kelly III).
17. Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 100th Cong. 57 (1987).
18. Id.
19. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
20. Id.
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dominant weaknesses of the American banking system: unit banking within
states and the prohibition of nationwide banking. This structure is
considered the main cause in the failure of so many United States banks,
some ninety percent of which were unit banks with under two million dollars
in assets.21 In contrast, Canada, which had nationwide banking, suffered no
bank failures22 and only a few of the over 9,000 United States banks that
failed or merged were branch banks. 23 Instead, the Act created new
approaches to financial regulation, notably the establishment of deposit
insurance and the legal separation of most aspects of commercial and
investment banking (with the exception of allowing commercial banks to
underwrite most government-issued bonds) ?4
The primary force behind the law was Senator Carter Glass 5 Glass
was a former Treasury Secretary who is considered the father of the Federal
Reserve System and a critic of banks that dealt in what he considered the
risky business of investing in stocks. 6 Senator Glass wanted banks to stick
to conservative commercial lending, and he capitalized on the anti-bank
viewpoints to push through the changes he wanted.27 Only two years after
21. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES
RELATING TO BRANCHING By FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 27 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES] (explaining Comptroller Pole's criticism of unit banking because of
the previously inconceivable number of small bank failures during the Great Depression).
22. See Eugene Nelson White, A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930, 44 J.
ECON. HisT. 119, 131-32 (1984) (asserting United States bank failures in 1930 were
disparately concentrated in the category of small, local banks that did not have branches and
therefore, were not geographically diverse). Some commentators have asserted that Canada
averted bank failures during the early 1930s because Canada's system was dominated by large
nationwide banks that were geographically diverse. E.g., id. at 131-32.
23. Leonard Lapidus, State and Federal Deposit Insurance Schemes, 53 BRooK. L.
REV. 45, 48 (1987) (noting branch banks coped better with the pressures of the Depression
when compared with unit banks); see also COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES, supra note 21, at 88-89
(referencing paper by Gary G. Gilbert, FIN. ECONOMIST, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION).
24. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
25. Carter H. Golembe, History Disputes Tales of Pre-1933 Securities Irregularities by
Banks, BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 3, 1995, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 696-97
(1987).
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Glass-Steagall was enacted, Senator Glass led an effort to have it repealed,
because he thought it was a mistake and an overreaction.2 S
Congressman Henry Steagall, a Democrat who was Chairman of the
House Banking and Currency Committee, developed a desire for helping
farmers and rural banks growing up in Ozark, Alabama. 29 He had little
interest in separating banking from Wall Street, but signed on to the bill after
Senator Glass agreed to attach Congressman Steagall's amendment, which
authorized bank deposit insurance for the first time.
For several years before 1933, Senator Glass wanted to restrict or forbid
commercial banks from dealing in and holding corporate securities.31 He
strongly believed that bank involvement with securities was harmful to the
Federal Reserve System, against the rules of sound banking, accountable for
stock market speculation, the Crash of 1929, bank failures, and the Great
Depression.32 It is commonly acknowledged that he was not able to
accomplish his goal of separating commercial and investment banking until
disclosures concerning National City Bank, the predecessor to Citibank, were
brought out in the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency's Stock
Exchange Practices Hearings. Disappointment with speculators and
securities merchants carried over from investment bankers to commercial
bankers. The two were equally abhorred, and an embittered public did not
care to make distinctions between them.34 The Banking Act of 193335 was
passed and quickly signed into law.
36
Restricting banks' ability to grow too large has been a common focus in
legislation over the years. During the 1930s and 1940s, banks adhered to the
28. See 79 CONG. REC. 11,827, 11,933-35 (1935). Glass urged repeal because he
thought he was wrong, when he expected the investment banking industry could furnish the
capital needs of American businesses without involving commercial banks. Id.
29. Langevoort, supra note 27, at 696-97.
30. Id.
31. Golembe, supra note 25, at 3.
32. Id.
33. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) 1st Sess.
(1934), reprinted in 7 LEGISLATIVE HIST. OF THE SEC. ACT OF 1933 AND SEC. EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934, at Item 22 (J. S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973); see also Golembe, supra
note 25, at 3; Langevoort, supra note 27, at 696-97.
34. George G. Kaufman, The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks, in HANDBOOK
FOR BANKING STRATEGY 661, 667-68 (Richard C. Aspinwall & Robert A. Eisenbeis eds.,
1985).
35. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
36. Id.
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basics of taking deposits and making loans. Congress did not intervene
again until 1956, when it enacted the Bank Holding Company Act to hinder
financial services conglomerates from accumulating too much power.38 That
law built a wall between banking and insurance in response to aggressive
acquisitions and expansion by TransAmerica Corporation, an insurance
company that owned Bank of America and an assortment of other
businesses.39 Congress thought it inappropriate for banks to risk potential
37. See Brenton C. Leavitt, The Philosophy of Financial Regulation, 90 BANKING L.J.
632, 646-47 (1973) (asserting that the philosophy of banking from the late 1930s through the
1950s was one of "caution, risk avoidance, and only limited concern for maintenance of a
competitive climate").
38. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. II 1997) (§ 1845 repealed 1966); see S.
REP. No. 1095 84-1095 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2482-83. The general
statement of the Senate report regarding the Bank Holding Company Act states:
[P]ublic welfare requires the enactment of legislation providing Federal
regulation of the growth of bank holding companies and the type of assets it is
appropriate for such companies to control. In general, the philosophy of this
bill is that bank holding companies ought to confine their activities to the
management and control of banks and that such activities should be
conducted in a manner consistent with the public interest. Your committee
believes that bank holding companies ought not to manage or control
nonbanking assets having no close relationship to banking.
It is not the committee's contention that bank holding companies are evil of
themselves. However, because of the importance of the banking system to
the national economy, adequate safeguards should be provided against undue
concentration of control of banking activities. The dangers accompanying
monopoly in this field are particularly undesirable in view of the significant
part played by banking in our present national economy.
Id.
39. 101 CONG. REc. 8040-41 (1955). In June 1955, the House Committee on Banking
and Currency reported:
One of the regulated bank holding companies which owns more than 50
percent of the capital stocks of banks with total deposits of slightly over $2
billion... owns all of the capital stock of a life insurance company ... with
over $5 billion of life insurance in force . . . in 47 states, 7 Canadian
Provinces, Hawaii, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. In addition, the
holding company owned from 92.5 to 100 percent of the capital stock of 4
fire and casualty insurance companies which write practically all forms of
insurance other than life.
Id. See also Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Thinking the Unthinkable: What Should Commercial
Banks or Their Holding Companies Be Allowed to Own?, 67 IND. L.J. 251, 251 n.1 (1992)
(asserting that Congress enacted amendments, in 1970, to the Bank Holding Company Act in
order to separate banking from commerce because First National City Bank (now Citibank)
led the money center banks in using the one bank holding company to engage in nontraditional
banking businesses).
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losses from underwriting insurance.4°  While many banks today sell
insurance products provided by insurers, banks still are not permitted to take
on the risk of underwriting.
Several efforts since 1933 by commercial bankers, their lobbyists, and
at times, regulators, to repeal or carve exceptions to the Glass-Steagall Act
have not been successful. These attempts have centered on those sections
of the Act that require separation of commercial and investment banking.42
Consequently, the United States is in a minority with the world's major
financial nations, for legally requiring this separation. 43
III. PROVISIONS OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The Glass-Steagall Act has come to stand for only those sections of the
Banking Act of 1933 that refer to banks' securities operations-sections 16,
20, 21, and 32.44 These four sections of the Act, as amended and interpreted
by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board and the
courts, control commercial banks' domestic securities operations in many
ways. Sections 16 and 21 relate to the direct operations of commercial banks
while sections 20 and 32 refer to commercial bank affiliations.45
Section 16, 46 as amended by the Banking Act of 1935,47 generally
prohibits Federal Reserve member banks from purchasing securities for their
own account. However, a national bank (chartered by the Comptroller of the
Currency) may purchase and hold investment securities up to ten percent of
40. Lichtenstein, supra note 39.
41. James R. Smoot, Financial Institutions Reform in the Wake of VALIC, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 691, 701-02 (1996).
42. Id.
43. Christopher T. Toil, Note, The European Community's Second Banking Directive:
Can Antiquated United States Legislation Keep Pace?, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615, 617-
18 (1990); see also Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Banking from Securities and
Commerce in the Modem Financial Marketplace, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 583, 617 (1991)
(explaining that banks permitted to underwrite securities abroad place United States banks at a
competitive disadvantage).
44. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). The Glass-Steagall Act is the common name for four sections of this Act: § 16
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. II 1997)), § 20 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994)), § 21 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1994)),
and § 32 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994)).
45. Id.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 111997) (defining investment securities as
bonds, notes, or debentures considered by the Comptroller to be investment securities).
47. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 709, § 308(a) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 111997)).
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its capital and surplus.48 Sections 16 and 21 also prohibit deposit taking
institutions from both accepting deposits and engaging in the business of
"issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or
through syndicate participation, stock, bonds, debentures, notes or other
securities," with some notable exceptions. 49 These exceptions include United
States Government obligations, obligations issued by government agencies,
college and university dormitory bonds, and the general obligations of states
and political subdivisions. Municipal revenue bonds, other than those used
to finance higher education and teaching hospitals, are not included in the
exceptions, in spite of the attempts of commercial banks to have Congress
reform the Act. In 1985, however, the Federal Reserve Board pronounced
that commercial banks could act as advisers and agents in the private
placement of commercial paper.
52
Section 16,3 permits commercial banks to purchase and sell securities
directly, without recourse, solely on the order of and for the account of54
customers. In the early 1970s, the Comptroller of the Currency approved
Citibank's plan to offer the public units in collective investment trusts that
the bank organized. 55 But in 1971, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that sections 1656 and 2157 prohibit banks from offering a product that is
similar to mutual funds.58 In an often quoted decision, the Court found that
the Act was intended to prevent banks from endangering themselves, the
banking system, and the public from unsafe and unsound practices and
conflicts of interest.59 Nevertheless, in 1986 the Comptroller of the Currency
decided that the Act allowed national banks to purchase and sell mutual
shares for its customers as their agent and sell units in unit investment
48. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997); 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378
(1994).
49. Section 16 of the Banking Act is now codified as 12 U.S.C. § 378.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bankers Trust Commercial Paper Placement Activities, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,270, at 90,836 (June 4, 1985).
53. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 111997).
54. Id.
55. 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1998).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. 111997).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1994).
58. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). This is the seminal Glass-
Steagall case, where the Court first introduced guidelines for determining the permissibility of
commercial bank involvement in banking activities not expressly covered in the Act. Id.
59. Id.
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trusts.6° In 1987, the Comptroller also concluded that a national bank may
offer to the public, through a subsidiary, brokerage services and investment
advice, while acting as an adviser to a mutual fund or unit investment trust.
61
Since 1984, the regulators have allowed banks to offer discount brokerage
services through subsidiaries, and these more permissive rules have been
upheld by the courts. 62 Thus, more recent court decisions and regulatory
agency rulings have tended to soften the 1971 Supreme Court's apparently
strict interpretation of the Act's prohibitions. 
63
Section 2064 prohibits banks from affiliating with a company "engaged
principally" in the "issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution
at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities." 65 In June 1988, the United States
Supreme Court, by denying certiorari, upheld a lower court's ruling
accepting the Federal Reserve Board's April 1987 approval for member
banks to affiliate with companies underwriting commercial paper, municipal
revenue bonds, and securities backed by mortgages and consumer debts, as
long as the affiliate does not principally engage in those activities.
66
60. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 363, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,533, at 77,828 (May 23, 1986) (authorizing ndtional banks to act as agents in
the buying and selling of unit investment trusts).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1998) (codifying the Federal Reserve Board's limited
exception to Regulation Y's prohibition that a bank holding company providing discount
brokerage services may not provide investment advice or research services and allowing
National Westminster Bank, PLC to provide discount brokerage services to institutional and
high net worth customers); see also Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 73 FED. RESERVE BULL.
930 (1987) (permitting limited sharing of customer lists between a bank and an affiliated
broker serving institutional customers); J.P. Morgan & Co., 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 810
(1987) (expanding banks authority to engage in investment advisory and execution services);
Citicorp, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473 (1987) (authorizing banks, within limits, to engage in
dealing in securities and underwriting).
62. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
207 (1984). Discount brokerage activities also have been held permissible for national banks.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd,
758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Clarke v. Securities
Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (holding that a discount brokerage office operated by a
national bank is not a branch for purposes of the geographic restrictions of the McFadden
Act).
63. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971) (holding strict
interpretation of Glass-Steagall because "public confidence is essential to the solvency of a
bank").
64. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
65. Id.
66. Citicorp, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473, 475 (1987) (approving bank holding
companies' applications to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed
securities, and commercial paper).
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"Principally engaged" was defined by the Federal Reserve as activities
contributing more than five to ten percent of the affiliate's total revenue.67 In
1987, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Federal
Reserve Board's 1985 ruling allowing a bank holding company to acquire a
subsidiary that provided both brokerage services and investment advice to
institutional customers.68 Between 1984 and 1988 the Court held that
affiliates of member banks can offer retail discount brokerage service, which
excludes investment advice, on the grounds that these activities do not
involve an underwriting of securities, and that "public sale" refers to an
underwriting.
69
Section 327 prohibits a member bank from having interlocking
directorships or close officer or employee relationships with a firm
"primarily engaged" in securities underwriting and distribution.7' Section
3272 is applicable even if there is no common ownership or corporate
affiliation between the commercial bank and the investment company.
Sections 20e4 and 325 do not apply to nonmember banks and savings
and loan associations.76 They are legally free to affiliate with securities
67. Id.
68. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988) (combining offerings of securities
brokerage and investment advice for bank holding companies' institutional customers upheld).
69. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 221 (1984)
(allowing discount brokerage services); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034,
1048 (2d Cir. 1989) (allowing the sale of interests in a pool of assets consisting of home
mortgages); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47,
69 (2d Cir.) (allowing underwriting of securities through bank affiliates), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1059 (1988); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 821
F.2d 810, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (allowing bank to act as a full-service broker and investment
adviser), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (allowing underwriting of securities by nonmember bank affiliates),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (allowing bank to act as an agent in
private placement of securities), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Investment Co. Inst. v.
Clarke, 793 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir.) (allowing the operation of a pooled trust fund), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); Investment Co. Inst. v. Clarke, 789 F.2d 175, 175 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 377 (1994).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
76. 12 U.S.C. 88 78,377 (1994).
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firms. Consequently, the law applies unevenly to essentially similar
institutions. In addition, securities brokers' cash management accounts,
which are functionally identical to checking accounts, have been judged not
to be deposits, as specified in the Act.77
It is interesting to note, that commercial banks are not barred from
underwriting and dealing in securities outside of the United States.78 The
larger money center banks, against whom the prohibitions of the Glass-
Steagall Act were directed, are particularly active in these markets. Citicorp,
for example, has a presence in nearly 100 countries, is a member in major
foreign stock exchanges, and offers investment banking services in many
foreign countries.79
In summary, commercial banks are allowed to offer many financial
services. These include certain aspects of investment advisory services,
brokerage activities, securities underwriting, mutual fund activities,
investment and trading activities, asset securitization, joint ventures, and
commodities dealing. They can also offer deposit instruments that are
similar to securities.
The commonly accepted rationale for the Glass-Steagall Act is well
expressed in the Supreme Court's opinion in Investment Company Institute v.
Camp ("ICr), 80 when it analyzed the policies behind the Act.81  William
Camp, the Comptroller of the Currency, gave First National City Bank, now
Citibank, permission to offer commingled investment accounts.82  In
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,83 the United States Supreme Court decided
in favor of the ICI and described the rational for the Act as follows:84
There is no dispute that one of the objectives of the
Glass-Steagall Act was to prohibit commercial banks, banks that
receive deposits subject to repayment, lend money, discount and
77. Langevoort, supra note 27, at 710.
78. Ferrara, supra note 43, at 617.
79. 9 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES 123-126 (Paula Kepos et al.
eds., St. James Press 1994); Financial Services Mergers: Hearing Before the House Banking
and Financial Services Committee, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John J. Roche, general
counsel for Citicorp).
80. 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The seminal Glass-Steagall case, Investment Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), introduced guidelines for determining the permissibility of
commercial bank involvement in banking activities not expressly covered in the Act. Id. It is
interesting to note that First National City Bank was Citibank's predecessor.
81. Id.
82. Comptroller Camp's approval was promulgated in 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (1998).
83. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
84. Id.
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negotiate promissory notes and the like, from going into the
investment banking business.
The failure of the Bank of United States in 1930 was widely attributed
to that bank's activities with respect to its numerous securities
affiliates. Moreover, Congress was concerned that commercial banks
in general and member banks of the Federal Reserve System in
particular had both aggravated and been damaged by stock market
decline partly because of their direct and indirect involvement in the
trading and ownership of speculative securities. The Glass-Steagall
Act reflected a determination that policies of competition,
convenience, or expertise which might otherwise support the entry of
commercial banks into the investment banking business were
outweighed by the "hazards" and "financial dangers" that arise when
commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by the Act.85
IV. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT OF 1998
The version of financial institution modernization that passed by a nar-
row margin,86 in the House of Representatives in May 1998, would make
sweeping changes to the nation's banking laws. It permits broader cross
affiliations between banks and other financial services providers, such as in-
surance companies and securities firms.87 The Financial Services Act of
1998 ("H.R. 10")88 is designed to provide a regulatory framework for this
new financial order.89
A. Holding Company Provisions
The Glass-Steagall restrictions on banks affiliating with securities firms
would be repealed, thereby allowing commercial banking and investment
banking to be combined in a financial holding company with no additional
walls, commonly known as firewalls, or limitations.9° The Bank Holding
Company Act restrictions on banks affiliating with insurance companies
85. Id. at 629-30 (footnotes omitted).
86. Passed by a vote of 214-213 on May 13, 1998.
87. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong., (1998).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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would also be repealed.91  In addition, state laws that "A revent or
significantly interfere" with such affiliations would be preempted. 2
Holding companies wishing to qualify for this new authority must have
all of their bank affiliates meet at least a satisfactory Community
Reinvestment Act ("CRA") 9 3 rating, and offer and maintain low cost basic
banking accounts if they offer consumer transaction accounts to the general
public. 4 Furthermore, both the parent holding company and all subsidiary
depository institutions have to be well capitalized and well managed. 95
The Federal Reserve Board remains the umbrella regulator for the new
holding companies and has limited authority over the functionally regulated
affiliates.96 The Securities and Exchange Commission is given backup
authority over wholesale financial holding companies.97 H.R. 10 requires
that the Federal Reserve Board defer to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the state insurance commissioner on all interpretations and
enforcement of applicable federal securities laws or state insurance laws.98
The Federal Reserve Board is permitted to transfer its authority to the
appropriate federal banking agency of the lead insured depository institution
subsidiary if it is not significantly engaged in nonbanking activities.99 In
addition, financial holding companies would be allowed to engage in
activities that are deemed to be financial in nature or incidental to financial
activities by the legislation, including insurance underwriting and merchant
banking.1m The Federal Reserve Board is also given authority to deem other
activities to be financial in nature or incidental to financial activities.)' °
91. Id. § 102.
92. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1998).
93. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994) (stating financial institutions have a "continuing
and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered").
94. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. § 121 (1998).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 111 (describing functional regulation as regulation based on the type of
product rather than the type of institution).
97. Id.
98. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (1998)
(mandating deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to state insurance
regulators within their respective jurisdictions).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 103.
101. Id.
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B. Banking and Commerce
The commercial baskets contained in the original bill were
eliminated.1°2 The bill allows for a grandfathered commercial basket for new
financial holding companies of no more than fifteen percent of the annual
gross revenues of the holding company for a period of ten years.103 The
Federal Reserve Board is authorized to grant one additional five year
extension for the divestiture of nonfinancial activities.10
4
The wholesale financial services holding companies authorized by the
bill are allowed to retain commodities they own.105 This allowance is subject
to a five percent limitation of total consolidated assets of the holding com-
pany at the time it becomes a wholesale financial services holding com-
pany' °6 In addition, wholesale financial services holding companies have a
fifteen percent grandfathered commercial basket that does not sunset or
automatically expire.107
C. State Law Preemption for Authorized Activities
State laws that prevent or significantly interfere with activities allowed
by H.R. 10,108 or any other provision of Federal law, are preempted for all
insured depositary institutions or wholesale financial institutions.1°9 H.R.
10 affirms the applicability of state insurance regulation, like the
McCarran-Ferguson Act,110 and provides a safe harbor for state laws
governing insurance sales."' This is essentially for state laws that are no
more stringent than the Illinois law which requires physical separation of
insurance and banking activities1 12 The legislation also requires the federal
102. Financial Restructuring: Highlights of Treasury's 1997 Legislative Proposal on
Financial Modernization, BANKING PoL'Y REP., June 16, 1997, at 7 (explaining commercial
baskets would permit bank holding companies to invest in, and maintain their longstanding
investments in, commercial businesses that do not engage in financial activities).
103. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 103 (1998).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 136.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 309 (1998).
109. Id. § 309.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
111. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 309 (1998).
112. Financial Services Mergers: Hearing of the House Banking and Financial
Services Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Bill Greenwood, president-elect of the
Independent Insurance Agents of America).
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banking agencies to enact joint consumer protection regulations for the sale
of insurance.
113
D. Subsidiaries
H.R. 10 restricts national bank subsidiaries from engaging in any
activity that is not authorized by federal statute for a national bank, such as
certain insurance underwriting activities, merchant banking or real estate
development.1 4 The bill amends the Banking Act of 1933 to prohibit all
bank subsidiaries, state and federal, from underwriting securities. It does,
however, allow a national bank to own a subsidiary that conducts agency
activities that are financial in nature." 6 For example, insurance agency
activities could be conducted without geographic restriction.
E. Wholesale Financial Institutions
The legislation creates a Wholesale Financial Institution, ("WFI"),
commonly pronounced woofie, which can be state or national and can make
loans to businesses but, is not insured, and cannot take retail deposits or
deposits of less than $100,000.117 This will allow securities firms to provide
wholesale banking services without becoming subject to many of the rules
designed to protect retail consumers and the deposit insurance fund.!18 WFIs
are subject to bank holding company regulations and the Community
Reinvestment Act.119  The Federal Reserve is given authority to exempt
WFIs from any regulation if they are consistent with the safety and
soundness of the institution and would not put the deposit insurance funds or
creditors of the institution at risk.120
113. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 308 (1998).
114. Id. at § 121. This would substantially reduce the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency's authority to expand national bank activities through its operating subsidiary
regulations. Some of the activities that would be prohibited in the bank subsidiary may be
permissible if engaged in by an affiliate of the holding company. See discussion infra Part VI.
for a more complete discussion of the operating subsidiary issue that has been at the center of
much controversy between the agencies over this bill.
115. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 121 (1998) (amending 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 5136).
116. Id. § 121.
117. Id. § 136.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 136 (1998).
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F. Federal Home Loan Bank System
H.R. 10 allows community financial institutions to be members in the
Federal Home Loan Bank System.121 A community financial institution is
defined as an insured depository institution with less than $500 million in
total assets. 12 Furthermore, it permits community financial institutions that
are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System to get longoterm
advances for funding small business, agriculture or rural development.
G. Insurance
H.R. 10 prohibits national banks from underwriting insurance.124
Activities that are presently authorized by the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") are grandfathered. 1 5 National banks are prohibited
from selling or underwriting title insurance unless the national bank or its
subsidiary was actively and lawfully engaged in that business before the date
of enactment.126 Furthermore, a national bank will be permitted to sell title
insurance in a state in which state chartered banks were authorized to sell
title insurance as agents as of January 1, 1997.127
The bill expedites the review of disputes between insurance regulators
and the OCC over the classification of new products. lu In addition, it
eliminates the judicial "deference" afforded to the OCC in court disputes
with state insurance commissioners.12 9 H.R. 10 also creates a national
licensing system for insurance within five years, thereby allowing banks and
insurance companies to sell insurance nationwide without having to comply
with varying state licensing requirements. 130  A bank desirous of selling
insurance would be required to purchase an existing, at least two years old,
131 132insurance agency in that state. This provision will sunset in five years.
121. Id. § 162.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 165.
124. Id. § 304.
125. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. §304 (1998).
126. Id. § 306.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 307.
129. Id. § 307(a).
130. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 322 (1998).
131. Id. § 305.
132. Id.
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H. Securities
Banks will lose their complete exemption from broker dealer registration.
133
However, the bill recognizes that banks have traditionally been involved in cer-
tain securities activities and provides specific exemptions for those activities.
134
These are including, but not limited to, trust activities and government securities.
To the extent that banks offer investment advice to a mutual fund, they will lose
their exemption from the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.135
I. Thrift Charter/Unitary Thrift Holding Company
The thrift charter is preserved. 136 The bill grandfathers existing unitary
thrift holding companies and permits them to change owners, and retain all
powers. 137 The unitary thrift structurepermits any type of company, financial or
nonfinancial, to own a thrift charter. However, new unitary thrift holding
companies that had not applied for a charter by March 31, 1998 are prohibited.13
J. National Association of Regulated Agents and Brokers
H.R. 10 establishes the National Association of Regulated Agents and
Brokers ("NARAB"). 14° The NARAB provision is designed to force the
states to create more uniform licensing and regulation for the sale of
insurance. 141 This provision takes effect three years after passage of the bill,
if the states have not acted. 42
V. INSURANCE AND BANKING INDUSTRIES' POSMONS
Like most commercial banks, banking trade groups, and smaller
financial institutions, Citicorp was opposed to the passage of H.R. 10.143
133. Id. § 206.
134. Id.
135. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. §§ 211-212 (1998).
136. Id. §§ 401-402.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. §§ 401-402 (1998).
140. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 322 (1998).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 321.
143. Sam Loewenberg, Getting it Done: With billions at stake, Citicorp and Travelers
pull out the stops to get past '30s-era regulations preventing their merger plan, BROWARD
DAILY BUS. REV., Apr. 28, 1998, at Al.
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Citicorp has become a supporter of H.R. 10 since its deal with Travelers was
announced. 44 The bill's opponents generally argue that few additional
benefits are provided while they are potentially subject to a more complex
and vague regulatory framework. Citicorp opposed the bill, largely because
of the limitations it placed on banks getting into the insurance business.
145
The bill's main industry supporters are the insurance and securities
industries, and several large banks, which argue that the legislation enables
financial service providers to offer customers a broader range of financial
services andproducts, while remaining competitive both in the United States
and abroad.
VI. FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT TURF WAR
The Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC") present sharply different views as to the desirability of H.R. 10.147
A noticeably bitter struggle over the reign of federal bank regulatory
authority has continued for several years between the OCC and the Federal
Reserve.
1 48
A. Current Regulatory Structure
There are currently three federal banking agencies, the Federal Reserve,
the OCC, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).149
National banks are supervised and regulated by the OCC while the Federal
Reserve or the FDIC supervise and regulate state chartered banks.150 Were
the powers and missions of these three agencies identical, competition among
them would not be very important, nor would it reach the level that
commentators often characterize as a "turf war."
151
The OCC is the only all inclusive banking agency among the three
agencies, with the power to charter a bank, supervise or regulate the bank,
144. Jeffrey Marshall, Capital Question: Does Might Make Right?, U.S. BANKER, June
1998, at 38.
145. Loewenberg, supra note 143, at Al.
146. Id.
147. Leslie Wayne, More Maneuvering and More Delay for Banking Bill, N.Y. TlMEs,
July 18, 1998, at D3.
148. Carter H. Golembe, Much More is Involved in Agency Turf Wars than Meets the
Eye, BANKING POL'Y REP., Sept. 18, 1995, at 2.
149. CARTER H. GOLEMBE & DAviD S. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING
11(1981).
150. Id. at 12-13.
151. Id. at 2.
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and close the bank. 52 It is responsible for maintaining the safety and sound-
ness of the federal banking system while accommodating the nation's need
for competitive and innovative banking. 153 The Comptroller of the Currency,
which is part of the Treasury Department within the Executive branch, has
historically been a strong advocate of modernizing banking law.' 54
The Federal Reserve and FDIC have only bank supervisory and
regulatory powers for state chartered banks under their respective
jurisdictions. 55  These powers are shared with the state chartering
agencies. 56  However, bank supervision and regulation is not the most
important responsibility of each agency. 57  The FDIC's primary
responsibility is to manage the deposit insurance system. 158  The Federal
Reserve's primary purpose is to act as the nation's central bank and to
achieve sound monetary policy. 1
59
Although the Federal Reserve is a relatively minor player in terms of
supervision and regulation of individual banks, it is the sole regulator for
bank holding companies. 6° The Federal Reserve received this power in
1970, over arduous protests by the Treasury.' 6' The Federal Reserve has
generally regarded bank supervision and regulation as useful and sometimes
critical for achieving its monetary policy responsibilities. 62 Even so, bank
supervision and regulation are clearly of secondary importance to the Federal
Reserve.'
63
B. Interagency Friction
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury have conflicted before. To
somewhat oversimplify their relationship, the Treasury is a borrower of
152. Id. at 17.
153. Id. at 11.
154. GOLEMBE, supra note 149, at 17-18.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id. at 18-20.
157. Id. at 11.
158. Id.
159. GOLEMBE, supra note 149, at 11.
160. Id. at 11, 13.
161. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-1747 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5561,
5562. In the late 1960s many banks converted into one bank holding companies to avoid
Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA") regulation by the Federal Reserve Board. In addition,
nonbank corporations, including major conglomerates, also took advantage of the loophole in
the BHCA by acquiring one bank, thus mixing banking and nonbanking. Until 1970, one bank
holding companies were exempt from the strictures of the BHCA. Id.
162. GOLEMBE, supra note 149, at 2.
163. Id. at 13.
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money, while the Federal Reserve has the power to create or extinguish
money. 164 Hence, there is a necessary separation between the two. At times,
this separation has been set aside with one agency made superior to the other.
For example, to finance World War IT, the Treasury demanded fixed bond
prices and low interest rates. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve was forced to
comply and was no longer free to conduct monetary policy, a limitation that
did not end until 
1951.'r
Another significant factor is that the Federal Reserve is independent of
the Treasury. As Allan Sproul, former president of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank, once pointed out, the Federal Reserve is "independent within
the govemment."' Therefore, it has the benefit of not being held
accountable politically to the electorate. 167 The Treasury, on the other hand,
is part of an elected administration.
168
The current discord between the agencies likely began in 1996, when
Comptroller Eugene A. Ludwig promulgated new rules applicable to
corporate applications of national banks. 169 The rules established a process
for a national bank to follow, which allowed operating subsidiaries of
national banks to engage in any activity incidental to banking, even those
banned from the parent bank." 0 The threat posed by the Comptroller's
action was clear. A bank holding company is cumbersome and costly.
17 1
The operating subsidiary innovation could make the bank holding company
obsolete or, at best, a less desirable organizational form for banks."' If
holding company affiliates were largely replaced by bank subsidiaries, the
basis for the Federal Reserve Board's power would be removed. 7 3 The
Federal Reserve would return to being, as it had been for almost sixty years,
a minor player in federal bank regulation when compared to the Comptroller
of the Currency. 7 4
164. The powers of the Comptroller of the Currency originated in the National
Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864 and are codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (1994) and 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215 (1994). The powers of the Federal Reserve Board
originated in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and are codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-530
(1994) and 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
165. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From
Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROoK. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (1995).
166. Allan Sproul, president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank from 1941 to
1956, in a classic statement on central banking in the United States.
167. GOLEMBE, supra note 149, at 18.
168. Id. at 17-18.
169. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1998).
170. Id.
171. The New American Universal Bank, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1310, 1321-22 (1997).
172. Id.
173. GOLEMBE, supra note 149, at 2.
174. Id.
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The term "turf wars" probably stems from the fact that in 1970, the
Federal Reserve was given a substantial portion of the "turf" within the
jurisdiction of the OCC. 175  Now, twenty-eight years later, the Federal
Reserve is trying to protect that turf. It is interesting to note, however, the
model for the Federal Reserve has always been the Bank of England, which
only last year was stripped of its bank supervision and regulatory authority
because of a belief that such authority is better kept separate from central
banking.
176
C. Financial Modernization Debate
The clearest indication of the division between the two agencies is the
fact that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan,
endorsed H.R. 10, while the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin,
strongly opposed the same bill.177  At issue is who should regulate
nontraditional banking activities, such as insurance, securities underwriting
or real estate development. 178  The dispute boils down to what future
structure banks will be allowed to organize their non-banking activities
under.
National and state chartered banks want to get into nontraditional lines
of business through operating subsidiaries because the bank owns the
subsidiary outright.1 7 9 This allows the bank to easily move capital in and out
of the companies. 180 Bankers and banking regulators insist that the bank and
its non-banking subsidiaries would be safely segregated and would not put
financial stress on one another.
181
The Federal Reserve wants such activities to be placed in an affiliate of
the bank holding company, where it would be the chief regulator, while the
Treasury Department wants to place these activities in bank operating
subsidiaries, where the Treasury's Office of the OCC would have principal
175. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997)
(granting the Federal Reserve power to regulate bank holding companies).
176. Carter H. Golembe, Bank of England Loses Regulatory Role: Lessons for the U.S.,
BANKING POL'Y REP., June 16, 1997, at 1.
177. Competition in the Financial Services Industry. Hearing Before the Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statements of Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan).
178. Id.
179. Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case
in Support, 97 CoLuM. L. REv. 1895 (1997).
180. Id.
181. Id.
[Vol. 23:899
111
: Nova Law Review 23, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
1999]
regulatory supervision. 182 In testimony at the June 17, 1998 Senate Banking
Committee hearings on competition in the financial services industry,
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin noted that the elected administration is
accountable for economic policy, with bank policy being a key component of
economic policy. Robert Rubin testified "[u]nder H.R. 10,183 banks would
gravitate away from the national banking system and the elected
administration would lose its nexus with the banking system .... 184
The Federal Reserve supports the bill because it believes that permitting
riskier financial activities, to be conducted through an operating subsidiary,
would extend the safety net subsidy and, in doing so, would jeopardize the
deposit insurance fund. 85 In summing up the Federal Reserve's position,
Chairman Greenspan testified "[w]e believe that an expansion of the national
bank charter would be a mistake for bank safety and soundness, the deposit
insurance funds and safety net, the financial services industry (consumers
and businesses alike), and the taxpayer." 186 The Federal Reserve wants
financial conglomerates organized in holding companies so that affiliates are
adequately separated and capital is segregated among the various businesses
owned by the parent firm.
187
What neither Rubin, nor Greenspan, nor many of the others involved on
both sides like to point out is that each regulatory agency has a vested
interest in the outcome. Should the operating subsidiary approach win, the
Comptroller and Treasury would hold on to regulatory turf through oversight
of national banks. On the other hand, should the holding company structure
be adopted, the Federal Reserve would acquire vast new powers to regulate
the new financial conglomerates that would form into holding companies
among banks, insurers, and securities firms.
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE CrTCORP-TRAVELERS MERGER
The creation of Citigroup has been reported as the much needed catalyst
that will move Congress to amend the law .and allow affiliations among
banks, insurers, and securities firms. Shortly after the public announcement
of Citigroup, the original sponsor of H.R. 10, House Banking Chairman, Jim
182. Competition in the Financial Services Industry: Hearing Before the Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statements of Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan).
183. Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1998).
184. Competition in the Financial Services Industry: Hearing Before the Senate
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Robert Rubin,
Treasury Secretary).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Leach, issued a statement affirming that the merger emphasizes the need for
Congress to pass financial services reform.
188
Citibank, a federally chartered bank holding company, would have been
unable to complete the deal if they applied to the Federal Reserve to buy
Travelers, because it is illegal for banks to engage in Travelers' business of
underwriting property and casualty insurance. 89 Instead, Travelers applied
to the Federal Reserve in May for a new bank holding company charter and
the new holding company will acquire Citibank.19° Under the Bank Holding
Company Act, T9 new bank holding companies are allowed two years to
divest nonconforming businesses, and the Federal Reserve is allowed to grant
as many as three one-year extensions to the divestiture period.192 This would
give Citigroup up to five years to lobby Congress to change the laws. 193 The
rules, of course, were written to give companies time to get rid of
unacceptable businesses, not to figure ways to keep or acquire them.
H.R. 10 appeared to be shelved until Travelers and Citibank announced
the Citigroup merger. 194 Unsettled disputes among regulators, consumer
groups, insurance agents, and financial services firms prevented H.R. 10
from reaching the floor in late March. 95 That was only days before the
Citigroup deal was announced and before the two companies said they
expected legislative changes that would allow banks to underwrite insurance.
After a flurry of last minute lobbying and arm twisting among the
various constituencies, H.R. 10 was expected to be voted on by the full196
House on May 7, 1998. It was postponed again amid reports that support
was waning. Among the lobbyists was Travelers Chief Executive Officer,
Sanford Weill, who flew to Washington to persuade congressmen and
convince Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to ease the department's
opposition to the bill. 98
188. Richard W. Stevenson, Financial Services Heavyweights Try Do-It-Yourself
Deregulation, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1998, at Al.
189. The Glass-Steagall Act is the term customarily used to refer to four sections of the
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(1994 & Supp. 1 1997); 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378 (1994)).
190. Loewenberg, supra note 143.
191. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994 & Supp. 11
1997); 12 C.F.R. § 225.137 (1998).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Loewenberg, supra note 143.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Stevenson, supra note 188.
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If the Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10, does not become law this
year, Citigroup has several alternatives, one might even say an "umbrella" of
options.19 The simplest option for Citigroup would be to divest its insurance
underwriting businesses. It might seem odd for an insurer and a bank to
merge only to get rid of insurance, but not all of that business is
underwriting, much of it is sales and distribution. At the April 29, 1998
Hearing of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, Citicorp's
general counsel, John J. Roche, testified that he understood the public's
confusion of why two companies would merge if they thought they would
have to divest important parts of the business.20 Mr. Roche emphasized that
the merger was about distribution and that they thought Citigroup would be
able to retain the insurance distribution side of the business.2u He did
underscore, however, that if faced with divestiture, Citigroup would divest
itself of the underwriting business to conform with the law.202 To facilitate
this possibility, Travelers would keep its property and casualty company
separate.2 3 The property and casualty company already trades on the New
York Stock Exchange with seventeen percent of its shares owned by the
public? 04 Mr. Roche also estimated that only twenty percent of Citigroup's
projected profits would be lost if they were forced to divest.205 In fact,
Citigroup could spin off the underwriting business and merge it with another
underwriter. As early as the Spring of 1998, analysts expected CNA
Financial Corporation to merge with Travelers Group.20
Merging Travelers' life insurance business with a similar company
would be more difficult because it is wholly owned. Selling it would also be
undesirable considering the tremendous opportunities to market products like
variable annuities to customers of Citicorp and Salomon Smith Barney.
However, Citibank does have a life insurance subsidiary in Delaware that
was grandfathered in under the Bank Holding Company Act.207 Whether the
subsidiary retains its grandfathered status, assuming the merger is approved,
remains to be seen.
199. H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1998).
200. Financial Services Mergers: Hearing Before the House Banking and Financial
Services Comm., 105th Cong., (1998) (statement of John J. Roche, general counsel for
Citicorp).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Financial Services Mergers, supra note 200.
206. Melissa Wahl, Buffett's bid for General Re puts reinsurers in the spotlight, Cml.
TRm., June 26, 1998, § 3, at 1.
207. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. H 1997); 12 C.F.R. § 225.137 (1998).
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If the current laws are not changed, Citigroup could also consider
debanking. Debanking ranges from actually dropping the bank charter to
spinning off complete lines of business. The easiest of this broad spectrum is
the option of giving up its banking charter and flipping to a thrift charter.
20 8
A thrift charter is much more liberal than a bank charter and might permit
Citigroup to keep its business intact. Citibank has operated thrifts for years
and Travelers recently obtained a thrift charter.2°9  One of the reasons
Citibank opposed H.R. 10 before the merger was because the proposed bill
would have eliminated thrift charters.2 0 As a unitary thrift holding company,
Citigroup could retain its retail branches with their deposits in a thrift
subsidiary. However, thrifts must maintain at least sixty-five percent of their
loans in mortgage, consumer or education-related assets.211  Up to twenty
percent of their assets can be in commercial loans, providing that half are
loans to small businesses. 12 The loans Citigroup could not accommodate in
the thrift subsidiary could be participated to Salomon Smith Barney, as an
affiliate. There are some substantial drawbacks to this option. As a thrift,
Citigroup would no longer have access to the Federal Reserve Bank's
discount window for borrowings and it would be supervised by the Office of
Thrift Supervision, which does not qualify as a "comprehensive supervisor"
under international guidelines.213
The more impractical debanking option would be for Citigroup to
liquidate its bank charter. Assuming Citigroup truly wanted to debank, it
would have to pay off or sell its huge amounts of deposits, which would
require alternative funding. A company that debanks can no longer take
208. Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Influence of Enhanced Thrift Institution Powers on
Commercial Bank Market Expansion, 67 N.C. L. REv. 795, 818-19 (1989).
209. In November 1997, Travelers Group received approval to convert its Delaware
chartered commercial bank to a federal thrift charter. The new institution, Travelers Bank &
Trust, will act as a subsidiary of Commercial Credit Co., a subsidiary of Travelers Group.
OTS Order No. 97-120 (Nov. 24, 1997).
210. Loewenberg, supra note 143.
211. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
("DIDMCA"), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.). This statute blurred the lines between banks and thrifts by allowing all depository
institutions to offer interest bearing checking accounts, write residential mortgage loans and
make consumer loans. Id. DIDMCA also preempted state usury ceilings on mortgage loans,
allowed federal thrifts to branch statewide and permitted all associations to put up to 20
percent of their assets in commercial loans and corporate debt instruments. Id.
212. Id.
213. Daniel M. Laifer, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of International
Banking, Post-BCCI, 60 FORDHAM L. Rav. S467 (1992) (noting it was the lack of
comprehensive supervision that allowed the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) to create a multi layered operation which effectively eluded supervision, thereby
concealing the fraudulent practices for which that bank was later dissolved).
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government insured deposits.214 It would have to look to funding sources
such as commercial paper or other forms of debt and equity. This may not be
practical since consumer deposits accumulated through a retail branching
system are much cheaper than purchased money. 215  Although debanking
seems drastic, Wells Fargo seriously considered trading their bank charter for
a thrift charter in 1993 to achieve greater freedom than banks enjoyed at the
time.216 In addition, ING Groep NV, a Dutch financial services company,
actually liquidated its New York state bank charter so it could merge with an
217insurance company.
Another radical option would be for Citigroup to relocate outside the
United States. They could choose to be regulated by an agency such as the
Bank of England. Citicorp's chairman John S. Reed has acknowledged in
the past that Citicorp had considered a plan to incorporate offshore.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether we realize it or not, Glass-Steagall has maintained the safety
and soundness of our banking industry. While reform is necessary for our
financial services industries to compete in the global marketplace, legislation
must be carefully crafted to ensure safety and soundness. The real question
is whether Congress is up to the task or whether the market will find its own
way of circumventing outmoded laws and restrictive regulations through
other administrative and agency rulings. Technically, under Glass-Steagall,
Citicorp has two years to divest its insurance holdings after the merger.219
On the other hand, many members of Congress may regard the two, and
possibly five, year grace period as their own grace period for passing
financial reform. Members may convince themselves that rather than voting
214. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994) (authorizing chartered depository institutions only to
apply to the FDIC for deposit insurance purposes); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a) (1994)
(defining a bank as any national, state or district bank, or any federal branch or insured
branch).
215. Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in
a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501,516 (1989).
216. Steve Cocheo & William Streeter, Breakaway Strategies, ABA BANKING J., Jan.
1996, at 32 (stating that during this time, interstate banking was not allowed, nor could banks
sell securities or mutual funds).
217. Id.
218. Fred R. Bleakley, Weakened Giant: As Big Rivals Surge, Citicorp's John Rked is
at a Crossroads, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1991, at Al.
219. See Glass-Steagall § 16 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994 & Supp. H1
1997); Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994 & Supp. 111997); Federal
Reserve Board Regulation Y, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843 (1994 & Supp. I 1997), 12 U.S.C. §
1847 (1994).
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immediately on a complicated bill they do not really understand, Congress
now has the luxury of this grace period to take testimony from interested
parties on the implications of the merger. At the end of the grace period,
Congress would be placed in a terrible dilemma. If it does nothing, Citigroup
could be forced into a divestiture, something that may well disrupt financial
markets. This would be compounded if, as expected, other major insurance
company and bank mergers occur in the meantime.220 Critics will charge that
a lot of middle income Americans that invest in the financial markets through
pension plans and mutual funds will suffer greatly from the fallout of
divestiture.
To avoid these consequences, Congress will have little choice except to
enact a bill that, in effect, ratifies the then existing situation. Ratifying where
the market ends up evolving would not provide for issues such as functional
regulation, consumer protections, and others currently provided for under the
Financial Services Act of 1998, H.R. 10. Although passage in 1998 is
uncertain due to Congressional time constraints, it appears increasingly
probable that some form of legislation ultimately will be enacted, hopefully,
sooner, rather than later.
Laura J. Cox*
220. Gene G. Marcial, Inside Wall Street: Romance for Amex and AIG?, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 27, 1998, at 110 (quoting Robin Manners West, an investment manager who had
correctly predicted the Banc One acquisition of First Chicago NBD, as suggesting American
Express and AIG may be considering a merger in order to compete against Citigroup).
* J.D. candidate May, 1999, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
M.B.A./Banking, 1989, Nova University.
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I. OVERVIEW
Prior to the United States Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Bestfoods' on June 8, 1998, there had been a decade of confusion and
anxiety over parent corporation liability2 under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 3
The ruling in Bestfoods makes it much more likely that future decisions will
be uniform, balanced, and precise with regard to parent corporation liability
for its subsidiary's illegal discharges.4 The resolution of corporate parent
1. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (Souter, J., unanimous decision).
2. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Environmental Law: Corporate Parent
Liability under CERCLA, 219 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (1998).
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
4. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
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liability under CERCLA is important because there are a large number of
hazardous waste disposal sites covered by CERCLA which are owned and
operated by poorly capitalized subsidiary corporations that have well
capitalized parent corporations. 5 Defining the standard by which a parent
may be held liable, due to the parent's good capitalization, will allow the
government to replenish the Superfund under which CERCLA operates.
Thus, facilitating increased cleanup activities at hazardous sites.6
The intent of this note/comment is threefold. First, this note/comment
provides an opportune tangent into the intricacies of CERCLA as it applies
to the modem industrial polluter and parent corporation liability. Second, a
detailed description of the BesOfoods case and its history will put a very
obscure principle, which is fundamental to the resolution of environmental
woes7 in a clean and understandable context. By looking into the arguments
of both sides of the case it will become clear why and how the United States
Supreme Court reached its decision and what issues were left unresolved.
The preceding history of the case will demonstrate the lack of uniformity
between courts in considering the issue of parent corporation liability under
CERCLA. In conclusion, this note/comment will enumerate the political,
social, environmental, legal, and economic ramifications of the Court's
ruling in Bestfoods.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no area of law more fundamental to our human existence than
environmental law. However, environmental issues are often overlooked
because they threaten the capitalist's primary goals of attaining wealth and
economic growth.' After three hundred years of exploiting the once fertile
United States and several years of depleting its energy still further by
dumping synthetic chemicals, there are apples that taste like tennis balls,
oranges that taste like cardboard, and pears that taste like sweetened
Styrofoam.9 But alas, where certain evils could be abolished with a "stroke
of the pen, chemical pollution [can] not."'1 The United States has hundreds
5. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986, 987 (1986) [hereinafter Harvard Liability].
6. See Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for
Hazardous Substance Releases under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 421,423 (1990).
7. See id.
8. See Vice President Al Gore, Introduction to RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING xv,
xv-xxvi (Houghton Mifflin Company 1994) (1962).
9. BENJAMIN HOFF, TiE TAO OF POOH 101 (Penguin Books 1982).
10. GORE, supra note 8, at xix.
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of hazardous waste disposal sites and an estimated 10,000 sites which will
eventually be considered Superfund sites.1
With haste,12 Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 after many highly
publicized abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites were found throughout
the United States. 3 Many of these sites had already damaged the
environment and human health "through the contamination of drinking water
supplies" and protein digestion in livestock.14  The main objective of
CERCLA is to clean up the nation's hazardous waste sites 15 by imposing
liability broadly on all parties who may have been potentially responsible for
the disposal of the waste.' 6 CERCLA allows The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to bring actions to recover damages for past and future
cleanup costs. 17 These cleanup costs can run into "the tens of millions of
dollars for each site.'
CERCLA is essentially a strict liability statute requiring only: a release
of hazardous substances, at a facility, which causes injuries to the plaintiff'
and a defendant who is a responsible party as defined by the Act.20 There is
no need for culpability to be held liable under CERCLA.2 ' However, the
statute is "not [a] model of legislative draftsmanship," 22 as it provides no
direct means of imp osing parent corporation liability for the illegal acts of
their subsidiaries. Nevertheless, nothing in CERCLA precludes parent
liability either.2 Allowing parent corporations 25 "to escape CERCLA
liability undermines the [entire] purpose of the Act 26 because the parent
11. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 421-24.
12. Harvard Liability, supra note 5, at 987.
13. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 425.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 422.
16. Harvard Liability, supra note 5, at 986.
17. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 750 F. Supp. 832, 834 (W.D.
Mich. 1990), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
18. Joel Glass, Test Shows when Firms Must Pay Price, LLoYD's LIsT INT'L, June 17,
1998, at 9.
19. The plaintiff may be a normal citizen or a state or federal appointed enforcement
bureau. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).
20. Id.
21. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (W.D. Mich.
1991).
22. Brief for Respondent Bestfoods at 2, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876
(1998) (No. 97-454).
23. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
24. Id. at 437.
25. Parent corporations are so called because of their control through ownership of the
corporate stock of their subsidiary. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1884 (1998).
26. Harvard Liability, supra note 5, at 987.
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corporations usually have the deeper pockets and can more adequately
reimburse the aggrieved party under the Act.27 The difficulty in identifying
the responsible parties under the Act2 has been enunciated in the varying
decisions across the United States regarding parent liability under
CERCLA.9
Since CERCLA's enactment, many courts have built an increasingly
"confused web" of statutory interpretation regarding parent liability. 0
Before the Besifoods ruling, the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals all differed on what standard to apply in order to
find parent corporation liability.31 Indeed, the case law relied upon in
Bestfoods reflects the widely divergent view that courts take in regard to
parent corporation liability; some require a piercing of the corporate veil,
while others require only a small degree of control by the parent over the
subsidiary.32 In addition, there is widespread conflict between jurisdictions
whether to apply state corporate law or to develop a federal corporation law
27. See id.
28. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 425.
29. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884 n.8 (1998) (citing an exhaustive number of cases
which illustrate the divergent views that different circuits hold in relation to parent
corporation liability under CERCLA).
30. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 2, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No. 97-454).
31. See Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support
of Petitioner at 14, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No. 97-454) (citing
Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth Corp.,
996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993); John S. Boyd Co., Inc. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d
401 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990); but
see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990)).
32. Compare Martignetti v. Hairg-Farr, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Mass. 1997)
(using an actual control test to find parent liability), with Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers,
No. 90-2349, 1992 WL 161123, at *3 (E.D. La. June 24, 1992) (requiring that plaintiff
establish circumstances that require court to pierce the corporate veil), and Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T.L. James & Co., 893 F2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring corporate veil to be pierced,
but billing it as direct CERCLA liability), with United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (requiring only that parent control the "operations" of the subsidiary
itself), with Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996) (extends liability to all those
involved in creating harmful environmental conditions), with Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water
Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993) (parent is only liable where
corporate veil can be pierced), with Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107,
1110 (11th Cir. 1993) (finds liability when parent exercises actual and pervasive control in
daily operations of subsidiary), with Bumet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (holding a
corporation and stockholders to be separate entities).
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framework for use in interpreting CERCLA liability.33 While the Bestfoods
decision resolved many of these conflicts, other conflicts still persist.
34
The Bestfoods case has been closely monitored by environmental,
maritime, insurance, legal, and aviation groups.35 In Bestfoods, Justice
Souter held that a parent corporation could be held liable for the illegal
discharges made by its subsidiary in either of two ways.36 First, a parent can
be held liable under CERCLA for acts of its subsidiary through direct
operator status.3 7  Thus, if the parent controls the subsidiary's polluting
facility, it will be held liable, but a parent is not liable when it controls only
the operations of the subsidiary's business. 38 The parent is essentially liable
for its own acts as operator of a subsidiary owned facility.39 The second wao
in which a parent can be held liable is indirect or derivative liability.
Indirect liability occurs through a process called piercing the corporate veil.
If and only if the corporate veil can be pierced may a parent be charged with
derivative or indirect liability under CERCLA. The Bestfoods decision
also addresses specific factors that can be applied in evidencing either a
piercing of the corporate veil or direct operator liability.42 It is critical to
understand that there is a significant difference between liability through the
corporate veil and liability through direct operator status under CERCLA.43
This definitive ruling settled a long standing area of confusion and may lead
to uniformity in court decisions, but there may be derogatory consequences
in light of the rules promulgated in Bestfoods.
33. Compare Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1979) (holding that while
statutes may fashion a complete body of federal law, corporation law is reserved to the states),
and United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (holding there is a presumption that
long-established and familiar principals of state law will govern), with Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
475 U.S. 355, 362 (1986) (holding federal statutory powers preemptive over state law).
34. See Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
35. Glass, supra note 18, at 9.
36. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1886-87 n.12 (1998).
37. Id. at 1881.
38. Id. at 1886.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 1885-86.
41. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
42. Id. at 1888.
43. Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir.
1994).
44. BesOfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1876.
1999]
122
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
Ill. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act is not as comprehensive as its title suggests. While CERCLA
covers not less than ninety-four pages in the United States Code, including
definitions, response authorities, liability, presidential delegation of powers,
and pollution insurance, it does not address something as fundamental to the
remediation of hazardous waste sites as parent corporation liability.45
Neither, the legislative history nor the text of the statute provides indications
that Congress intended or did not intend parent corporation liability for the
acts of subsidiaries.46 In general, the legislative history for CERCLA is
relatively sparse, and its provisions are vague.47 Nevertheless, the statute
and its legislative history are complete enough to allow courts to employ an
effective statutory construction scheme starting with the language in the
statute itself.48  The language in CERCLA is lengthy and complex.
49
Therefore, a brief discussion of the statute is warranted in order to put
Bestfoods and other parent corporation liability cases into the proper
perspective.
The main objective of CERCLA is to take decisive action to cleanup or
otherwise make benign the nation's leaking waste sites.50 It is remedial
legislation that protects the environment and public health by imposing
retroactive liability.5 The statute was designed to be comprehensive and
gives the President broad power to mandate that private parties and
government agencies alike remediate hazardous waste sites. 2 The President
automatically delegated most of his authority to the EPA in 1981."
CERCLA not only imposes costs on those who are actually responsible for
contamination, damage, injury from chemical poisons, and environmental
harm,54 but it is also designed to encourage voluntary cleanup by private
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
46. See Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 18, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
47. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.
1995), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
48. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995).
49. 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
50. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
51. See Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d at 588.
52. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998) (quoting Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994)).
53. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No.
97-454).
54. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1882.
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parties.55 Congress' intent was to limit the defenses that might exist under
state law with regard to the environment5 6 and to abrogate indemnity
agreements which hinder holding responsible parties liable 57 CERCLA's
final goal is to prevent the actual discharge of waste in the first place by
implementing a "national hazardous substance response plan," and putting
potentially liable parties on notice of impending CERCLA claims if no
remedial action is taken at the site.
58
CERCLA created a "Superfund" into which monies are deposited to
help cleanup the sites that pose the most environmental danger.59 The EPA's
job is to recover past and future costs associated with the cleanup plan for
each site in order to replenish the Superfund6 Each site typically requires
tens of millions of dollars to implement a long-term cleanup plan. 1 The key
to CERCLA is to pay for environmental cleanup at the expense of private
responsible parties instead of taxpayers. 62 The CERCLA Superfund receives
a stipend from the government each year in excess of eight billion dollars,63
which is mainly derivative from taxes on the oil and gas industry. 4 However,
the estimated cost of cleaning up the possible 10,000 national Superfund
sites is three hundred billion dollars.65 For this cost related reason, only a
very small number of sites are acutally being detoxified,66 and less than
eleven percent of those sites are being funded by private responsible parties.
The remaining ninety percent of the cost is "being shouldered" by the
government, Le. the taxpayers. 67
Courts have required several elements to establish liability under
CERCLA. The site, which is the subject of the action, must be considered a
facility. There must have been a release or threatened release of hazardous
55. See Amicus Brief of United States Business nd Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 14-15, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).
57. Id. § 9607(e).
58. Id. §§ 9605(a), (c).
59. d § 9611.
60. See generally United States v. Codova Chem. Co. of Mich., 750 F. Supp. 832, 835
(W.D. Mich. 1990), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
61. See Glass, supra note 18, at 9.
62. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422-23.
63. See id. at 425.
64. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
17, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No. 97-454).
65. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 424.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 425.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 455,461 (E.D. Va. 1988).
1999] 933
124
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
materials which occurred at the facility.69 Such release must have caused the
plaintiff to incur costs to respond to the release.70 Additionally, the
defendant must be a responsible party as defined by CERCLA.
71
The terms "release" and "facility" have been broadly interpreted by
courts so that they never pose a significant obstacle to the imposition of
liability.12 Under CERCLA, a facility is defined as:
Any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft or [ ] any
site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but
does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any
vessel.
73
This broad definition has led to little or no leeway in arguing that one's site
is not a facility. Courts have clarified that a facility is only the immediate
area where the hazardous waste has "come to be located" and not the entire
property on which the waste is located. 74 Likewise, disposal occurs not only
through active human conduct, but also refers to passive movements of
hazardous waste through soil, metal, bodies of water, or other means. 75 The
critical determination in CERCLA liability lies in identifying the responsible
party as defined by the act.
The idea of holding responsible parties liable does not impute a
necessity of culpability.76 CERCLA casts a wide net to help pay the costs of
cleaning up the environment.77 The act is "sweeping" in that every party that
may be potentially involved in the disposal of hazardous materials should be
forced to contribute to cleanup efforts at the site in question.78 Even some of
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 570 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd sub nom United States V. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
72. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 429.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994).
74. E.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842-43 (4th
Cir. 1992).
75. See, e.g., id. at 845.
76. Id. at 846.
77. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 21, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
78. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 n.1 (1998) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989)).
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the several states have been held liable under the statute for their actions in
releasing already deposited waste during public works projects.79
CERCLA lists the persons who may be held liable for the cleanup costs
associated with a polluted site.80 Those persons include any prior owner or
operator of the facility whose involvement coincided with the release of the
hazardous substance, any present owner or operator of the facility, any
person who arranged for the disposal or transport of the hazardous substance
from the facility, and any person who, by contract or otherwise, actually
transported or disposed of the materials.81 The liability for these owners,
operators, arrangers, and transporters arises from their definite and real
relationship with the facility where the dangerous materials were released
into the ecosystem. 2 A person is defined to include corporations.8 3 To
operate a facility means to direct the workings of or to manage the facility.8
4
It is readily apparent that CERCLA was created to hold liable any entity that
was remotely connected with the illegal discharge of hazardous waste into
the environment. By holding past and present owners, operators,
transporters, and arrangers jointly and severally liable for toxic discharges,
CERCLA attempts to maintain a safety net of cleanup funds.8 5
The comprehensiveness of the responsible party section under
CERCLA is important to understand. Even an entity that owns a non-
operational facility is liable under CERCLA if toxic discharges were made
before the facility went offline16 A tenant who exercises control and
authority over a facility can be held liable as well as the owner of the facility
that the tenant rents.8' It follows then that no parties who were affiliated
with the polluting facility in some way can escape liability after a release of
hazardous substances is facilitated.
This assessment, however, is incorrect because there is an entire body
of corporate America that can escape liability based on their status as a
79. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
81. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(3).
82. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 4, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) (1994).
84. Petitioner's Brief at 20, Bestfoods (No. 97-454) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)).
85. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 554 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(holding CERCLA a joint and several liability statute unless defendant proves that the harm is
divisible).
86. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876
(1998) (No. 97-454).
87. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir.
1992).
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88parent corporation. CERCLA does not impose direct liability on parent
corporations for illegal discharges made by their subsidiaries. 89 Likewise, an
officer of a corporation that is liable under CERCLA is usually immune from
the statute except where that officer plays a role in the polluting activities of
the corporation. 9° It is up to the courts to interpret CERCLA to determine
under what conditions a parent will be held liable based on CERCLA,
federal, and state laws.
CERCLA's inherent limitations often confine its ability to remedially
enforce its provisions and obtain funds from potentially liable sources. The
Act does not require that federal law be used in interpreting its provisions. 9'
This leads to enforcement difficulties when trying to hold a parent liable for
the acts of its subsidiary because corporation law is derived from state power
and state common law.92 The law presumes that long established and
familiar principles of state law will govern unless a federal statute provides
otherwise.93 CERCLA, therefore, does not cast the widest net available to
remedy environmental woes because the traditional corporate form protects
parent companies. 94 The phrase "corporations will be held liable" does not
suggest that the same corporation's shareholders will be held liable.95
Therefore, when CERCLA's text states that a "corporation ' may be held
liable, it does not require that the parent corporation, the corporation's
principal shareholder, will be held liable. It may be reasonably concluded,
then, that CERCLA's direct text does not tamper with traditional state
notions of limited liability for corporations.97 This may explain why
CERCLA has been "subjected to a myriad of legal attacks since its
enactment [,]" regarding when and to what extent parent corporations may
be held liable for violations of its provisions.98
CERCLA provides one limited defense to those parties who are
innocent purchasers of contaminated property.99 The defense provides that
88. See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990).
89. Id.
90. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 21 ENVrL. L. REP. 20805, 20805
(W.D. Mich. 1991).
91. See Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents
at 4, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
92. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
93. Id. at 534.
94. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.
1995), rev'd sub nom Untied States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
95. Respondent's Brief at 20, BesOfoods (No. 97-454).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994).
97. Glass, supra note 18, at 9.
98. See Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 427.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
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there will be no liability for an otherwise liable party if "an act or omission
of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant" resulted in
an illegal release, which was caused solely by that third party, and the
otherwise liable party "exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substances concerned" and "took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions" by the third party.'00 However, if the act or omission on the part
of the third party was in relation to a contractual relationship regarding the
hazardous substance of which the owner was a party, the defense will not
work.01 A release caused by an act of war or God will also remove liability
from any owner.' 2
In addition, a claim by a previous owner that he or she sold the
hazardous material, and its liability with it, will not succeed0 3 because
CERCLA imposes strict liability on all previous owners.' 4 This is true
regardless of the duration of the ownership of the facility.'0 5 These defenses
are the extent of affirmative defenses available to defeat CERCLA liability.
The only other defense available is to disprove the liability on the merits and
the elements.
The courts, in enforcing and interpreting CERCLA, have proven to be a
powerful ally to the statute. The courts generally construe CERCLA
broadly, paying particular attention to its remedial purpose, and make rulings
that flow from policy considerations rather than abstract legal principles.
Courts recognize that Congress gave the statute wide latitude to shift the
costs of cleanup actions under the CERCLA from public entities to private
responsible parties.1' 7 Therefore, the courts usually follow the route to a
cleaner environment proscribed in CERCLA and defer to its remedial
purpose. 08
The nation's courts have prescribed rights that defendants have under
the statute. It is well settled that private responsible parties may make
binding and enforceable agreements to apportion the cleanup costs under
CERCLA between joint defendants' 9 Parties held liable, or parties that
settle the case with the EPA, may seek contribution from any and all other
100. Id. § 9607(b)(3).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 9607(b)(1)-(2).
103. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 841.
105. See id. at 844.
106. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
107. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 426.
108. Id. at 429.
109. Cordova Chem. Co. v. Department of Natural Resources, 536 N.W.2d 860, 863
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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responsible parties under the act.110 Being accused of a CERCLA violation
does not crush an entity's options; it simply forces someone involved, and
possibly everybody involved, to cleanup his or her own mess.
CERCLA, in one overly complex statement, provides that the United
States can no longer tolerate short-term economic gain at the expense of
long-term environmental health."' The true costs of producing
environmentally harmful chemicals must fall upon those who profit from
their production. The preceding discussion of the CERCLA statute will
assist in a proper understanding of the information in the proceeding
sections. An entire body of law has arisen out of the complexities contained
in CERCLA. This body of law incorporates everything from simple civil
procedure issues to complex issues of state versus federal law.
IV. THE LIABILITY THEORIES PRECEDING BESTFOODS
Because CERCLA does not speak directly to the issue of parent
corporation liability for the acts of subsidiaries, the courts were left to
struggle with the concept in order to find a resolution that preserved the
corporate form but allowed liability where it was deserved. The courts
always start with the language included in the statute when interpreting a
legislative enactment. Then, the courts must determine the meaning of a
term or section in the statute by considering first its bare definition, and then
its placement and purpose in the overall statutory scheme.1 3 CERCLA's
overall statutory scheme is to take decisive action to clean up or otherwise
make benign the nation's leaking waste sites.114 Therefore, the meaning of
"persons"' 5 in CERCLA must have been meant to include parent
corporations if they had something to do with the waste produced. "The
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, [always] depends on context."' 1 6
The silence of Congress on this parent corporation liability issue has
sparked widespread and nonuniform interpretation of CERCLA in the
nation's courts.1
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (1994); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers, No. 90-
2349, 1992 WL 161123 *2 at *8 (E.D. La. June 24, 1992).
111. See Gore, supra note 8, at xxi.
112. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995) (quoting Brown v. Gardner,
513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (citing King v. St.Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)).
113. Id. at 145.
114. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994).
116. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145.
117. See supra note 33.
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CERCLA provides no direct means of attaching a parent corporation for
its subsidiary's acts in violation of the Act's provisions."1 However, it is
well known that CERCLA's general thrust is to extend liability to all parties
involved in bringing about dangerous environmental conditions.! 9 This
thrust is in direct conflict with the tenet that a corporation and its
stockholders must be treated as separate entities in the eyes of the law. 2W It
is entirely acceptable that a corporation is used specifically as an insulator
from liability on statutory assessments. Limited liability is a hallmark of
corporation law.121 However, the desirable and socially beneficial protection
of limited liability must be surrendered "when the sacrifice is essential to the
end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld.12
Although never directly stated, the courts of the United States must
consider the cleanliness of the environment to be an accepted public policy
because they have found several ways to limit limited liability in the
CERCLA context.123 The nation's courts have for the most part applied two
different standards in determining whether a parent corporation can be held
liable for illegal discharges made by its subsidiary. The first standard
involves looking to the amount of control that the parent corporation
exercises over the subsidiary; if the requisite amount of control exists, then
the parent may be held liable.124 The second standard involves looking
closely at the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary to see if
piercing the corporate veil is warranted.2's There are two main theories
behind piercing the corporate veil: alter ego theory and mere instrumentality
theory. However, the two theories are identical in substance and only
differ in form.'27
It is essential to remember that the theory of direct liability through
control and the theory of derivative liability through piercing the corporate
veil are separate, unique, and noninterchangeable, but they are equally as
118. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
119. Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996).
120. Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410,415 (1932).
121. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361 (1944).
122. Id. at 362 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 95 (N.Y. 1926)
(Cardozo, J.)) (internal quotations omitted).
123. See supra note 33.
124. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir.
1997).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985);
Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 423.
126. See Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 432.
127. See id. at 430-31.
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effective in finding liability over parent corporations.' 2  A conflict arose
over veil-piercing regarding whether to apply state corporate veil-piercing
laws or to use federal standards in the context of CERCLA. "Ultimately, the
question facing the courts is whether to adhere to the traditional common
law rule strictly limiting [parent] liability, or instead to look beyond the
formalities of separate corporate existence and impose direct CERCLA
liability on parent corporations and individual shareholders." 29
Up until Bestfoods, the lower courts around the United States differed
on whether to apply state or federal veil-piercing standards. The general
consensus was that federal law governs the question of CERCLA liability,
but state law is not irrelevant because "corporations are creatures of state
law. 130 Some statutes allow courts to fashion a new body of federal law to
usurp state law, but corporate law is not such a body of law.13 1 Nevertheless,
if the state law allows an action that is prohibited by the federal law or the
application of state law is inconsistent with federal policy, then federal law
must displace the state law.132 In addition, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that
federal law governs whenever a case involves the rights of the United States
under a nationwide federal program.1 33 Under these rules, it would seem that
environmental protection is consistent with national policy and that a clean
environment is a right of the United States as defined by CERCLA.
Notwithstanding the previous discussion, many courts hold that federal
law may never intrude into veil-piercing under CERCLA. In order to
abrogate state law, a federal statute must directly apply to the question
addressed by the state common law.' 34 Nothing in the legislative history of
CERCLA indicates that Congress intended to alter the basic tenets of state
corporation common law,1 35 nor does the text of the statute itself indicate
that federal corporate law should be presumed. 136 It is agreed, however, that
no state may empower its corporations to disregard federal laws or
policies. 37 Regardless of whether state or federal law is used to determine
whether piecing the corporate veil is warranted, piercing the veil is the only
128. See Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7th
Cir. 1994).
129. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 435-36.
130. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1977)).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., id. at 479.
133. United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).
134. E.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
135. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
137. E.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944).
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indirect way in which a parent corporation can be held liable for illegal toxic
releases made by its subsidiary under CERCLA.
"Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law,
yet it remains among the least understood."138 Veil-piercing derives from the
abuse of the corporate form's single most valuable asset of limited
liability.139 "It is legitimate for [people] to stake only a part of their fortune
on an enterprise." When a corporation abuses the protection provided by
the corporate form as a vehicle to achieve an unjust result, courts would
remove limited liability. This removal is known as piercing the cbrporate
veil.14 1 All that veil-piercing consists of is enforcing a judgement against a
shareholder of a corporation for the acts of that corporation.1 42 The two
types of veil-piercing used are alter ego and mere instrumentality theories. 43
Both theories involve proving that the two entities were so intermingled that
they ceased to exist as separate entities.144  However, some jurisdictions
require fraud in order to pierce the corporate veil.145
When a parent company completely dominates and controls the
subsidiary or operates the subsidiary as a business conduit of the parent
company, the subsidiary is considered an alter ego of the parent. If the
subsidiary is an alter ego, then a court may pierce the corporate veil and hold
the parent liable for the acts of the subsidiary. 146 If the corporation is
established to perpetrate a fraud or to commit an illegal act, or if the parent
drains the subsidiary's assets, limited liability will not apply, and the veil
will be pierced.147 The existence of interlocking directorates is not enough to
pierce a corporate veil where there is no evidence of fraud or wrongdoing on
the part of the parent. 48 Neither one hundred percent ownership of the
subsidiary by the parent nor the parent having the same officers as the
138. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Barnett, Piercing the Corporate Veil in
Florida: Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NovA L. RE'. 663, 665 (Winter 1997) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
Empirical Study, 76 CoRNELLL. Ray. 1036, 1036 (1991)).
139. Id. Liability after a corporate investment usually will not exceed the amount
invested.
140. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929)).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 666.
143. Cane, supra note 138, at 667.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985).
147. Id.
148. American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
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subsidiary is, by itself, sufficient to pierce the veil under the alter ego
theory.1
49
In alter ego, the parent actually controls the subsidiary without regard to
its being a distinct entity, so the two are but one entity. The acts of one are
therefore the acts of all, and the veil may be pierced. 50  The following
factors indicate that a subsidiary is the alter ego of a parent: 1) commonality
of stock ownership; 2) commonality of directors and owners; 3)
commonality of business departments; 4) consolidated financial statements
and tax returns; 5) the parent finances the subsidiary; 6) the parent created or
caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; 7) the subsidiary operates on an
extremely inadequate amount of capital; 8) the parent pays the salaries and
expenses of the subsidiary; 9) the subsidiary receives business based solely
upon grant of the parent; 10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property as if it
were its own; 11) the daily operations of the two entities are not kept
separate; and 12) the subsidiary does not practice the usual corporate
formalities. 5'
The mere instrumentality theory requires control just like the alter ego
theory. However, the exact wording of the theory deviates from the alter ego
theory. The control must be present to such an extent that the subservient
company has no distinct corporate interests of its own and operates only to
achieve the purposes of the parent corporation. 52 A domination of finances,
policies, and practices that control the corporation must occur so that the
subsidiary has "no separate mind, will [,] or existence.' ' 53 The difference
between alter ego and mere instrumentality is that with mere instrumentality,
there are no factors; there are simply three concrete elements: 1) control by
the parent company; 2) the control exercised by the parent was used to
perpetrate a fraud or worse; and 3) the control caused the specific injury
complained of in that case. 54 The courts acknowledge that although a parent
is an entity unique from its subsidiary, sometimes the corporate fiction must
be overlooked to inhibit fraud. In such a case, the subsidiary must be treated
as an instrumentality of the parent.
55
The Fifth Circuit believes no direct liability for parent cor1.orations
exists under CERCLA unless the corporate veil can be pierced. This
circuit also limits veil-piercing to situations where the corporate form is used
149. Jon-TChem., 768 F.2d at 691.
150. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1960).
151. Jon-TChem., 768 F.2d at 691-92.
152. Id. at 691.
153. Id.
154. Fisser, 282 F.2d at 238.
155. Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 154 A.2d 684, 687 (Del.
1959).
156. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990).
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as a sham, to perpetrate fraud, or solely to avoid personal liability. 157 The
Eastern District of Louisiana agrees that a parent may be held liable under
CERCLA only if the veil can be pierced.'r 8 The only problem with this
theory is that the conditions under which the veil may be pierced are
different in each state. In California, for example, one may pierce the veil
when the unity between the parent and the subsidiary causes their separate
personalities to no longer exist and adherence to the corporate form would
promote injustice. 159 California's reasoning differs from many states' veil-
piercing laws and illustrates the need for uniformity in federal CERCLA
actions.
To complicate the matter even further, some courts apply the federal
veil-piercing standard when deciding parent corporation liability under
CERCLA." A district court in Massachusetts applied federal veil-piercing
standards in reviewing CERCLA claims against parent companies.16 The
court's reasoning was that policies underlying CERCLA directed a federal
veil-piercing review. 62 The Third Circuit also felt it was necessary to use
federal veil-piercing standards in order to achieve uniformity in the
application of CERCLA. 6' Remember, piercing the corporate veil is not the
only way in which a parent can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiaries;
there is also a control test by which a parent could be held liable as an
operator under CERCLA.164
Many courts allow for both the actual control standard to be used in
finding direct CERCLA liability, and veil-piercing to be used to find indirect
liability for parent companies. The test under the actual control standard is
whether or not the parent substantially and actively participates in the day-
to-day activities of the subsidiary company. 65 The type of control necessary
can also be expressed as control which evinces the parent's "exclusive
domination.., to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or
157. Id.
158. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., No. 90-2349, 1992 WL 161123 at *3
(E.D. La. June 24, 1992).
159. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 431.
160. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987).
161. Id. at 31.
162. Id. at 32.
163. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir.
1993).
164. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A)-(21) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
165. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir. 1997);
Martignetti v. Haigh-Farr, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Mass. 1997).
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independent significance of its own.' 66 Direct liability under operator status
is conferred when the parent has such extreme control over the subsidiary's
activity that it becomes an operator subject to direct liability.167
There must be more than mere ownership and the control that is
incidental to ownership to find parent liability under CERCLA.168 Owning
stock is not enough; 69 there must be actual participation in the conduct that
led to the release causing CERCLA liability. 70 The normal amount of
oversight that any prudent investor would give to an investment is not
construed as worthy of direct liability, although it does represent a certain
degree of control.17  Some courts narrow the control test to require that the
parent be actively involved in the day-to-day operations of the actual facility
that is the subject of the CERCLA action. The actual control test does not
appear to differ wholeheartedly from veil-piercing standards, but the
distinction will become important in the context of the Besifoods case.
One last important issue that often presented itself in the cases before
Bestfoods was corporate officer liability. An officer of a corporation
charged with CERCLA violations is not liable unless that officer spent a lot
of time at the actual facility where the release was made, had the opportunity
to participate in the illegal release, and directed such release.
73
It is important to understand that this was the mindset of the courts as
the Bestfoods case came to the docket. There were two forms of liability for
parent corporations under CERCLA: a parent could be directly liable as an
operator of the polluting subsidiary, or a parent could be indirectly liable as
an owner of the polluting subsidiary through veil-piercing.
166. E.g., Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088
(1998) (citing Outokumpu Eng'g Enter. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1996)).
167. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1990).
168. Id. at 27; See generally Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co.,
31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929).
169. E.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 58 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
170. E.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (1 1th Cir.
1993).
171. E.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir. 1997).
172. E.g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220
(3d Cir. 1993).
173. See, e.g., Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prod., Inc., 931 F.2d
327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991).
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V. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS
A. Facts of the Case
The contaminated site ('The Site") which is the subject of the Besifoods
case is located near Muskegon, Michigan. It is a rural setting in western
Michigan. There is a southeasterly flow of groundwater beneath The Site
toward and The Unnamed Tributary and Little Bear Creek. From 1959 until
1986, the Site was used by many chemical companies to produce
pharmaceutical, veterinary, and agricultural synthetic, organic, and
intermediate chemicals.1 74
Ott Chemical Company ("Ott r') owned and operated The Site from
1957 until 1965. Then, in 1965, a different Ott Chemical Company ("Ott
IF') bought The Site. Ott II was a wholly-owned subsidiary of CPC
International ("CPC"). 7 5 CPC placed some of its own employees on the
board of Ott II.176 Ott II tendered The Site to Story Chemical Company
("STCC") in 1972. STCC was then declared bankrupt in 1977.77
Shortly thereafter, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") attempted to find new buyers for The Site to assist in its cleanup.
They simultaneously investigated the extent of the environmental
degradation and remedies available at The Site. DNR entered into
negotiations with Aerojet-General Corporation ("Aerojet") and its
subsidiary, Cordova Chemical Company ("Cordova"), which resulted in
Cordova Chemical Company of California ("Cordova Cal".), Aerojet's
wholly-owned subsidiary, purchased The Site from the STCC bankruptcy
trustee. In 1978, Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan ("Cordova
Mich.") bought the site from Cordova Cal. and owns it to this day.
Operations, however, ceased at The Site in 1986.171
When tested in 1957, the groundwater beneath The Site was in a pure
and potable condition. After the groundwater was again tested in 1964,
seven years since chemical production had started, the groundwater showed
contamination. This contamination was a result of pumping water into The
Site for use in production and then pumping the water out of The Site.179
174. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 555 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
175. CPC changed its name to Bestfoods shortly after litigation began.
176. Respondent's Brief at 5, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
177. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 555.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Because of waste disposal at The Site, surface water, groundwater, and soil
were contaminated with a large volume of toxic substances.'80
During the periods when Ott I and Ott H owned The Site, chemical
wastewater was dumped into unlined, engineered lagoons on the
northwestern edge of The Site. Many contaminants then seeped into the
ground and local waters from the lagoons. No waste, however, was dumped
into the lagoons when STCC or Cordova owned The Site."8
Ott I and II also buried hundreds of chemical-filled drums in a sandy pit
on The Site. These drums eventually ruptured causing further soil
contamination and water contamination through leachate. In addition, all of
the owners through the present allowed major chemical overflows and spills,
which they failed to clean up; instead, the materials were buried. In one
such case, a train car full of hazardous chemicals spilled onto The Site's
railroad tracks. 82
The contamination eventually reached the water supply of the
surrounding community. By 1981, the groundwater that was extracted
looked like brown root beer and contained foam. The air had a foul stench
from chemicals that permeated everything. The soil and grounds of The Site
were purple from the toxins released. In addition, there were many
containers randomly thrown about that were exploding, leaking, corroding,
and crushed. Free roaming traces of phenol, methylene, benzene, methyl
isocyanate, and chloride were on The Site.
8 3
Regardless of how the contaminants entered the ground, they eventually
reached, through soil movement and leaching, The Unnamed Tributary and
Little Bear Creek. Ott I and Ott II attempted to use purge wells'14 to slow
down the proliferation of hazardous materials. STCC and Cordova,
however, did not make use of these purge wells, thus allowing an unchecked
spread of contamination from the Site.'
Cordova Mich. and Cordova Cal. did not dump or bury waste. The two
companies repaired the sewage system and equalization tanks, which were
required for the sewage system to function properly, and all chemical waste
was pumped offsite to a county treatment facility. Nevertheless, benzene
180. Id. at 555-56.
181. Id. at 556.
182. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 556.
183. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
184. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 556. Purge wells are deep and wide wells that
penetrate the earth far below the water table. When in operation, they pump water from the
groundwater beneath a contaminated site and create a cone of depression whereby water will
not flow past the site, but up into the well. Therefore, any contaminants will not pass beyond
the site in question.
185. Id.
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and one half dichloroethane, used exclusively on this site by the Cordova
companies, was found in large quantities in the soil and groundwater.
186
In 1981, federal action began when the EPA investigated The Site. By
1982, the EPA placed The Site on the national priority list and ranked The
Site the 137th most in need of federal remedial action. As of 1991, the EPA
had a three-phased plan to repair the groundwater, surface water, and soil in
and surrounding The Site. Implementation of the plan will cost many
millions of dollars.1 7
B. Procedural Posture of the Case
This litigation included many consolidated claims regarding who should
be held liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA1 81 CPC, Aerojet, Cordova
Mich., the Michigan DNR, and the United States were all parties to this
action.189 In May and June of 1991, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan conducted a fifteen-day trial to determine who
was responsible for cleanup costs at the site in question.'90 There was a
windstorm of cross-claims, counterclaims, and contribution claims.' 91 The
district court then consolidated the case into three phases: remedy,
insurance, and liability. 192 The trial on the first phase of liability included
twenty-nine live testimonial witnesses, 2300 exhibits, and dozens of
transcribed depositions.'93 The trial court found that CPC, Cordova, and
Aerojet were liable as operators under CERCLA.'9 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, ruling with a
divided panel, 195 first reversed in part and remanded the case back to the
district court.196 The court of appeals then granted a rehearing en banc and
vacated its previous judgement.? In the court of appeals' second swing at
the plate, it again reversed in part and remanded by a seven-to-six
majority.198 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 et seq.
189. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 549.
190. Id. at 555-70.
191. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1883 (1998).
192. Id.
193. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 554.
194. Id. at 581.
195. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1883.
196. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 1995).
197. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586, 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
198. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998)
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the conflict between the circuits regarding parent corporation liability under
CERCLA.0 The Court heard the case on March 24, 1998 and made its
ruling on June 8, 1998.01
C. The District Court Decision
CERCLA, according to the district court, imposes strict, joint and
several liability whenever there is a release at a site, and the statute must be
interpreted broadly to avoid frustrating its remedial purpose.202 The court
held that liability under CERCLA could attach to a parent corporation in two
ways: either directly, as operator of the subsidiary, or indirectly, when the
corporate veil could be pierced."
3
Liability through operator status occurs only when the parent exerts
influence or power over the subsidiary by forcefully participating in and
exerting control over the subsidiary's business operations during the time of
the waste disposal. 2°4 Oversight of the subsidiary that is consistent with the
investment relationship will not create such liability.20 5 To determine if the
appropriate "nexus of control"' ' 6 was present, the court considered the
following factors: 1) the parent's representation on the subsidiary's board of
directors; 2) the parent's management of the subsidiary; 3) the parent's daily
involvement with the subsidiary; 4) the overlapping policies between the
parent and the subsidiary; and 5) management, waste disposal, finance, and
personnel policies z70
The district court also ruled that that a parent could be held liable
through indirect or vicarious liability via traditional state law governed
methods of veil-piercing.208 In Michigan, a three-pronged veil-piercing test
is used to "prevent fraud, illegality or injustice."20 The elements of the test
require the following: 1) that the subsidiary is an instrumentality of the
parent; 2) that the limited liability between the parent and the subsidiary was
specifically used to perpetrate a fraud or evil; and 3) that the fraud or evil
199. United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997), rev'd sub nom United
States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
200. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884.
201. Id. at 1876.
202. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 554, 571-72 (W.D.
Mich. 1991), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
203. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1883; CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 572.
204. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp at 573.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 577.
207. Id. at 573.
208. Id. at 574.
209. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574.
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caused the injury to the plaintiff.210 Michigan law allows for an exception in
that veil-piercing may also be warranted when it is done to serve the interests
of justice.21 1 The fiction of separate corporate entities is disregarded if the
two companies have identical interests so as to suggest that the subsidiary
212
was an alter ego of the parent.
The court reasoned that CPC was directly liable as an operator with
regard to The Site because it significantly controlled its subsidiary's
decisionmaking and business, even though neither CPC nor its former
subsidiary still owned The Site.213 Internally, CPC installed its officers on
the board of Ott II, and externally, CPC imposed policies of development on
Ott ]1.214 These actions established, for the trial court, that CPC reached the
nexus of control such that they assumed responsibility for the release of
hazardous waste.2 5 In addition, Cordova Cal. was subject to indirect
CERCLA owner liability through veil-piercing because its subsidiary owned
the site in question; Cordova Cal. was the sole shareholder of Cordova Mich.
stock, and there was an identity of interest between the companies. 6 The
intermediate parent here exercised dominion and control over its subsidiary
to the point where the corporate fiction ceased to exist, and the parent was
therefore held liable.217
This decision established that the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan would no longer allow parent corporations to
escape liability under CERCLA. It seemed like an important victory for the
environmental movement in the United States. However, The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit of the United States added its two cents to the
issue.
D. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and
remanded after rehearing the case.21 ' The court held, like in the district court
decision,219 that it would not interpret CERCLA in such a way that frustrated
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 574-75.
214. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574-75.
215. Id. at 577.
216. Id. at 578-79.
217. Id.
218. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572,586 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Besffoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
219. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 571-72.
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CERCLA's underlying policy2m However, it limited the deference it would
give to the statute in that it would only assess liability on those parties that
were culpable, or by some realistic measure contributed to the creation of the
harmful conditions. 22' The court refused to hold parent corporations liable
for the acts of their subsidiaries unless the corporate veil could be pierced,
thus rejecting the district court's view that actual control could bring about
direct liability.222
The focus of the opinion was whether the parent abused the corporate
form in such a way that the separation between corporation and stockholder
disappeared. 223 The court then applied Michigan state law with regard to
veil-piercing, just as the district court did.22 However, in applying the
Michigan veil-piercing standard, the court ruled that the facts in this case did
not warrant a piercing of the corporate veil.22 While CPC was found to have
had an active role with Cordova, the court found that the degree of control it
exercised did not force the separate personalities of parent and subsidiary to
cease to exist. In addition, there was no showing that the corporate form was
utilized to accomplish fraud or wrongdoing. 6 The court also let Cordova
Cal. off the hook by pronouncing that its brief period of ownership, before it
transferred The Site to Cordova Mich., did not put it in a position to incur
previous owner liability under CERCLA. 27
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's ruling in this case
accomplished three things. First, it allowed two potentially liable
companies with deep pockets to escape liability for environmental crimes for
which they clearly should have been responsible under CERCLA. 2 9 Second,
it set a precedent calling for the use of state law to determine parent
corporation liability under CERCLA.230 Third, the court removed the
possibility of direct operator-status liability for parent corporations under
CERCLA.231 Contrary to its pontifications in the beginning of the opinion, 2
it would seem that the court did indeed frustrate the remedial purpose of
220. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 577.
221. Id. at 578.
222. Id. at 580.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 581.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 583.
228. Id. at 572.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994).
230. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 580.
231. Id. at 580.
232. Id. at 577.
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CERCLA. In one ruling, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals managed to set
the environmental cause back eighteen years.
VI. UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS
A. Petitioner's Argument
There were three briefs submitted in support of the United States, the
petitioner, in United States v. Bestfoods? 3 The United States submitted a
brief and a reply brief,2 and the respondent, Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality,235 submitted a brief in support of the petitioner.26
According to the Solicitor General for the United States, The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals misapplied CERCLA, the most important statute which
allows the United States to remedy public dangers created by toxic
materials. 7 The Court of Appeals' ruling absolved all parent corporations
of liability under CERCLA even when they actively participate in the
operations of the polluting site.2 38 By only allowing parent liability when the
circumstances warrant a piercing of the corporate veil, the Sixth Circuit is
alienating the broader view held by the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals, which all allow for some sort of control test to
find direct liability for parents as operators under CERCLA.239
In the petitioner's opinion, this case's main issue is one of simple
statutory construction.m State common law veil-piercing standards should
not apply.24 The United States wants the Supreme Court to "apply the
[CERCLA] statute as Congress wrote it."2 2 The definition of "owner" in
CERCLA specifically excludes stockholders who do not participate in
233. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of
Petitioner (No. 97-454); Petitioner's Brief (No. 97454); Petitioner's Reply Brief (No. 97-
454).
234. Petitioner's Brief at I, Bes~foods (No. 97-454); Petitioner's Reply Brief at I,
Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
235. Formerly known as Michigan Department of Natural Resources.
236. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of
Petitioner at I, Besifoods (No. 97-454).
237. Petitioner's Brief at 16, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
238. Id.
239. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of
Petitioner at 14, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
240. Id. at 6.
241. Id.
242. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15, BesOfoods (No. 97-454) (citing Dunn v. CFTC, 117
S. Ct. 913, 916 (1997)).
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managing the facility where the release occurred.243 This suggests that a
stockholder who does participate in the management of the site is susceptible
to liability. 4 The statutory term "operator" in CERCLA must be interpreted
in terms of its plain and ordinary meaning as opposed to an unusual or
technical meaning.245 The plain meaning of "to operate" is to "direct the
workings of [or] to manage. ' ' 4
Congress wanted to impose liability on any operator of the site in
question, regardless of protection provided by the corporate form.247 CPC,
the United States argues, was an operator as defined by CERCLA, because it
actively controlled the operations of the facility where the illegal release was
made. Understand, however, that the petitioner is no longer referring to
active control of the subsidiary's business; instead, it is saying that CPC had
extensive control over the decision-making at The Site, which therefore
shows that CPC operated The Site.249 This is direct liability in its most
forward form; there is nothing vicarious about it; CPC physically controlled
operations at The Site.20 CPC's argument that operator status is only
conferred when a corporation mechanically operates a polluting facility
would produce an absurd result because parents could control decision-
making at a facility but others would be subject to liability for the parents'
decisions.2' Any sort of managerial control over the facility is enough to
obtain CERCLA liability over a parent.z 2 The United States suggests that
there could never be anything bad, even considering limited liability, about
requiring a corporation to pay for the harm it causes.
The petitioner also argued that a federal veil-piercing standard must be
used instead of the various state standards when interpreting parent liability
under CERCLA. 4 CERCLA specifically precludes the use of all state
243. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1994).
244. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Bestfoods (No. 97-454) (citing United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich.,
113 F.3d 572, 587 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876
(1998)).
245. Petitioner's Brief at 20, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
246. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1989)).
247. Id. at 25.
248. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 1, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 5.
252. Id. at 6.
253. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 17, Besifoods (No. 97-454).
254. Petitioner's Brief at 32, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
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common law defenses in attempting to escape owner or operator liability.25
Therefore, the use of the state veil-piercing doctrine is impossible under
CERCLA. In addition, all fifty states have different veil-piercing standards.
Resorting to all of those different standards would be inconsistent,
unpredictable, ad hoc, and inappropriate in terms of CERCLA. 6 The
statute must be interpreted uniformly across the United States, employing
only federal veil-piercing standards.25'
As its final argument, Petitioner discusses the fact that CPC placed its
own corporate officers on the boards of directors of Ott II25 It is normal for
a corporate parent to place its own officers on the board of a subsidiary, and
that alone does not impute liability under CERCLA.2 9 However, CPC's
officers on the board of Ott II performed their duties on behalf of CPC and
not on behalf of Cordova; therefore, they represent an instrumentality of
CPC, which directed the functioning of Ott Il's facility.26
The petitioner presented a lucid and coherent argument. Nothing
presented in the argument was untrue or vague. However, it seems that
because the United States was on the side of what is right and good in the
world, it felt it did not have to present an aggressive argument that would
induce an emotional reaction in the Supreme Court Justices. It was a good
argument that made its point effectively, but it did not call for decisive
action to cleanup a life-threatening source of pollution.
B. Respondent's Argument
There were four briefs submitted in support of Bestfoods, the
Respondent.21 Bestfoods itself submitted a brief and a supplemental brief,
262
and the other two briefs were amicus briefs submitted by The Washington
Legal Foundation and The United States Business and Industrial Council.
Respondent argued that Congress did not give the courts a license to develop
255. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 12, Besifoods (No. 97-
454).
256. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 16, BesOfoods (No. 97-454).
257. See id. at 16.
258. Petitioner's Brief at 45, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
259. Id. at 44.
260. Id. at45.
261. Formerly doing business as CPC International.
262. Respondent's Brief, Bestfoods, (No. 97-454); Respondent's Supplemental Brief,
Bestfoods, (No. 97-454).
263. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents,
Bestfoods, (No. 97-454); Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in
Support of Respondents, Besifoods, (No. 97-454).
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ad hoc rules of corporate parent liability in terms of CERCLA.264 The courts
are not permitted to legislate via CERCLA.265 Federal intervention into the
basic premises of state corporation law will destroy the value of
incorporation266 and will devastate commercial relationships.267
It would not serve justice to "sweep aside longstanding principles" of
limited liability.268 Nothing in CERCLA suggests that Congress wanted to
override common law corporate principles.26 Congress must act against the
backdrop of the complete corpus juris of the states.270 Therefore, a matter
interpreted in a federal statute that is not addressed specifically must be left
to disposition via state law. 27' Because parent corporation liability is not
discussed in CERCLA, it follows that state law should be used in deciding
when and to what extent a parent can be held liable for the acts of its
subsidiary.272
The term "corporation" does not include its shareholders.273 Allowing
the courts to create an entire body of federal law from "whole cloth" will
necessarily destroy state sovereignty.274 Respondent believes that creating
this federal standard would constitute declaring "open season" on all parent
corporations for the illegal acts of their subsidiaries.275 There must be
significant conflict between the federal goals and the state law in order to
abrogate the state law.276 Moreover, in the arena of corporate law, there is a
strong presumption that state law must be applied to resolve parent
corporation liability.277
The need for national uniformity is not a strong enough need to displace
state corporation law. 278 There is a heavy burden on courts to use state and
264. Respondent's Brief at i, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
265. See Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents
at 2, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
266. Id. at 19.
267. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 23, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
268. Respondent's Brief at i, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
269. Id. at 29.
270. Id. at 28.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. Respondent's Brief at 20, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
274. Id. at 12.
275. Id. at 14.
276. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
4-5, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
277. Id. at 5.
278. Id. at 7.
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not federal law when applying a federal statute.279 It must be shown that
national uniformity is required, the state law would frustrate the federal
policy, and commercial relationships would not suffer in order to supplant
the state law.2'0
State veil-piercing law does not undermine CERCLA's purpose of
holding liable any potentially responsible parties.21  Using state law
provides the proper balance between CERCLA's imposition of costs and
protecting the corporate form.22 If the parent has a sham subsidiary, the
courts may still attack the parent, but corporate limited liability is held
inviolate. States are interested in protecting their citizens from
environmental contamination and will adjust their veil-piercing standards
accordingly in order to snare the widest net of potentially liable parent
corporations. 2 4
In arguendo, the different states have somewhat uniform veil-piercing
laws. Basic uniformity can be accomplished by allowing the states to
maintain their sovereignty.2 s Veil-piercing in most states requires, with
some variation, two basic elements: 1) uniformity in interest so that the
separate corporate personalities no longer exist; and 2) fraud or wrongdoing
in use of the corporate form. In addition, the only reason that the petitioner
wants to apply federal veil-piercing law is because fraud is not a necessary
element under federal law. In Michigan, fraud is a necessary element to
pierce the veil, and the respondent in this case is not guilty of any fraud.287
When Congress intends that there be a control test designed to find
liable parties included in a statute, they simply put it in the text of the
statute. s Congress put a control test in the Securities and Exchange Act
because it intended to do so in that case.289 A parent can only be held liable
as an operator if they mechanically operate the site where the pollution has
279. See Anicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 18, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
280. Id. at 18-19.
281. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
16, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
282. Id. at 14.
283. See Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 4, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
284. Id. at 22.
285. Anilcus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
9, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Respondent's Brief at 24, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
289. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (a) (1994).
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taken place.29° It would be improper to lower the threshold of vicarious
liability by suggesting that control over the subsidiary's business operations
indicated liability for an entity separate from the subsidiary.29' Actual
control over the subsidiary is irrelevant, only operation of the facility in
question is relevant, and CPC did not mechanically operate the facility.
The Supreme Court must not review evidence for credibility or discuss
specific facts.293 The factual findings of the lower courts must be honored,
and the District Courts did not find that CPC was an operator of The Site.
294
CPC did place some of its employees at the site, but that is indicative of
normal stockholder oversight . 9  Ott II made its own decisions, derived its
own revenues, and there was no abnormal intervention from CPC.
296
This argument is a textbook corporate America argument. It essentially
states that the courts must protect the profit-making enterprises of the nation
at the expense of the environment. Unfortunately for the environment, the
argument makes perfect legal sense. So, while one might want to disagree
with the points contained therein from an environmental and emotional
standpoint, he or she must submit that corporations and shareholders do have
certain rights, as do states.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Souter did not pull any punches when he wrote for an
unanimous court in United States v. Bestfoods. He boldly stated that a
parent corporation would not be held liable for violations under CERCLA if
it exercised control over its subsidiary's operations.2 97  However, the
resolution of this case did establish two ways in which a parent corporation
can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary under CERCLA.29 8 A parent
corporation will be attached under CERCLA only when the corporate veil
can be pierced and when the parent actually participated in the operations of
the facility where the release of hazardous substances was made.2 9
The basic American tenet that a parent corporation will not be held
liable for acts perpetrated by its subsidiaries guided the Court through its
290. Respondent's Brief at 19, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
291. See id. at 7.
292. Id.
293. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 1-2, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
294. Id. at 2.
295. Respondent's Brief at 5, BesOfoods (No. 97-454).
296. Id.
297. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998).
298. Id. at 1886 n.12.
299. Id. at 1881.
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reasoning.300 The control that is incidental to stock ownership cannot make a
parent liable for a subsidiary's acts beyond the assets of the subsidiary.01
The Court held that the control incidental to stock ownership includes the
formation of corporate guidelines, the appointment of officers, and all other
acts normal to the parent-subsidiary relationship.302 Even the subsidiary
having the identical board of directors as the parent is normal to the
shareholder relationship.303 "[T]he congressional silence is audible" in
CERCLA.304 Nothing in the act rejects the long-standing principal that
parent corporations are protected by limited liability.30 5
However, the Court does note that it is equally fundamental to
American law that when a shareholder misuses the corporate form, the
corporate veil may be pierced, and the shareholder will therefore be subject
to liability.30 CERCLA does not reject this principal of corporate law just
as it does not reject the principal of limited liability. 307  "[I]n order to
abrogate a common law principle, the statute must speak directly to the
question addressed by common law."308 For a matter as fundamental as
parent corporation liability to be omitted from a comprehensive statute like
CERCLA means that it was left out for a reason.2 The Court, therefore,
agreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that a parent corporation may
be held derivatively liable for the acts of its subsidiary under CERCLA when
and only when the corporate veil may be pierced under state law.310
The Court continued by stating that there is a significant difference
between liability as an owner versus liability as an operator, since CERCLA
311provides for both. Piercing the corporate veil applies to liability for an
owner, but there may be a case where the parent corporation is an operator as
defined by the Act.312 A parent may be liable for its own acts as the operator
of the facility which is owned by its subsidiary if the CERCLA violation can
be traced to the parent and the parent directly participated in the violation.313
300. See id. at 1884.
301. Id.
302. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884.
303. See id.
304. Id. at 1885.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885.
308. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,
534 (1993)).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1885-86.
311. Id. at 1889.
312. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1886.
313. Id. at 1886.
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Therefore, while indirect liability may be limited to cases where the
corporate veil may be pierced, CERCLA's operator proviso deals with one's
direct liability for his or her own actions.314 A direct owner of a facility, a
subcontractor, a malicious saboteur, a business partner, and even a parent
corporation can be held liable.315 In the case of operator status, state
corporate law and the distinction between parent and subsidiary is irrelevant.
The critical inquiry is whether the parent operated the facility in question.1 6
It follows that a parent whose veil cannot be pierced because it adhered to
the traditional separation between parent and subsidiary may be held liable
as operator if it intervenes on one occasion relating to the release of
hazardous materials.1 7
In defining what it means to operate a facility, the court employed
dictionary definitions, plain meanings, and common sense.318 CERCLA
meant something more than mere mechanical activation of pumps and valves
when it used the word "operate" to describe those who are liable under the
statute.319 The Court ruled that the meaning of "to operate" should be
construed in the "organizational sense" that was intended by CERCLA.3z To
,,321
operate means "to conduct the affairs of; to manage: operate a business.
Justice Souter then extended the meaning of "to operate" under CERCLA to
mean directing, managing, or performing tasks directly related to the
disposal of hazardous materials. This sharpened definition as applied to
CERCLA also included institutional decisionmaking regarding "compliance
with environmental regulations.3 22  The Court of Appeals, therefore,
correctly rejected the District Court's view of an actual control theory based
direct liability.
The Court rejected the actual control test for two reasons. First, the test
inappropriately combined indirect and direct liability; second, it did not look
at the parent relationship with the facility in question, but only at the
parent's relationship with its subsidiary.3  The District Court only
considered CPC's one hundred percent ownership interest and the fact that it
placed its own employees on Ott H's board of directors; thus, the court did
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct at 1886-87 n.12.
318. See id. at 1887.
319. Id. at 1889.
320. Id. at 1887.
321. Id.
322. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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not adequately analyze CPC's liability.325 The Court then directed the
District Court to consider the relationship between The Site and CPC on
remand.3 6
Guidance was given as to what constitutes operation of the facility.32
7
Again, a sole stockholder in a corporation has the right to supervise the
subsidiary's finances, proscribe mandatory policies that the subsidiary must
follow, and monitor the subsidiary's performance without liability attaching
because of such actions.32 The main question is: "in degree and detail, [are
the] actions directed to the facility by... the parent... eccentric under
accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility[?] ' 329
It is completely normal for a parent corporation to place its own officers
on the board of directors of a subsidiary, and that fact alone may not
establish parent corporation liability for the illegal acts of its subsidiary.330
Common or dual officers can and do "change hats" when representing either
the parent or the subsidiary, and the courts presume that they put on their
subsidiary hats when they work for the subsidiary.331 However, when it
appears that an officer is acting in a manner that is congruent only with the
interest of the parent while also deviating from well-established corporate
norms, the presumption may be rebutted.
33F
In conclusion, the Court stated that CERCLA does not fundamentally
alter or displace common law rules of limited liability. 333 If the actual
control test were used as the standard, derivative liability through veil-
piercing would be unnecessary. 334  CERCLA-specific corporate law
doctrines are impermissible because they cast aside all traditional
expectations of liability under CERCLA.335
The Court found adequate information contained in the record to
support a belief that CPC did in fact operate The Site as defined by
Bestfoods.335 It therefore vacated the judgement of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the District Court to reconsider the issue in light of
Bestfood. 337
325. See id. at 1887-88.
326. Id. at 1888.
327. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1888.
331. Id.
332. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889 n.13.
333. Id. at 1889.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1890.
337. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1890.
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D. Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
The two forms of finding liability announced in Bestfoods33s allow the
EPA and private CERCLA plaintiffs to know when they will be able to force
a parent corporation to contribute to a cleanup effort. The Court pronounced
bright line rules which, if violated, indicate corporate parent liability.339 The
guessing of the past is now over. However, there probably are many
corporate parent boards of directors that alter their policies with regard to
their subsidiaries in order to escape liability under the Bestfoods ruling but
continue managing their subsidiaries as they see fit. If making profits at the
expense of the environment is their corporate goal, it is assured that they will
find a way to do it without violating the lines drawn in Bestfoods.
CERCLA's intent is clear: it is a comprehensive statute designed to
attach liability onto every potentially responsible party. 340 It is inconceivable
that Congress intended that parent corporations could escape liability based
on fictional protections provided by the corporate form. The Bestfoods
ruling allows parent corporations, which may have been deeply involved in
the polluting activities of their subsidiaries, to escape liability. 34 ' The Court
should have looked more deeply into the policy concerns that underlie
CERCLA. If it had, it would have seen that the statute is sPjecifically
designed to prevent exactly what the Court allowed to happen. Common
law defenses are precluded when assessing CERCLA liability; only the
defenses set forth in the text of the statute are effective.43 By limiting parent
liability to situations where the parent operated the facility in question, the
Court effectively demonstrated to potential polluting parents how to
indirectly require that their subsidiaries pollute but get away with it in the
process. A parent, for example, could place profit requirements on a
subsidiary attainable only if it illegally dumped hazardous waste.
The Court of Appeals noted that the courts should not interpret
CERCLA in such a way that frustrates its purpose.345 However, the Supreme
Court's decision to allow state law to determine whether the corporate veil, 346
should be pierced does frustrate CERCLA' s purpose. Unlike federal law,
most state veil-piercing laws include an element of fraud that must be proven
338. Id. at 1886 n.12.
339. Id. at 1876.
340. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
341. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889.
342. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
343. Id. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
344. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.
345. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
346. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
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in order to pierce the veil.347 Under the Court's reasoning, a parent that has
interfered with a subsidiary to the point where the corporate veil should be
pierced, and has indirectly forced the subsidiary to pollute, but has not
engaged in any deception or fraud will nevertheless be protected by the
corporate form.34' The use of state law to pierce the corporate veil under
CERCLA frustrates the Act's purpose because federal veil-piercing law
would necessarily provide for more parents' indirect liability under
CERCLA. The purpose of CERCLA is to cleanup the environment by
forcing responsible parties to pay for the cleanup.349
A state legislature or court system is now in the position to tailor its
veil-piercing law with the intent to attract corporations that are interested in
producing goods and not cleaning up the environmental pollutants they
release. States could easily make the test for piercing the corporate veil
narrower than it currently is in order to attract the worst element of rich,
polluting companies. In terms of whether state or federal law applies in veil-
piercing cases, "the congressional silence is audible." 350 Some recent cases
that struggled to interpret Bestfoods have held that state law governs in veil-
piercing inquiries.5 1 Several courts have resolved the issue by relying on the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Donahey v. Bogle,3 which requires application33
of state law in veil-piercing cases. However, there is a strong possibility
that federal law may be held applicable in other jurisdictions. This issue
requires a legislative solution.
In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court promoted form over function. While
there now exist strict, uniform bounds by which a parent corporation may be
held liable for the acts of its subsidiary under CERCLA,54 if a parent
corporation maintains a few formalities with regard to the corporate form, it
is nevertheless immune from liability should the subsidiary be charged with
a CERCLA violation. It is true that parent corporations now have more to
fear than ever. Before Bestfoods, the law regarding parent corporation
liability was confused and erratic at best.355 Nevertheless, the circumstances
by which a parent corporation will be held liable for the CERCLA violations
347. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
9, Besffoods (No. 97-454).
348. See Bestroods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889.
349. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
350. United States v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 2d 203, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing United
States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (1998)).
351. E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765
(N.D. 1Il. 1998).
352. 129 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 1997).
353. Id. at 843.
354. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1886 n.12.
355. See supra note 33.
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of its subsidiary under Bestfoods are narrow, including only when the
corporate veil may be pierced under state law, and when the parent actively
manages or operates the polluting facility.356 Shareholders and parent
corporations know how to protect themselves because of the Besifoods
decision.3
VII. CONCLUSION
The environmental problem, which the Supreme Court tried to resolve
in Bestfoods, is not merely legal in nature. It permeates deeply rooted social
policies underlying CERCLA and the principle of limited liability.358 From
the first Superfund site, a coal tar sludge waste depository,359 to present-day
environmental catastrophes, all modem levels of economic activity have
some effect on the environment. People prefer to "struggle along on [the]
asphalt and concrete, in imitation of the short-lived transportation machines
for which those hard surfaces were designed.,, 360 The use of agricultural
chemicals has increased to over one billion tons per year since 1962, up
nearly four hundred percent. 361  Humankind has developed a mind that
separates it from the natural world.362 To complicate matters, CERCLA, a
statute designed to save the environment, is so confusing that courts stumble
over its language and struggle to interpret it correctly.
363
Bestfoods sheds light on the confusing area of CERCLA parent
corporation liability. 3M4 One open issue is that of the safe limits for a parent
in its oversight, advisory, and standard-setting role with its subsidiary.365
Perhaps intentionally, Bestfoods did not draw a clear line on that issue.
Already, a case has cited to Bestfoods questioning its ruling.366 In the future,
356. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1881.
357. George J. Weiner & Lara Bernstein Mathews, Parent Corporation and Individual
Liability under CERCLA after Bestfoods, 13 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT 456, 461
(1999).
358. See Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 461.
359. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 6 (1989).
360. HOFF, supra note 9, at 93 (emphasis added).
361. Gore, supra note 8, at xix.
362. HoFF, supra note 9, at 77.
363. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995)
(rehearing en bank granted on CERCLA action), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods,
118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
364. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
365. Id.
366. United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580 (1998).
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new court decisions, corporate practices, and new CERCLA clarifications
may resolve these still unresolved issues.367
Proponents of limited liability would argue that the theory of limited
liability through corporate ownership has proven to be beneficial to the
United States because the corporate structure insulates 68  Besfoods
demonstrates that the idea of limited liability is alive and well in terms of
CERCLA.369  Direct parent corporation liability would discourage
investment across the board.370 Limited liability encourages growth because
it allows investors to minimize their risks.7 The purchaser of one share of a
corporation is not forced to place her entire wealth at risk.372 Finally,
supporters of limited liability argue that it allows capital to flow to socially
desirable but risky ventures.
73
However, these arguments do not hold water in the environmental
context. Limited liability has protected wealthy industrialists since the late
1830s.374 It allows a parent corporation to avoid bearing the full social and
economic costs of its actions. The parent corporation is free to reap the
full benefit of the subsidiary's production at the expense of the community
which supports it without bearing the true cost of its activities. 6 Limited
liability, therefore, merely provides an incentive to use a subsidiary as a
shield. The parent can then shift the costs of environmental cleanup to377
involuntary contributors. Involuntary contributors are residents of the
community, recreational users of natural resources, and the government.3 78 It
is simply unconscionable to allow parent corporations to get rich while
taxpayers and residents bear the environmental costs for the corporation's
activities:
Economic analysis favors holding parent corporations of
responsible parties liable for the outstanding portion of any
judgement for hazardous waste clean-up costs and natural resource
367. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
368. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial .Council in Support of
Respondents at 23, Besifoods (No. 97-454).
369. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (1998).
370. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 14, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
371. Harvard Liability, supra note 5, at 988.
372. Id. at 989.
373. Id.
374. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 429-30.
375. Harvard Liability, supra note 5, at 990.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 991.
378. Id. at 992.
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damages. Application of this liability rule would internalize the
risks of setting up subsidiary corporations to perform hazardous
waste disposal activities. Therefore, corporations would have
strong incentives to exercise care when delegating and overseeing
hazardous waste disposal activities. In addition, application of the
rule would reduce the exposure of involuntary creditors to the risk
of releases of hazardous waste-a risk that they are ill-suited to
avoid or bear. Finally, the rule would reduce the enforcement costs
of cleaning up unsafe hazardous waste disposal facilities and
restoring natural resources.
37 9
In the future, the courts should use the social, economic, democratic,
and policy factors underlying CERCLA to decide when limited liability
should not apply.380 Liability for environmental harms should be placed
squarely on the shoulders of those who are in the best position to mitigate
damages and bear the costs.3s 1 Parent corporations are in this position
because they already have the oversight hierarchy in place and they can exert
strong influence over polluting subsidiaries.382 Parent corporations should
not incur liability when they unwittingly play some part in the subsidiary's
waste disposal activities,38 3 but in the interests of economic efficiency, they
should bear the costs of environmentally dangerous activities about which
they knew or should have known.
Mother Nature is the last constant in this ever shrinking world. If
CERCLA is to be the instrument of her savior, it must flourish, punishing all
those who would attempt to poison and destroy her bounty. Economics,
democracy, and recreation-these beliefs and activities exist because life
exists, and without a life-supporting ecosystem, free from chemical
pollutants, they will cease to exist.
Christian A. Guzzano
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